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ABSTRACT 
Over two decades of post reforms, the financial system of many sub-Saharan African countries 
remained underdeveloped and highly exclusive with only 34% of adults 15 years and above having 
a basic bank account. Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced robust growth, on average 
4.8% per annum over the past 15 years surprisingly with widening income inequality and sluggish 
decline in headcount poverty ratio. This unfolding evidence challenged conventional thinking about 
the role of finance on growth and welfare. However, there is a shortage of empirical evidence 
linking financial development and financial inclusion to welfare. Knowledge of this relationship is 
important to shape policy thinking on how financial reforms can help to redress poverty and income 
inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. The purpose of this study is to fill this knowledge gap by 
examining the relationship between financial development, financial inclusion and welfare 
dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis is structured into four main chapters, a descriptive 
chapter and three empirical chapters. 
The evidence from the descriptive analysis showed that financial inclusion, financial stability, 
financial integrity and consumer financial education are interrelated and under a suitable balance re-
enforces each other. It also emerges that the level of financial intermediation in sub-Saharan Africa 
is low. As a result, huge unmet demands for credit and saving facilities exist across all regions. By 
regions, the rate of formal saving and borrowing in Southern, Eastern and West African countries is 
two times higher than the rate in French West and Central African countries. Overall, the level of 
financial inclusion in French West and Central Africa is the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The results from Chapter 3 revealed that income inequality will increase at the early stages of 
financial development but the positive trend reverses to negative as the financial sector reaches a 
higher stage of development – inverted u-shape. Specifically, financial sector might lend more to 
the rich and well-connected elites at some levels of financial development especially when 
institutions are weak, but as the system develops, more people have access and resultant effects 
tickles down to the lower income earners, hence income inequality starts to reduce. Finally, income 
inequality has some links with GDP per capita – increases with lower GDP per capita and declines 
as GDP per capita grows, translating into an inverted u-shape. 
Empirical evidence from Chapter 4 suggests that financial inclusion has both positive and negative 
relationships with welfare, depending on the aspect of financial inclusion and the indicator of 
welfare used. First, account ownership, formal loan and saving have a positive relationship with 
human development index but the relationship with electronic payment is mixed. Secondly, health 
insurance and loan to pay school fees reduces headcount poverty whiles, account ownership, formal 
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loan and health insurance reduces under-five mortality rate per 1000 live birth. Finally, formal 
account use for business purposes, electronic payment and formal loan increases income inequality 
at least in the short run. These results reflect the prevailing robust growth and rising levels income 
inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Finally, evidence from Chapter 5 revealed that financial inclusion has a positive relationship with 
assets ownership. The results suggests that a one-unit change in financial inclusion (credit, monthly 
saving and insurance) can increase assets ownership by 21% at the 10th quantile of the conditional 
assets distribution for users of financial services compared to non-users holding other factors 
constant. For all the aspects of financial inclusion analysed, the magnitude of the response to a unit 
increase in financial inclusion at the 10th, 20th and 30th quantiles is higher than the response at the 
median quantile. This suggests that financial inclusion and assets building programmes can have a 
substantial effect at the bottom of the assets distribution. Hence, this evidence provides a good case 
for a progressive assets building social welfare for the poor and low-income families in South 
Africa.  
In summary, these results showed that French speaking west and Central African countries have 
lower levels of financial inclusion compared to other regions in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, 
the emerging evidence suggest that financial development increases income inequality in the group 
of African countries studied and that low GDP per capita also increase income inequality. Finally, 
evidence also revealed that financial inclusion exerts some positive influence on welfare with 
exception of income inequality and that asset building social welfare programmes can be used to 
complement the income transfer approach to poverty reduction. 
 
Key Words 
Financial development, financial inclusion, welfare, augmented mean group and quantile 
regression. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The role of the financial sector to intermediate between net savers and borrowers as well as to 
support economic activities is well documented in both the theoretical and empirical literature. Such 
evidence consistently shows that well-developed financial systems improve well-being (Beck et al., 
2007a; Levine, 2005). However, after over two decades of post financial reforms1, the financial 
sector of many sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries are yet to perform their intermediation role 
optimally. Private sector credit as a ratio to GDP in SSA trend below 25% since the 1990s and the 
number of adults 15 years and older with formal bank accounts including mobile money accounts 
increased by 10% to 34% in 2014 (Allen et al., 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2014). Notwithstanding 
this low level of financial intermediation, SSA has experience robust growth on average 4.8% per 
annum for over one and half decades with rising levels of income inequality (AfDB, 2012). This 
runs contrary to the theoretical perspective that financial development will improve efficiency of 
capital allocation, which in turn will stimulate growth and relax credit constraints for the poor, thus 
reducing income inequality (Beck et al., 2007a). Consequently, the question remains as to whether 
financial development actually leads to a reduction in income inequality and enhanced welfare, 
particularly in SSA. Just like two sides of a coin, “head” and “tail”, the financial system comprises 
financial development (depth dimension) and financial inclusion2 (access dimension). Both 
constitute the broader financial system but are distinct because a developed financial system is not 
necessarily inclusive. This takes the study to the next issue related to the access dimension of the 
financial system.  
Similarly, there is a growing consensus from the theoretical perspective, buttressed by emerging 
empirical evidence, that broader access to formal financial services enhances overall welfare and 
supports prosperity. That is, greater financial inclusion through rural bank branch expansion and 
extension of financial products lower poverty rate, increase saving and business growth (Aportela, 
1999; Bruhn and Love, 2013; Burgess and Pande, 2005). A recent study by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) research team showed that income distribution matters for growth. 
Specifically, Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) found that if the income share of the top 20% richest 
                                               
1 Some of these reforms include interest rate liberalisation, removal of ceilings on deposits and lending rates, and 
restructuring and privatisation of state-owned banks and efforts to develop the financial sector (Senbet and Otchere, 
2005).  
2 Financial inclusion is the provision of basic financial services such as bank accounts, savings, loans, micro insurance 
and other services to the poor and underserved. 
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increases by 1 percentage point, GDP growth will decline in the medium term. However, a similar 
increase in the income shares of the bottom 20% poor is associated with higher GDP growth. This 
suggests the need for greater inclusion to enhance share prosperity and improve the living standard 
of the poor.  
For poor individuals with erratic and unpredictable income, financial inclusion ensures effective 
management of their resources by providing a convenient and safe means to save. Saving helps 
build transaction history and improve credit scores, thereby opening the doors for easy access to 
credit facilities. Financial inclusion also improves the balance sheet of households through access to 
savings and investment in productivity-enhancing economic activities that support economic growth 
and raise the standard of living of the poor. The access of the missing middle3 such as SMEs to 
loans or lines of credit will enable them to invest in productive assets that in turn will increase job 
creation. Better wage offers because of business growth will lead to higher disposable income for 
employees, which can increase saving, thereby increasing deposit base of banks (see Khan, 2011 for 
details). Apart from the link with welfare, financial inclusion also relates to other aspects of the 
financial system such as financial stability, financial integrity and financial consumer protection 
(Cull et al., 2012; Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015; Han and Melecky, 2013).  
Despite these emerging links between financial inclusion and welfare and other aspects of the 
financial system, SSA is host to about 3504 million unbanked adults and this is likely the results of 
withdrawals of financial services amidst ongoing financial reforms (Culpeper, 2012: 3). If financial 
inclusion does improve well-being, then the need for inclusive financial sector development in SSA 
is critical, now more than ever given the high levels of poverty and income inequality. Based on this 
argument, the question that needs to be answered and which has not been given proper research 
attention in the literature is, if financial inclusion enhances welfare, which aspects of financial 
inclusion are instrumental in this regard?  
The first two objectives examined how financial development and financial inclusion affect welfare 
at the aggregate level. The third objective builds on the second and extends the analysis at the 
individual level. This is motivated by growing evidence from the developed economies that 
financial inclusion can be used in combination with asset accumulation to achieve targeted 
intervention at the lower end of the income pyramid. This strategy started in the 1990s in the United 
States of America, Singapore and Canada, where financial inclusion and asset accumulation are 
                                               
3 The missing middle small and medium size enterprises that are too big to be financed by microfinance and too small 
and risky for conventional commercial banks as such are underserved (Culpeper, 2012).  
4 This is when mobile account holders are considered as financial inclusion which in fact may not be the case if these 
mobile accounts are not linked to a physical account at a formal financial institution to enable the holder to save and 
build assets. The population of SSA age 15 + is about 533.1 million (0.66*533.1 = 351.8 million unbanked adults).  
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used as a strategic intervention to develop the capacity of the poor whilst assisting them to smooth 
consumption through income transfer. Proponents of this “asset building social welfare” approach 
argued that a sustainable way for the poor out of poverty is to build some level of assets because 
these assets generate further income (Sherraden, 1991; Sherraden and Boshara, 2007).  
The available evidence from this innovative approach to redress socio-economic challenges are 
promising although skewed in favour of developed countries because of the existence of an 
effective welfare system and developed financial sector. Recently, some footprints have started to 
emerge in Africa, in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Ghana (Sherraden and Boshara, 2007). Under the asset 
building social welfare programme, government provides incentives for the poor and low-income 
population to save for specific purposes such as post-secondary education, home purchase, and to 
start a small business with “match deposits”. Early evidence from Africa shows that assets building 
programmes help to reduce vulnerability and sexual harassment for orphanage children and to 
change saving behaviours amongst youth (Ssewamala and Ismayiloya, 2009; Austrian and 
Muthengi, 2014; Lee et al., 2015; Crea et al., 2013).  
Unfortunately, this issue cannot be investigated across countries due to data limitation on financial 
inclusion and asset accumulation. Consequently, this last objective focuses on South Africa to 
provide more insights into this relationship at the individual level. Several factors motivate the 
focus on South Africa. Firstly, the existence of an effective social welfare system with about 16.9 
million poor people receiving income transfers (SASSA, 2016). Secondly, a well-developed 
financial system with about 75% of adults 15 years and older with access to a basic bank account 
(FinScope, 2014). Finally, the availability of a suitable financial inclusion dataset, FinScope, with 
sufficient indicators of individual assets ownership.   
The above large number of grant recipients seems to suggest the South African government relies 
heavily on income transfer as its main intervention strategy to redress social vulnerability. With this 
rapid growth, one wonders about the sustainability of the fiscal budget and importantly the effect on 
inter-generational poverty transfer. However, if government considers capacity development whilst 
smoothing consumption for the poor, foster childcare and child grant caregivers can be incentivised 
through match deposits to save for post-secondary education for these children. Unfortunately, a 
complementary strategy to income transfer through assets building is yet to be tested in South 
Africa. Hence, the last empirical essay of this thesis will explore the relationship between financial 
inclusion and individual asset ownership in South Africa. This has implications for asset building 
social welfare programmes for the poor and low-income families. 
Generally, the conventional belief is that financial reforms will stimulate financial development and 
streamline efficiency of allocating scarce resources, leading to economic growth and improvement 
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in overall well-being. However, SSA faces slow poverty reduction and widening income inequality 
in an era of robust economic growth post financial reforms. This challenges conventional 
convictions about the role of financial sector development on growth and welfare. Thus, the three 
areas highlighted relating to these challenges will form the basis of this thesis and each is dealt with 
as a stand-alone paper to fill the knowledge gap and contribute to the empirical literature.  
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between financial development, 
financial inclusion and welfare dynamics in SSA. The study achieves this by pursuing four specific 
objectives that are stand-alone papers. The first objective is divided into two sub-parts: part 1 
explores the links between financial inclusion, financial stability, financial integrity and consumer 
financial protection and part 2 gives a descriptive analysis of the level of financial inclusion in SSA. 
The second objective re-visits the long-run relationship between financial development and income 
inequality in a balance panel of 15 selected African countries from 1985 to 2007. The third 
objective examines the relationship between financial inclusion and welfare in a cross-section of 37 
sub-Saharan Africa countries. Finally, the fourth objective explores the relationship between 
financial inclusion and individual assets ownership in South Africa. 
Objective 1: 
The aim of the first objective, presented in Chapter 2, is twofold: part one explore the links between 
financial inclusion, financial stability, financial integrity and consumer financial protection. Part 
two provide a descriptive analysis of the level of financial inclusion across regions in SSA using the 
global financial inclusion (Global Findex) dataset for 2011 and 2014. The analysis focuses on three 
dimensions of financial inclusion: account ownership, credit and savings. This sets the basis for the 
empirical analysis and highlights regions and countries that are lagging behind in terms of financial 
outreach to the adult population.  
Objective 2: 
The second objective of this study, executed in Chapter 3, focuses on the long-run relationship 
between financial development and income inequality in a panel of 15 selected African countries 
from 1985 to 2007 using an augmented mean group (AMG) estimator. The objective of this chapter 
is to determine whether or not financial development has an effect on income inequality and 
whether the effect depends on the level of financial development or the level of economic 
development. This is achieved using the Standardised World Income Inequality Dataset (SWIID) 
created by Solt (2009). The countries covered are Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa, Tunisia and 
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Uganda. Due to data limitations in SSA, three Northern African countries are included to increase 
cross-sectional (N) and time (T) dimensions in order to permit a technique that will estimate the 
relationship per country. This allows the uncovering of the heterogeneous effect of financial 
development on income inequality thereby addressing the limitations of previous studies of pooling 
the data across countries and assuming a homogeneous effect.  
Objective 3: 
The third objective, which is the focus of Chapter 4, uses a cross-section regression to examine the 
relationship between different aspects of financial inclusion and welfare in a group of 37 SSA 
countries using the disaggregated Global Findex 2011 dataset. Seven aspects of financial inclusion 
are used: ownership of an account at a formal financial institution, formal account used for business 
purposes, electronic payments, formal loan, formal loan to pay school fees, formal saving and 
health insurance. These are disaggregated into male and female as well as regional (rural and 
urban). Welfare is proxied by four indicators: human development index (HDI), poverty headcount 
ratio (less than US$1.25 a day), under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births and income inequality 
as measured by the Gini coefficient. The aim is to determine which of these aspects has the greatest 
potential to enhance welfare and which indicator(s) of welfare, if any, is affected the most by 
financial inclusion. This is essential to fill the gap in the empirical literature and to guide policy on 
which aspect of financial inclusion to encourage for more uptake and use. 
Objective 4: 
The final objective addressed in Chapter 5, uses quantile regressions to explore the relationship 
between financial inclusion and asset accumulation in South Africa using the FinScope 2014 
consumer survey. The underlying objective is to access the feasibility of asset building social 
welfare programmes for the poor and low-income families in South Africa. The FinScope dataset 
has information on several indicators of individual asset ownership as well as access and use of 
financial services from the formal and informal financial sectors. Hence, a suitable dataset to 
explore a relationship that has implications for asset building social welfare programmes to assist 
the poor build assets and find a sustainable pathway out of poverty. Three aspects of financial 
inclusion are used (credit, monthly saving and insurance) and 22 different types of individual 
physical asset indicators to derive an asset index using multiple correspondence analyses (MCA). 
The results of this chapter address empirical shortages in the field of financial inclusion and asset 
ownership in South Africa and provide key insights for social policy in South Africa.  
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1.3 LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an understanding of the 
links between financial inclusion and the other core aspects of the financial system. It also provides 
a comparative descriptive analysis of the level of financial inclusion in sub-Saharan Africa between 
2011 and 2014. The analysis focuses on three dimensions of financial inclusion: account ownership, 
credit and savings, and includes only countries that participated in the two Global Findex surveys.  
Chapter 3 presents the first empirical paper of the study on the relationship between financial 
development and income inequality in a balanced panel of 15 African countries from 1985 to 2007 
using an augmented mean group estimator. 
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between financial inclusion and welfare in 37 Sub-Saharan 
African countries using the Global Findex 2011 dataset.  
Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between financial inclusion and assets ownership at the 
individual level using the FinScope 2014 consumer survey for South Africa. 
Finally, Chapter 6 draws conclusions from the main findings, discusses policy implications and 
suggests potential areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Financial inclusion has recently gained national and international recognition among policy makers 
and in the development arena as a major driver for inclusive economic growth. As such, the G20 
leaders endorsed inclusion as one of the pillars for the global development agenda (GPFI, 2012b: 
1). Foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have supported initiatives to extend 
financial access to the underprivileged and have sponsored the Global Financial Inclusion (Global 
Findex) database at the World Bank (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a). 
Evidence from the Global Findex showed that account ownership worldwide has improved by 11%, 
from 51% in 2011 to 62% in 2014, but account penetration is skewed to the developed world. 
Account ownership in high-income OECD countries is above 90% while developing and Africa 
countries host the bulk of unbanked adults. SSA host the second largest unbanked after MENA with 
only 34% of adults with accounts (including mobile money accounts) by 2014. This represents a 
10% increase from 24% in 2011 but still leaves about 350 million adults without a basic bank 
account (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2014). 
Despite this low level of financial inclusion, detailed analysis of various aspects of financial 
inclusion across regions in SSA is lacking. Such an analysis is essential to provide insights for 
policy intervention. Furthermore, given the “vision 2020” of the World Bank to provide access to 
everyone and the increasing adoption of financial inclusion at national level (Cull et al., 2014), the 
potential linkages between financial inclusion and the other core aspects of the financial system 
need to be well understood.  
The main objective of this chapter is first to explore the potential linkages between financial 
inclusion and the other core aspects of the financial system: financial stability, financial integrity 
and consumer financial protection. Secondly, to use the Global Findex 2011 and 2014 for SSA 
countries that participated in both surveys to give a detailed comparable descriptive analysis across 
four5 main regions: Central, West, East and Southern Africa. West Africa is divided into French-
                                               
5 Central Africa (Cameroon -CMR, Chad -TCD, Congo -COG, Equatorial Guinea -EGA, Democratic Republic of 
Congo -ZAR, Gabon -GAB and Central African Republic -CAR); West Africa (Benin -BEN, Burkina Faso -BFA, Côte 
d’Ivoire -CIE, Ghana -GHA, Guinea -GIN, Liberia -LBA, Mali -MLI, Mauritania -MRT, Niger -NER, Nigeria -NGA, 
Senegal -SEN, Sierra Leone -SLE, Togo -TGO); Southern Africa (Angola -AGO, Botswana -BWA, Lesotho -LSO, 
Madagascar -MDG, Malawi -MWL, Mauritius -MUS, Namibia -NBA, South Africa -ZAF, Swaziland -SWA, Zambia -
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speaking West African (FWA) countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo) and non-French-speaking countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania and Sierra Leone). The 
analysis focuses on three indicators of financial inclusion: account penetration, credit and savings. 
This grouping is mainly for analytical purposes and has nothing to do with countries and regional 
demarcations. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the linkages between financial 
inclusion and the other three core aspects of the financial system. Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 analyse 
access to and use of financial services across countries, population segments and across regions. 
Finally, Section 2.6 draws conclusions to the chapter.  
2.2 FINANCIAL INCLUSION, FINANCIAL STABILITY, FINANCIAL CONSUMER 
PROTECTION AND FINANCIAL INTEGRITY: THEORETICAL LINKAGES 
Since the empirical evidence of Burgess and Pande (2005) linking financial inclusion with poverty, 
financial inclusion has been widely adopted and prioritised on the policy agenda for many 
developed and developing countries (Cull et al., 2014). Whilst financial inclusion is essential to 
foster inclusive growth, there are some potential challenges involved. First, the inclusion of the poor 
and underserved into the formal financial system introduces new challenges to regulators, 
particularly in Africa, with limited resources and human capital. Second, there is a need to establish 
the potential link between financial inclusion and financial stability as countries pursue the ultimate 
objective of universal financial inclusion. However, this potential link is complicated and complex 
because of the inter-link of financial inclusion with other core aspects of the financial system, 
namely financial stability, financial integrity and financial consumer protection. The lack of data to 
measure financial inclusion over time as well as the objective of financial stability, financial 
integrity and consumer protection aggravates these challenges, making it difficult to draw strong 
conclusions (Cull et al., 2012). As such, Cull et al. (2012: 1) argue that these four factors are inter-
related and under the right conditions will be positively related. Consequently, failures in one 
dimension are likely to lead to problems in the others. Therefore, there are good reasons to believe 
that the outcome level of financial inclusion, financial stability, financial integrity and financial 
consumer protection objective may be mutually re-enforcing each other and inter-dependent. 
According to the International Association for Insurance Supervision IAIS (2012: 7), financial 
inclusion contributes to financial stability and is an important element in the delivery of fair, safe 
and stable financial markets in any jurisdiction. Other studies such as Khan (2011), Han and 
                                                                                                                                                            
ZAM, Zimbabwe -ZIM,), East Africa (Burundi -BDI, Comoros -COM, Ethiopia -ETA, Kenya -KEN, Rwanda -RWD, 
Somalia -SMA, Sudan -SDN, Tanzania -TZA, Uganda -UGA). 
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Melecky (2013) and Morgan and Pontines (2014) supported the existence of these linkages. 
According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP, 2012: 11), the following 
hypothesised linkages exist at the outcome level: 
First: From financial stability to financial inclusion 
I. Financial stability builds consumer trust in the financial sector as a whole, making it more 
likely that individuals will want to be included. 
II. Financial stability can affect key factors such as interest rates and inflation that can reduce 
key prices and make financial services more affordable to the poor. 
Second: A reverse link from financial inclusion to financial stability 
 On the other hand, financial inclusion brings more people into the formal financial sector 
and engenders greater participation by different segments of the economy. This is likely to 
increase aggregate savings, ensure a more diversified, and stable deposit base of banks, 
thereby increasing systemic stability (Khan, 2011: 4; Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015: 51). 
Furthermore, diversifying the loan portfolio of lenders away from large borrowers reduces 
the chances of systemic risk. 
 A financial sector that is inclusive is more likely to have greater political legitimacy by 
enhancing social cohesion and this reduces the chances of political instability, which 
triggers financial instability. 
 Greater financial inclusion enables households to smooth consumption by adjusting their 
savings and borrowings in response to changes in interest rates and other unexpected 
economic development. Hence, a large informal sector hinders the interest rates channel of 
monetary policy because the financial decisions of financially excluded individuals and 
firms are independent and unaffected by the monetary policy action of the central bank. 
Consequently, as access to the formal financial sector increases through financial inclusion, 
it makes the interest rates channel of monetary policy more effective. This facilitates the 
task of the central bank to safeguard financial stability (Khan, 2011: 4; Mehrotra and 
Yetman, 2015: 88). 
Third: financial inclusion, financial integrity and consumer protection 
According to Chiwira et al. (2013: 147) financial integrity refers to the reputation of financial 
institutions. A financial system characterised by bank failures, fraud, money laundering and insider 
trading reduces the integrity of the financial system. A similar pair-wise linkage between financial 
inclusion, integrity and consumer protection can be hypothesised as follows. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
 
 Financial integrity is likely to engender more trust in financial institutions and the financial 
system as a whole, thus encouraging uptake and use of financial services. 
 Financial inclusion moves people from transacting in cash only to bank accounts that can be 
monitored. This helps in the implementation of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism guidelines and makes it possible to track and report suspicious 
transactions for proper investigation (Khan, 2011: 4). 
 Financial inclusion increases the ability to apply and enforce consumer protection norms, 
thereby increasing the integrity of the financial sector. 
While empirical evidence to substantiate these hypothesised theoretical linkages is still at infancy, 
there are ultimately good reasons for countries to align the objectives of financial inclusion, 
financial stability, financial integrity and consumer protection in the long run. This is because 
financial inclusion brings new consumers into the mainstream financial sector, some of whom are 
first time users with no credit record or identification documents.  
This increases risk on the part of the financial services providers and may compromise on 
compliance with the standard setting bodies’ requirements such as the “know your customer” 
requirement of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). There is therefore the potential of conflict 
between greater financial inclusion and the other core objectives of the financial system, and 
striking a balance between these objectives is a challenging task. However, the Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion (GPFI, 2012a) recommended the adoption of a proportionate approach to 
regulation and supervision. That is, regulators and supervisors need to develop a framework that 
balances the risks and benefits against the costs of financial inclusion. The ideal option will be to 
conduct a due diligence assessment of the benefits of bringing the financially excluded individuals 
and firms into the formal financial system and develop proportionate approaches that will enhance 
inclusion. Sometimes this can occur on a “test and learn” basis where new ideas are tested on a 
small number of customers to predict impact. Appropriate implementation, and tiering of regulatory 
and supervisory requirements depending on the nature of risk, scales and complexity of the 
financial product can be enforced once the trial yields favourable outcomes (GPFI, 2012a: 3).  
Nonetheless, there is also the possibility that financial inclusion can lead to financial instability with 
a devastating effect on welfare and the economy at large. This can occur when financial inclusion is 
driven by reckless credit extension and/or by rapid growth of unregulated parts of the financial 
sector. Consequently, when banks extend credit to the previously excluded and the poor without due 
consideration of their ability to pay, financial risk can result in crisis (Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015: 
91). Available evidence also tells us that before the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, about 150 
million new customers were added to the formal financial sector every year (Hannig and Jansen, 
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2010; World Bank, 2012). It is obvious that a significant number of these new customers lack basic 
understanding of the sophistication of formal financial services to make informed decisions and 
efficient use of the available services. As such, the inclusion of these new customers can be 
associated with the risk of financial instability if appropriate financial consumer protection is not in 
place to empower consumers. 
Consequently, financial consumer protection should form an integral part of financial inclusion to 
ensure that providers of financial services do not use their informational advantage to increase 
profits and lure vulnerable customers into over-indebtedness. A well-designed regulatory 
framework and institutional structure is a prerequisite to ensure timely discourse of financial 
information during and after the customer has acquired the product (Hannig and Jansen, 2010). 
Therefore, active policies are required to support this broad-based financial inclusion agenda (see 
World Bank, 2014a for detailed review). Table 2.1 presents a list of African countries that have 
some consumer financial education strategy in place following the World Bank 2013 survey.  
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Table 2.1: Consumer financial education and banking crises 
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Benin* No No No No No No 1988 
Botswana Yes No No No Yes Yes None 
Burkina Faso* No No No No No No 1990 
Burundi* No No No No No No 1994 
Cape Verde  Yes No Yes No No Yes 1993 
Congo, Dem. Rep.* Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 1983,1991,1994 
Côte d’Ivoire * No No No No No No 1988 
Guinea-Bissau* No No No No No No 1995 
Kenya  No Yes No Yes Yes No 1985,1992 
Madagascar* No No No No No No 1988 
Malawi  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes None 
Mali* No No No No No No 1984 
Mauritius* Yes No No Yes No No None 
Namibia  No No No No No No None 
Niger* No No No No No No 1983 
Nigeria  Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 1991, 2009 
Senegal* No No No No No No 1988 
South Africa  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes None 
Sudan  No No No No No No None 
Swaziland  Yes No No Yes Yes No 1995 
Tanzania  Yes No No No No No 1987 
Togo* No No No No No No 1993 
Uganda  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1994 
Zambia  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 1995 
 
Source: World Bank 2013 Financial Literacy Survey and Laeven and Valencia (2013)  
* Indicates French-speaking countries 
Table 2.1 summarises six basic aspects of financial education that countries should have in place in 
order to enhance and increase individual understanding and usage of financial services. An 
interesting observation from Table 2.1 is that all the countries have participated in either one or both 
of the Global Findex 2011 and 2014 surveys. Apart from Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Mauritius, the rest of the French-speaking countries have no structures in place to support consumer 
protection and empowerment relative to their non-French-speaking counterparts. Furthermore, all 
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French-speaking countries have experienced at least one banking crisis, even though some non-
French-speaking countries also experienced banking crises. Hence, the 1980s and late 1990s was a 
difficult period for many African countries (see Laeven and Valencia, 2013). That is, many 
countries (except for Mauritius) went through either a banking or financial crisis and because of this 
bad experience, public trust in the banking sector dwindled, possibly causing some not to use 
formal financial services. Based on the theoretical linkages discussed in Section 2.2, the risk to 
financial stability and consumer exploitation might be higher in French-speaking African countries 
than non-French-speaking due to lack of institutional structures to protect consumers. Principle 5 of 
the G20 High Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection states explicitly that all 
stakeholders should promote financial education and awareness. Furthermore, clear information on 
consumer protection, rights to recourse and responsibilities for using financial services should be 
easily accessible to consumers (World Bank, 2014a: 29). This implies that countries with none of 
the six institutional structures to support consumer financial education in operation have failed 
Principle 5 of the G20 High Level Principles on Financial Consumer Production. Therefore, the 
lack of effective financial education strategy suggests consumers will not fully benefit from the 
opportunities offered by modern financial systems and the level of financial inclusion will be low as 
observed in French West and Central African countries. 
2.3 ACCESS TO FORMAL SERVICES – ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP 
Although some progress has been made to improve access for the unbanked in SSA about 64% of 
adults, representing 350 million adults are still without basic financial products such as a transaction 
account. Figure 2.1 illustrates account penetration across five regions in SSA between 2011 and 
2014. 
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Figure 2.1: Account ownership by regions 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using Global Findex 2011 & 2014 
In order to understand the pattern of account ownership across regions, French-speaking West 
African countries are separated from non-French-speaking. Figure 2.1 captures this information and 
shows that account ownership is highest in Southern Africa, with 36% and 37.6% respectively in 
2011 and 2014 relative to any other region. French West and Central African countries have the 
lowest level of financial inclusion in SSA, and this is obvious from lack of institutional structures to 
support, empower and enhance consumers’ understanding. At country level, account penetration 
varies significantly and countries with the lowest level of financial inclusion are mostly from 
French-speaking African countries. Figure 2.2 depicts this information. 
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Figure 2.2: Accounts at formal financial institutions in SSA 
 
 Source: Global Findex, 2014 
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With the exception of Mauritius and Rwanda, with average account ownership of 82% and 35.5% 
between 2011 and 2014 respectively, the rest of the French-speaking countries (Benin, Niger, 
Cameroon, Chad, Togo, Guinea, Mali, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Congo Republic, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Senegal and Burundi) have a very low level of financial inclusion. However, 
some non-French-speaking African countries, such as Sierra Leone, Malawi, Sudan, Mauritania, 
Tanzania and Uganda, have low levels of financial inclusion but they perform relatively better than 
the French-speaking countries.  
Furthermore, when account ownership is analysed per country across regions, countries in Central 
Africa show evidence of gender discrimination in access to formal financial services compared to 
other regions. Figure 2.3 shows some evidence of gender discrimination with some degree of 
severity observed in Chad. Apart from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), none of these 
Central African countries have financial consumer protection structures in operation and all the 
countries have experienced a banking crisis between the 1980s and 2000s (see Table 2.1 column 8). 
This raises the issue of consumer trust in the banking sector and is a likely reason for the low level 
of financial inclusion in Central Africa. 
Figure 2.3: Account ownership in Central Africa 
 
Source: Global Findex, 2014. 
For West Africa, there is some emerging evidence of gender discrimination observed in Benin, 
Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Figure 2.4 depicts this information. 
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Figure 2.4: Account ownership in West Africa 
 
Source: Global Findex, 2014 
Among the few countries that showed evidence of gender discrimination, the severity of 
discrimination is highest in Nigeria with a gender gap of about 20.7%. Mauritania and Sierra Leone 
showed a gap in 2011 however, the gap narrowed by 2014. Meanwhile, in the Southern African 
region, access to account ownership seems to be equitable with exceptions in Angola, Botswana, 
Malawi and to a lesser degree Mauritius (see Figure 2.5).  
Figure 2.5: Account ownership in Southern Africa 
 
Source: Global Findex, 2014 
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Finally, gender access to formal accounts in East Africa also suggest that Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan 
and Uganda discriminate in terms of account ownership, however, the extent of discrimination is 
less in Kenya than in other countries in the region. Overall, the evidence on accounts in SSA 
suggests some gender gap in access in Rwanda (15%), Sudan (10%), Uganda (10%), Botswana 
(11%) and Nigeria (20.7%) by 2014. The gender gap in countries in Central Africa is less than 10% 
in most cases.  
Figure 2.6: Account ownership in East Africa 
 
Source: Global Findex, 2014 
After analysing account ownership by gender, we turn to the account ownership by the 40% 
poorest, young adults, those with primary or less education and rural dwellers. This can be termed 
the disadvantaged group, as they constitute the vulnerable segment of the population that the 
traditional formal banking sector considers risky to do business. Figure 2.7 depicts account 
ownership across regions disaggregated by population segments. The evidence illustrates that 
account penetration by this segment is on average higher in Southern Africa (SA), followed by East 
Africa (EA) and West Africa (WA), whereas French-speaking West Africa (FWA) and French 
Central Africa (CA) have the least inclusive financial sector. An interesting observation from Figure 
2.7 is the steady increase into the formal financial system in Southern, East and West Africa and to 
some degree in Central Africa of the 40% poorest, those with primary or less education, young 
adults and rural dwellers. According to Kelly and Rhyne (2013: 4-6), rising real incomes among the 
poor is moving millions of poor out of poverty, and if this claim is true it will create new demands 
for formal financial services. However, this will depend on the ability of financial service providers 
to design financial products that will meet the specific needs of the newcomers. Kelly and Rhyne 
(2013) envisage a transition from the usage of informal to formal financial services because of 
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income growth from less than US$1 a day to more than US$2 a day and this creates a new income 
class. Literature refers to this group as the vulnerable middle class6 because they are not quite poor 
but not quite rich enough to be classified as middle class according to OECD standards. However, 
with continuous rising real income, the vulnerable middle class will transition permanently into the 
middle class. Although it represents an opportunity to expand financial services, it also poses 
challenges for regulators. 
The task will be to ensure responsible financial inclusion where credit extension takes into 
consideration the ability of individuals to pay as well as the establishment of empowerment 
programmes such as consumer education and dispute resolution mechanisms. Figure 2.7 suggests 
that account ownership by the 40% poorest, primary or less education, rural dwellers and young 
adults 15-24 years is highest in Southern Africa, followed by East and West Africa, while Central 
Africa and French West Africa come last. Consequently, as the formal financial sector increases 
access to this segment, infrastructure should equally follow suit to ensure newcomers are protected 
from abusive and aggressive practices of some service providers.  
Figure 2.7: Account ownership: 40% poorest and underserved 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using Global Findex 2011 & 2014 
                                               
6 The vulnerable middle income group are not wealthy enough to be out of the danger of falling below the poverty line 
but have incomes that is barely above subsistence levels (Kelly and Rhyne, 2013: 7). 
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2.4 USAGE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES – CREDIT 
A key aspect of financial inclusion is the ability of account holders to use their accounts to save, 
borrow, receive remittances and make payments. The Global Findex 2014 added further questions 
to gauge the proportion of adults around the world that have initiated a new loan in the past 12 
months. Figure 2.8 depicts the responses for all the SSA countries that participated in the survey. 
During 2014, on average about 55% of adults 15 years and above borrowed money in the past 12 
months, of which about 41% borrowed from friends and family while only 6% borrowed formally. 
Across the various population segments, there is a growing demand for financial services in SSA 
and on average about 50% of the bottom 40% poorest, young adults aged 15 to 24, those with 
primary or less education and rural dwellers have initiated a loan in the past 12 months. The 
proportion of these demands met by the formal financial sector is under 6% across these market 
segments. Hence, restricted access to formal financial institutions such as commercial banks has 
made borrowing from friends and family an important source to many individuals in SSA.  
Figure 2.8: Borrowing by market segments in SSA in 2014 
 
Source: Global Findex 2014 
Within SSA, significant variation exists between regions on the proportion of adults with access to 
formal credit. Access to formal credit for individuals across the regions increased marginally 
between 2011 and 2014. For example, the proportion of adults with formal credit in Southern, East 
and West Africa between 2011 and 2014 is below 8%, whereas in French West and Central Africa 
the figure is below 4% for the same period. This suggests evidence of underdeveloped financial 
systems in the French-speaking West and Central African countries if one measures financial 
development using credit extension. Further, linking access to formal credit with financial consumer 
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protection shows that French West and Central African countries have about two times less access 
to formal credit than other regions (see Figure 2.9). 
Figure 2.9: Usage of formal credit across SSA regions: 2011 and 2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using Global Findex 2011 & 2014 
Furthermore, access to formal credit is disaggregated into the 40% poorest and the previously 
disadvantaged – young adults aged 15 to 24, less than primary education and rural dwellers. Figure 
2.10 displaced this information and showed clearly that great variations exist across regions in 
terms of improving access to formal credit between 2011 and 2014 to the 40% poorest and 
underserved. Southern, East and West Africa have experienced some improvement in credit access 
across the population segment relative to French-speaking West and Central Africa. The improved 
access to credit for rural dwellers in Southern and East Africa is due certainly to innovation and the 
success of technological advancement in financial service delivery such as mobile money in these 
regions. Furthermore, of importance is the continuous improvement in access to formal credit for 
young adults that reflects financial sector response to life cycle events and demographic transition. 
For example, some of the young adults may be borrowing to pursue further studies, others are 
graduates seeking to establish small enterprises as well as to acquire assets and start living. As 
noted earlier, sustainable financial inclusion requires that the necessary financial infrastructure be in 
place to support healthy financial intermediation. However, this is a big challenge for SSA as the 
Africa Development Bank (AfDB, 2010: 7) estimates the gap in financing infrastructure in Africa to 
be about US$93 billion per year over a decade depending on the size of GDP growth. 
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Figure 2.10: Usage of formal credit: 40% poorest and underserved in SSA regions 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using Global Findex 2011 & 2014 
2.5 USAGE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES – SAVINGS 
Although poverty and inequality of income is persistent in SSA, the proportion of adults who 
reported saving some money in the past 12 months is high. According to Global Findex (2014), 
SSA is the second after East Asia and Pacific and high-income OECD countries in terms of saving 
rates. Between 2011 and 2014, the proportion of people aged 15 plus who reported saving money in 
SSA increased from 40% to 60%. However, formal saving increased by 2% from 14% in 2011 to 
16% in 2014. Furthermore, across the population segment, the 40% poorest, young adults, rural 
dwellers and those with primary or less education exhibited a positive saving rate between 2011 and 
2014. This difference in reported saving rate and those who actually saved formally suggests huge 
unmet demands for saving facilities in SSA, indicating massive opportunities for financial services 
expansion (see Figure 2.11). The proportion of adults who save formally in SSA on average 
increased in 2014 across the market segment although informal saving clubs also showed a positive 
trend across all the market segments. However, the picture looks different at country level and 
regions within SSA, as discussed in Figures 2.9 and 2.10. Next, we examine the pattern of saving 
across regions.  
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Figure 2.11: Formal and informal saving by market segment in SSA 
  
Source: Global Findex 2014 
Figure 2.12 again shows that saving across the regions has increased steadily from an average of 
about 32% in 2011 to about 54% in 2014 across the regions. The proportion of adults who reported 
saving some money in the past 12 months increased about 23% across all regions by 2014. 
Surprisingly, only small fractions of these savings are intermediated through the formal financial 
sector in these regions (see Figure 2.13).  
Figure 2.12: Save money in the past 12 months by regions in SSA 
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Following from Figure 2.12, we also analysed the proportion of saving that was intermediated 
through the formal financial sector across the regions. Thus, Figures 2.12 and 2.13 connect with 
Figure 2.9 to gauge the level of financial sector efficiency to mobilise resources and channel them 
into productive activities. Southern, West and East African countries performed relatively well 
compared to French-speaking West and Central Africa in this regard. Overall, the level of financial 
intermediation in SSA is low as a huge amount of under-utilised resources lie idle somewhere in the 
informal sector: banks should mobilise and channel this into productive activities to support 
economic growth (Figure 2.12). It is evident from Figure 2.13 that on average less than half of the 
adults who reported saving money in the past 12 months across the regions save formally. This 
gives a strong signal of high usage of informal saving mechanisms probably because of lack of trust 
in the banking sector resulting from banking crises, particularly in French West and Central Africa. 
The patterns of saving across regions in SSA can further be disaggregated by market segments. 
Figure 2.14 depicts this information.  
Figure 2.13: Formal saving across SSA by region 
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Figure 2.14: Save in the past 12 months: 40% poorest and underserved across SSA regions 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using Global Findex 2011 & 2014 
Furthermore, by zooming on the 40% poorest and the underserved across all regions, a positive 
trend emerges between 2011 and 2014 (Figure 2.14). Savings by rural dwellers are relatively higher 
than the 40% poorest across all the regions but almost similar to those with primary or less 
education. This may be due to limited access to formal credit facilities in the rural areas, prompting 
people to build buffers against unexpected shocks. Also interesting is the rising proportion of young 
adults saving across all regions, reflecting a demographic shift and increased demand for saving 
facilities to manage lifecycle events. This group represents a strategic target market for financial 
services: however, evidence suggests greater proportions of their demands are unsatisfied by the 
formal financial sector in SSA (Figure 2.15). Furthermore, the 40% poorest can be divided into 20% 
poorest and the second quartile of 20% poorest which is referred to as the vulnerable middle class 
(Kelly and Rhyne, 2013). Understanding the need of these groups can enable more uptake and 
usage of formal financial services. Figure 2.15 depicts the fraction of adults who save formally 
across all regions and by this market segment within each region. 
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Figure 2.15: Formal saving-40 percentage poorest and underserved across SSA regions 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using Global Findex 2011 & 2014 
Figure 2.15 suggests that a significant fraction of the 40% poorest and underserved who reported 
saving money in the past 12 months, save outside the formal financial sector, usually using informal 
mechanisms. That is, from the high reported saving rate (Figure 2.14), just between 10 to 12% is 
saved formally in Southern, West and East African countries. Meanwhile, in French-speaking West 
and Central Africa, formal saving is between 1.9% to 5%. The increased integration of the 40% 
poorest and underserved may reflect the outcome of a successful technological innovation in the 
delivery of financial services: mobile money accounts, kiosk and agent banking through 
supermarkets outlets in Southern Africa. 
Figures 2.14 and 2.15 suggest that majority of individuals in SSA rely on the informal financial 
sector to satisfy their saving demands. This not only reduces the ability of individuals to build 
assets, manage their risk and plan for their future but also impinges negatively on the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. Informality makes the use of the interest rate as an instrument of monetary 
policy under a flexible exchange rate system difficult because more money circulates as cash 
outside the banking system. Efforts to regulate the economy using expansionary and contractionary 
monetary policy may become increasingly ineffective. For example, an increase in interest rates to 
cool down the economy will not deter informal borrowers from borrowing, and a reduction in 
interest rates to stimulate the economy will not encourage informal lenders to lower lending rates, 
because informality operates outside the regulatory environment. 
This patterns and trends represent the diverse nature of economies in SSA. Access to the formal 
financial sector seems to be more restricted in French-speaking West and Central Africa than in 
other regions, suggesting financial sector underdevelopment. Nigeria, the most populous country in 
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West Africa, alone contributes about 28% of the unbanked population in SSA. That is, only 44.2% 
of the over 96.6 million adults 15 years and above reported having an account at a formal financial 
institution, implying that about 54 million adults are unbanked (Global Findex, 2014). This 
represents a huge market for the expansion of financial services.  
Barriers to the use of formal financial services also vary across the region. According to Kempson 
and Whyley (1999), people can be excluded from the formal financial sector because of the places 
they live, cost and suitability of financial products, lack of knowledge and marketing of financial 
services. Within SSA, great variation exists in terms of the structure of the economies, level of 
financial sector development and geographical access to financial services. We analysed five major 
barriers to financial access to understand their variation across regions in SSA as of 2014. Figure 
2.16 depicts this information and shows that religion is not a major barrier to formal financial 
access in Southern and East Africa. However, religion seems to be a barrier in French West Africa, 
Central and West Africa as the proportion of people who report religion as a barrier ranged from 
7.3% in West Africa to 8.2% and 9.5% in French West and Central Africa respectively. 
Furthermore, the proportion of people who report lack of trust as a barrier to access financial 
institutions ranged from 10.1%, 12.4% to 17% in West Africa, French West and Central Africa 
respectively. This is higher than 7% and 8.1% in Southern and East Africa. This suggests that using 
banking agents as a model for financial inclusion in French West and Central Africa may be 
challenging unless financial institutions invest in training suitable qualified agents from their 
communities to instil public trust in the banking sector. 
Figure 2.16: Barriers to financial inclusion across regions in SSA – 2014 
 
Source: World Bank, 2016  
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Furthermore, high documentation requirements, costs and distance from home to financial services 
outlets are major barriers across all the regions. This is likely aggravated by the rural nature of 
countries in SSA, with more than 62% of the total population in SSA living in rural areas (World 
Bank 2014b). In addition, rural areas are deficient in infrastructure, particularly concerning access 
to electricity. A report by Tanguy (2010: 34) showed that the rate of rural electrification in SSA is 
only 40%, suggesting that about 226 million Africans living in rural areas have no access to 
electricity. This skews access to financial outlets such as bank branches and automatic teller 
machines (ATMs) which are concentrated in urban areas and thus increases the usage of informal 
financial mechanisms by rural dwellers as shown in Figure 2.11. 
The mode through which individuals across the regions in SSA get access to their funds varies 
depending on availability of financial outlets and the level of financial sector development. People 
can access their accounts at the nearest bank branches, agents, mobile account, ATMs or 
supermarket retail outlets. In Central Africa, withdrawal rates at ATMs are low: about 6% in 
Cameroon and Congo in 2011 and 37% in Gabon in 2014. Other modes such as agents, retail stores 
and mobile accounts are rarely used. Withdrawals at bank branches with the help of a teller 
dominate, ranging from 50% with a maximum of 81% in Cameroon in 2011. For West Africa, cash 
withdrawals at ATMs are gradually rising. Nonetheless, Benin has the lowest rate (0.8%) followed 
by Togo with less than 10%, whereas Nigeria is the leading country in West Africa with about 71% 
ATM withdrawal rates. Withdrawals using mobile accounts are growing faster than agents and 
retail stores. Ghana and Mali have above 10% mobile account withdrawal rates, and other countries 
in the region have less than 10%. Meanwhile, getting cash from tellers at bank branches in West 
Africa is high and ranged from 21% in Nigeria in 2011 to 92% in Benin in 2014 (Global Findex, 
2014). 
Southern and East Africa have the highest ATM withdrawal rates: above 38%, the only exception is 
Rwanda, where ATM withdrawal rates are 2.5%. The proportion of people who get cash from 
tellers at bank branches in Southern and East Africa is lower than in Central and West Africa. 
However, Rwanda has above 80% withdrawal rate at bank branches with the help of a teller. 
Malawi follows with above 50%, and in Angola, the proportion increased from 38% in 2011 to 60% 
in 2014. Finally, few people get cash from their accounts using agents and retail stores with the 
exception of Kenya and Rwanda where 8% and 13% get cash through agents. Compared to Central 
and West Africa, mobile account withdrawal rates are high in Southern and East Africa, with 
countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda reporting 20% to 58% 
mobile account withdrawal rates. Countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Rwanda report rates 
of above 10% (Global Findex, 2014). Hence, modes of access to funds correlate with the level of 
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financial development proxied by availability of ATMs, retail outlets and mobile money accounts. 
Using this as a guide, regions can be ranked according to financial sector development as follows: 
Southern Africa followed by East, West and Central Africa. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The main objectives of this chapter were firstly to demonstrate the linkages between financial 
inclusion and the other core aspects of the financial system – financial stability, financial integrity 
and financial consumer protection. Secondly, to give a detailed comparative descriptive analysis of 
three aspects of financial inclusion across five regions in sub-Saharan Africa, namely Southern, 
East, French-speaking West, West and Central African regions.  
First, emerging evidence suggests that financial inclusion, financial stability, financial integrity and 
financial consumer protection are interrelated. This implies that attempts to boost one aspect 
automatically lead to the strengthening of the others. For example, financial inclusion brings more 
people into the mainstream financial sector, which increases aggregate savings and diversifies the 
deposits base and loan portfolios of banks. Similarly, financial integrity builds public confidence 
and trust in the financial sector, encouraging more financial inclusion and increasing the resilience 
of the financial sector. Finally, when consumers are empowered through financial consumer 
education, it helps shape attitudes and behaviour towards wise financial decisions leading to 
household stability. Stability at the household level, in turn, enhances the overall stability of the 
financial sector, building confidence and trust that can encourage many people to use financial 
services.  
Secondly, the descriptive analysis showed that the overall level of financial intermediation in SSA 
is low and this can be ascribed to lack of competition among banks and infrastructure deficiency to 
assist banks to price risk appropriately. Other factors, such as the bad experience of the banking and 
financial crises in 1980s to 2000s, may have eroded public trust in the banking sector. However, 
evidence from the descriptive analysis showed that huge unmet demands for credit and savings 
facilities exist across all regions in SSA. On average, about 54.5% of adults 15 years and above had 
initiated a loan in SSA by 2014 but only 6% borrowed from the formal sector. Across the regions, 
the rate of formal saving and borrowing in Southern, East and non-French-speaking West African 
(Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Mauritania) countries is twice as high as the rate in French-
speaking West and Central African countries. It also emerges that most French-speaking African 
countries do not have institutional structures in place to support and empower consumers. Thus, 
correlating this with the low level of financial inclusion in French-speaking countries confirms the 
linkage discussed Section 2.2  
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A strong message emerging from this chapter is that to support financial inclusion, countries and 
regions should invest in building institutional structures to support consumer empowerment. For the 
French-speaking West and Central African countries, which lag behind other regions, this should be 
prioritised to enhance the efficacy of the overall financial system.  
This chapter has provided a descriptive analysis of the level of financial inclusion across all the 
regions in SSA to gauge the level of financial sector development, and serves to set the scene for 
the empirical chapters. Chapter 3 extends the analysis by examining how financial development as 
measured by the depth dimension of the financial system relates to welfare in selected countries in 
Africa, using the Augmented Mean Group developed by Eberhardt and Teal (2010) and Eberhardt 
(2012) that account for country-specific slope parameters to achieve this objective.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN AFRICA: A 
PANEL HETEROGENEOUS APPROACH7 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Researchers such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) argue that the operation of the financial 
system has a direct influence on the distribution of economic opportunities among individuals and 
firms. This implies that the financial system can directly influence the decisions of individuals to 
engage in economic activities and human capital accumulation. In so doing, the financial system 
influences the gap between the rich and the poor and the degree of persistence across generations. 
The descriptive analysis in Chapter 2 showed that the level of financial inclusion varies across all 
regions in SSA, with French-speaking West and Central African countries having the lowest level 
of inclusion. This is an indication of the unequal spread of economic opportunities with a possible 
negative consequence on well-being.  
This chapter expatiates on the role of the financial sector development in influencing aggregate 
welfare (income inequality) across selected number of countries in Africa. Three tested empirical 
relationships between finance and income inequality exist: Kuznets’ (1955) inverted u-shaped 
relationship between GDP per capita and income inequality, Greenwood and Jovanovic’s (1990) 
inverted u-shaped relationship between finance and income inequality, and Galor and Zeira’s 
(1993) and Banerjee and Newman’s (1993) negative linear relationship between financial 
development and income inequality. This relationship has recently attracted the attention of scholars 
and policy makers because of the negative effects of growing income inequality such as the erosion 
of democratic governance, inequality in political representation and increased civil unrest. 
Widening income inequality can also lead to a multiplier effect of other forms of inequalities such 
as between men and women (Kumar, 2014; Fuentes-Nieva and Galasso, 2014: 3).  
However, empirical studies in this area remain scant despite the growing interest, and the few 
available studies are mostly from developed economies (Li et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2004, 2007a; 
Clarke et al., 2006, 2013; Law and Tan, 2009). Findings from these studies suggest that financial 
development reduces income inequality. From the African continent, this relationship has been 
constrained by data limitation, and so far only two peer-reviewed papers and a working paper have 
attempted this relationship (Batuo et al., 2010; Kai and Hamori, 2009; Asongu, 2013). The 
                                               
7 This paper has been published as a working paper by ERSA and is under review with the Journal of Emerging Market 
Finance.  
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empirical methodology employed by most of these studies are fixed effects (FE) and random effects 
(RE), generalised method of moment (GMM) and instrumental variable (IV) (Batuo et al., 2010; 
Kai and Hamori, 209; Clarke et al., 2006, 2013). Recently, scholars have criticised the use of these 
techniques, arguing that when the time (T) and cross-sectional (N) dimensions are large, standard 
micro-econometrics techniques FE, RE, IV and GMM may yield bias and inconsistent estimates 
due to the potential of parameter heterogeneity across countries and serial correlation in the 
regressors (Baltagi, 2008; Pesaran et al., 1999). Furthermore, the process of arbitrary averaging of 
the data over fixed periods without due consideration of the length of business cycle is unlikely to 
eliminate business cycle effects since the length of business cycle phases fluctuates and varies 
across countries. This process may instead induce simultaneity and the estimated parameters can 
easily change signs and magnitude from the underlying parameter and hence differ significantly 
(Ericsson et al., 2001: 245; Wan et al., 2006: 656). 
This chapter addresses these empirical challenges by employing the augmented mean group (AMG) 
estimator developed by Eberhardt and Teal (2010) and Eberhardt (2012) to re-examine this 
relationship in Africa. Specifically, this chapter revisits the long-run relationship between financial 
development and income inequality in a balanced panel of 15 selected African countries8 from 
1985-2007. We examine whether financial development has an effect on income inequality and 
whether this effect depends on the level of financial development or the level of economic 
development. The AMG is a suitable technique for large T and N macro-panel data, accounts for 
country-specific slope coefficients and is robust to the presence of cross-sectional dependence 
(Eberhardt, 2012). Thus, Chapter 3 contributes to the body of knowledge from an empirical 
perspective.  
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature and Section 3 provides stylised facts about Africa. Section 4 describes the data and 
Section 5 specifies the econometric modelling. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 draws 
conclusions. 
3.2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
3.2.1  Theoretical review 
Economic theories have different predictions on how financial development can affect income 
inequality. For example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) predicted that the relationship between 
financial development and income inequality is an inverted u-shape. They developed a model of 
                                               
8 Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Tunisia and Uganda. 
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economic growth, financial development and income distribution in which financial intermediaries 
develop to facilitate trade. Trading through financial intermediaries allows both higher and safer 
returns because intermediaries can pool risk across large numbers of individuals. However, there is 
a cost associated with investing through intermediaries and these costs are higher at the early stages 
of economic development because financial intermediaries are at the infancy stage. These high costs 
constrain investing by the poor through financial intermediaries, only the rich can afford to invest 
through financial intermediaries at the early stage of development. Hence, during this early stage of 
economic development, financial intermediaries are virtually non-existent and the growth rate of the 
economy is slow. As the economy approaches an intermediate phase of economic growth, financial 
intermediaries begin to develop. At this stage, economic growth and the saving rate in the economy 
both increase and income inequality between the rich and the poor widens, given that the poor have 
lower capacity to save and therefore amass wealth at a slower pace. As the economy passes through 
the early to intermediate stages of economic development, demand for financial services from the 
real sector grows. The financial sector develop in response to these demands improve efficiency and 
reduce transaction costs as many people gain access, thus income inequality will start to decline. In 
the advanced stage of development, financial intermediaries become even more efficient and cost-
effective as well as providing greater access to many people. This translates into an inverted U-
shape relationship, with income inequality rising at the early stage of financial development and 
falling at the advanced stage of financial development.  
The second theory is based on financial market imperfections. Galor and Zeira (1993) developed a 
two-sector model where income distribution is linked to inheritance between generations and 
investment in human capital accumulation is indivisible. In the first stage, individuals can decide to 
invest in human capital and acquire skills or work as unskilled workers. In the second stage, 
individuals work as skilled or unskilled labourers depending on their level of education, spend their 
earnings and leave inheritances. In the model, individual inheritance determines whether an 
individual invests in human capital to become skilled or to remain an unskilled worker. 
Furthermore, individuals who inherit small bequests can borrow to finance human capital 
accumulation. Lenders of capital require collateral and borrowing incurs monitoring, supervision 
and enforcement costs. Consequently, those who inherit sufficient bequests can finance their human 
capital accumulation without borrowing but those who inherit small bequests need to borrow. 
Because of financial market imperfections, the poor underinvest in human capital accumulation and 
end up being unskilled and leaving no inheritances. Banerjee and Newman (1993) developed a 
model of occupational choice that focused directly on the interplay between the patterns of 
occupational choices in the process of economic development. In the model, agents receive their 
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initial wealth at maturity in the form of an inheritance from their parents and they may apply for a 
loan when economically active, but borrowing requires collateral, because contract enforcement is 
imperfect and agents can renege on their loan contracts. Because of these capital market 
imperfections, credit is rationed and people can borrow only limited amounts. Hence, occupational 
choices that require high initial capital are out of reach for the poor. As such, the poor instead opt to 
work for wealthier employers as wage earners, thus substituting financial contracts for wage 
contracts. This breaks down into a situation where the patterns of occupational choices are 
determined by initial wealth distribution and the structure of the occupational choices in turn 
determines how much people save and the type of risk they bear. These two theories suggest that 
when financial markets are perfect the society will achieve social efficiency. That is, brilliant 
children from poor family backgrounds and poor entrepreneurs with potential to succeed will gain 
access to capital regardless of their initial inheritance. This translates into a negative linear 
relationship between financial development and income inequality. However, in the presence of 
persistent financial market imperfections, schooling and entrepreneurship will be linked to initial 
inheritance, dynasty connections and networks. Thus, financial development will lead to Clarke et 
al. (2006) inequality-widening hypothesis of financial development.  
Kuznets (1955) also suggests that income inequality is related to the sectoral structure of an 
economy and predicts an inverted u-shape relationship between income inequality and economic 
development. Kuznets (1955) argues that the per capita income in the rural agricultural sector is 
lower than that in the urban and industrial sectors and that this difference in income causes people 
to move from rural to urban and industrial sectors. Kuznets (1955) predicts that income inequality 
will be higher during the transitional phase of an economy from agricultural to pre-industrialisation. 
However, as the early phase of industrialisation elapses, several forces converge to enhance the 
economic situation of new migrants within the urban population. Thus, after a while a new 
generation will be born in the cities and will be able to adapt to city life, gain skills through quality 
education and hence stand a better chance to secure a high-paying job. This translates into an 
inverted u-shape relationship between income inequality and economic development. Income 
inequality will rise at the transition phase and decline at the stage of full industrialisation. 
In summary, each theory predicts a completely different mechanism through which financial 
development relates to income inequality. This study will test these predictions to ascertain which 
one applies in the context of Africa. 
3.2.2 Empirical literature 
Empirical studies on the finance-inequality relationship started only when the Deininger and 
Squire’s (1996) dataset on income inequality was made available. Even with the availability of 
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income inequality datasets, empirical evidence remains scant with developed economies dominating 
available studies. Empirical evidence from Africa is almost non-existent, with only two peer-
reviewed papers and a working paper being the known available studies (Kai and Hamori, 2009; 
Batuo et al., 2010 and Asongu, 2013). One can generally group the studies into two categories 
based on the econometric methods used. The first group employs panel data techniques in a cross-
country analysis (see for instance, Li et al., 1998; Beck et al. 2004 and 2007a; Clarke et al., 2006 
and 2013; Rehman et al., 2008; Kappel, 2010). The second group of studies used country-specific 
time series methods (e.g. Law and Tan, 2009; Law et al., 2014) 
One of that earliest studies, Li et al. (1998) examined the Kuznets hypothesis, looking at the 
international and intertemporal variation in inequality in 49 developed and developing countries 
from 1947-1994 using analysis of variance (ANOVA), least square dummy variable (LSDV) and 
random effect (RE). They found income inequality to be stable, while income was rising for the 
period under study, thus rejecting the Kuznets hypothesis. Their results further suggest that the 
determinants of income inequality vary only slowly within countries but are significantly different 
across countries. 
Focusing on the finance-inequality relationship, Beck et al. (2004 and 2007a) found that income 
inequality declines faster in countries with a well-developed financial system. Their results further 
suggest that well-developed financial systems induce the incomes of the poor to grow faster than 
the average per capita GDP growth, which lowers income inequality. 
In a similarly related cross-country study Clarke et al. (2006 and 2013) investigated the relationship 
between finance and income inequality in 83 countries from 1960 to 1995 and recently (in their 
2013 study) expanded the countries to 91 while maintaining the same period. They employed 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and GMM in both analyses and in the earlier study, empirical evidence 
strongly supports the negative linear hypothesis with some weak support for the Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) hypothesis. Similar support for the negative linear hypothesis were found in the 
recent study but no support was found for Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) while there was some 
modest support for the augmented Kuznets hypothesis. 
Rehman et al. (2008) analysed data for 51 countries at different stages of economic growth to 
understand the factors driving income inequality among these groups of countries and split the data 
into four different income groups to test the Kuznets hypothesis. They found government spending, 
the literacy rate and trade openness to be the main factors driving income inequality in low, lower-
middle, middle and upper income countries. Their results showed that financial development 
reduces income inequality regardless of the stages of economic development. They also found 
support for the Kuznets inverted u-shape hypothesis. However, Kappel (2010) found that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
 
government spending reduces income inequality in high income but not in low-income countries. 
Evidence from regression analysis showed that inequality and poverty are not only reduced through 
better loan markets but also through well-developed stock markets. The results also identified ethnic 
diversity and land distribution as key factors driving income inequality. 
Recently emerging evidence suggests the existence of a threshold effect of financial development 
and institutional quality on income inequality. For example, Kim and Lin (2011) employed an 
instrumental variable threshold regression approach for a panel of developed and developing 
countries and found evidence of a nonlinear threshold effect of financial development. Their results 
indicate that financial development (banks and stock markets) will disproportionately help the poor 
and reduce income inequality only when a country has reached a certain threshold level of financial 
development. Below such threshold level, financial development will hurt the poor and worsen 
income distribution. Tan and Law (2012) also found evidence of a below-threshold effect. Their 
results suggest that financial development will reduce income inequality even at the early stage of 
financial development but this will only be sustainable below a certain threshold level. This plays 
out in three phases: a phase where income inequality reduces with financial development, a phase of 
no change in income inequality with financial development, and the final phase of rising income 
inequality with further financial development, thus translating into a u-shape. Further financial 
development after the second phase will increase income inequality. Recently, Law et al. (2014) 
employed a threshold regression approach and found that financial development will reduce income 
inequality only after a certain level of institutional quality. They concluded that until such 
institutional quality has been reached, the relationship between finance and income inequality will 
not exist. 
We now turn to studies that focused on African countries. All the studies are cross-country in 
approach. Kai and Hamori (2009) is the first known peer-reviewed study in Africa that examined 
the effect of globalisation and financial depth on income inequality in 29 SSA countries from 1980-
2002 using fixed and random effect models. Their empirical evidence showed that globalisation 
worsens income inequality but this effect dampens with economic development of countries. That 
is, since globalisation is likely to benefit those with some level of education, the equalising effect of 
globalisation will be higher in countries with high standards of education. Furthermore, they found 
that financial depth reduces income inequality but its effect declines with globalisation. That is, 
increased globalisation shifts financial resources towards the rich and hence the gap between the 
rich and the poor widens. 
Batuo et al. (2010) also investigated the effect of financial development on income inequality in 22 
African countries from 1980-2004 by testing the various theoretical hypotheses. They found 
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empirical support for the negative linear hypothesis that financial development reduces income 
inequality. Meanwhile Asongu (2013) examined the channel through which investment affects 
inequality and which channels are good for the poor in 13 African countries. The overall result 
revealed that financial development in Africa does not help the poor. The results showed that 
financial depth and activity reduces income inequality, whereas financial efficiency increases 
income inequality, providing support for Greenwood and Jovanovic’s (1990) hypothesis. That is, 
large average loan sizes and deposits per capita are likely to benefit the rich and well-established 
firms. Gries and Meierrieks (2010) also found in a group of SSA countries that weak institutional 
quality undermines the effectiveness of financial development to reduce income inequality in the 
region. 
Apart from cross-country studies, there are also single country studies that have examined this 
dynamic relationship between financial development and income inequality. However, none of 
these studies looked at African countries. The negative linear hypothesis of Galor and Zeira (1993) 
and Banerjee and Newman (1993) enjoy overwhelming support from single country studies 
regardless of the method used in the analysis (see Shahbaz and Islam, 2011; Bittencourt, 2010; 
Liang, 2006; Hoi and Hoi, 2012). Ang (2010) found that underdevelopment of the financial sector 
in India hurt the poor more than the rich. Law and Tan (2009) failed to find any statistically 
significant effect of financial development on income inequality in Malaysia. Instead, they found a 
statistically significant effect of institutional quality9 in reducing income inequality. The findings 
also identified real GDP per capita and inflation that were statistically significant in reducing 
income inequality. They concluded that maintaining low inflation and improving economic 
development would reduce income inequality. 
The foregoing review clearly shows that available empirical evidence, although not clear-cut, 
mostly focused on developed and non-African developing countries. Specifically, there are only two 
published papers from Africa. Furthermore, apart from single country studies outside Africa that 
have employed autoregressive distributed lag models (ARDL) in their analysis, most cross-country 
studies applied the conventional method of data averaging, which is not in line with empirical 
modelling for heterogeneous non-stationary panel data. This study argues that assuming 
homogeneity of slope coefficient when in fact the slopes are different may lead to misleading 
inferences. 
                                               
9 Institutional quality refers to five measures of political risk services (PRS): (i) corruption, (ii) rule of law, (iii) 
bureaucratic quality, (iv) Government repudiation of contracts, and (v) risk of expropriation; and six measures from the 
World Governance Indicators: a) voice and accountability, b) political stability and lack of violence, c) government 
effectiveness, d) regulatory quality, e) rule of law, and f) control of corruption. 
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3.3 STYLISED FACTS ABOUT AFRICA 
African countries remain among the poorest countries in the world and are highly unequal, with six 
out of the ten most unequal countries in the world in 2010 being from Africa (AfDB, 2012: 2). 
Besides having the lowest average per capita income amongst other regions in the world, SSA has 
the highest headcount poverty ratios. As shown in Figure 3.1, the headcount poverty ratio, which 
was 56.75% in 1990, has dropped only by 13.85% over two decades to 42.65% in 2012. In contrast, 
East Asia and the Pacific and South Asian, which had headcount poverty ratio above 50% in 1990, 
witnessed a significant drop to 7.21% and 18.75% respectively by 2012. 
Figure 3.1: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.9 a day (PPP) 
 
Source: PovcalNet, 2014 
Secondly, although Africa as a whole has witnessed robust GDP growth for over a decade and a 
half, living standards of Africans have not improved in line with the growth in GDP. Figure 3.2 
illustrates GDP per capita growth over five year intervals across regions. Figure 3.1 connects with 
Figure 3.2 as regions with a rapid decline in headcount poverty also showed an improvement in 
living standards. SSA again shows the lowest level of GDP per capita growth, which may suggest 
that the economic growth experienced over the past decades was not high enough to lower poverty 
significantly. It could also be because of economic growth being concentrated in the formal sectors 
while enormous untapped productive resources in the informal sectors remain excluded, thus 
perpetuating income inequality in the region. 
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Figure 3.2: Relative standards of living across regions 1980-2013 
 
Source: World Bank, 2014b 
Could the widening income inequality and persistent poverty rate despite robust economic growth 
rate be attributed to the state of the financial systems in Africa? In the past three decades, many 
SSA countries have adopted several financial sector reforms that emphasise market-oriented 
policies. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s many of the countries in the region adopted structural 
adjustment programmes that emphasised the liberalisation and opening of the financial sectors as 
opposed to the government-controlled eras of the past. A look at indicators of financial 
development in the region reveals that although the region has experienced some progress in the 
financial sector, the sector remains largely underdeveloped and among the least developed in the 
world. The level of financial exclusion also remains very high, with only 35% of the adult 
population having access to the banking sector and other financial institutions (Global Findex, 
2014). A cursory look at the indicators of financial development vis-à-vis the Gini coefficient, a 
measure of income inequality, in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 seems to suggest some correlation between 
income inequality and financial development. One can observe that in countries where domestic 
private credit as a ratio of GDP is rising, the Gini coefficient tends to fall. This can easily been seen 
in Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi and Mauritius. Conversely, in countries where domestic private credit 
declines, there are also some indications that the Gini coefficient rises. This is evident in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Lesotho and Mauritania. What is not clear, though, is the extent to which the level 
of financial development explains the behaviour of income inequality in these countries. Moreover, 
it is not obvious from the simple graphs whether the relationship between financial development 
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and income inequality is linear or non-linear. These can only be established using more advanced 
econometric techniques. Furthermore, the study performed pairwise correlation analysis for Gini 
coefficient and the two measures of financial development to complement Figures 3.3 and 3.4. The 
results reported in Table 3.1a at the end of this chapter showed that Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Nigeria 
and Rwanda have negative correlation of above 50% for domestic credit/GDP and 62% for bank 
deposits between Gini coefficients. Meanwhile, Morocco has a positive correlation of 78% between 
Gini coefficient and the two measures of financial development. Mauritius has on average about 
50% correlation between Gini coefficient and the two measures of financial development and 
Malawi has a correlation of 46% for domestic credit/GDP and 91% for bank deposits/GDP between 
Gini coefficients. Other countries such as Egypt, South Africa and Botswana have a negative 
correlation of above 56% between Gini coefficients only. The correlation analysis again does not 
provide any strong pattern just as Figures 3.3 and 3.4. In the next section, we turn our attention to 
the methods that the study uses to accomplish this.  
Figure 3.3: Gini net and domestic credit to GDP 
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Source: SWIID Version 4.1 created by Solt, 2009 
Gini net is the estimate of Gini index of inequality in equalised household disposable income post 
tax and post transfers, and Gini market (gross) is the estimate of Gini index of inequality in 
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equalised household market (pre-tax and pre-transfer) income using Luxembourg Income study data 
as the standard (Solt, 2014: 2). 
Figure 3.4: Gini net and bank deposits/GDP 
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Source: SWIID Version 4.1 created by Solt, 2009 
3.4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
This study used more than one source for data collection. First, financial development indicators are 
from the World Bank global financial development (WBGFD) database. Financial development is 
proxied using the domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). This ratio is widely used in the 
finance-growth literature (Beck et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2004). WBGFD defines this ratio as 
financial resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as through loans, 
purchases of none-quality securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a 
claim for payment. For some countries, these claims include credit to public enterprises. Financial 
corporations include monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial 
corporations where data is available such as finance and leasing companies, moneylenders, 
insurance corporations, pension funds and foreign exchange companies. Domestic credit therefore 
reflects the degree to which the private sector has access to financial intermediation. A second 
measure of financial development used is bank deposits that represent the total value of demand, 
time and savings deposits at domestic money banks as a share of GDP. Deposit money banks 
comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that do not accept transferable deposits 
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but incur liabilities such as time and savings deposits. These two measures are deflated by the end-
of-year consumer price indices (Beck et al., 1999: 6).  
Second, income inequality data are sourced from the Standardised World Income Inequality Dataset 
(SWIID) created by Solt (2009). The SWIID combines information from other income inequality 
datasets10 to create a standardised income inequality dataset with greater coverage that maximises 
comparability of available income inequality data for the broadest possible sample of countries and 
years. The SWIID uses the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) dataset to serve as the base for 
standardisation (Solt, 2009: 1). 
However, SWIID dataset has some limitations as discussed by Jenkins (2015), Wittenberg (2015) 
and Ferreira et al. (2015). This includes the strong assumption of constant ratios of Gini coefficients 
across series within groups of country year observations and the use of the five-year smoothing 
algorithm that is likely to prevent abrupt changes11. Despite the limitations highlighted by the above 
authors, the SWIID has been used in empirical analysis and has been published in peer-reviewed 
journals by researchers such as Law et al. (2014), Solt (2009), Solt et al. (2011), Solt (2015) and 
Sturm and De Haan (2015). Based on the research question we are trying to answer, the SWIID is 
the preferred secondary source data in terms of coverage, quality and comparability. The study uses 
control variables such as real GDP per capita measured at current United States dollars, inflation 
rate, consumer prices (annual %), trade openness (% of GDP), school enrolment, primary (% gross) 
and value added by the manufacturing sector to GDP. These variables come from the World Bank 
(2014b). Clarke et al. (2006 and 2013) have used similar variables in their analysis in a group of 
developed and developing economies. Table 3.1b at the end of this chapter depicts summary 
statistics of the dependent and control variables. The mean of all the variables falls between 1 and 3 
with the exception of the Squared GDP per capita and inflation. Hence, there is no strong evidence 
of extreme observations (outliers) in the data. 
                                               
10 The United Nations University World Income Inequality Dataset version 2.0c, the OECD Income Distribution 
Database, the OECD Income Distribution Database, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
generated by CEDLAS and the World Bank, Eurostat, the World Bank’s PovcalNet, the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the World Top Incomes Database and national statistical offices around the world. 
 
11 They also indicated that the imputation procedure introduces variability in the data that needs to be accounted for in 
any empirical analysis. Jenkins (2015: 39-40) in a regression analysis illustrates that ignoring the multiple imputation 
when analysing the data may not lead to larger standard errors provided that the sample is drawn from the same region. 
The SWIID has 46 African countries with varying country and year observations. Some countries have very few 
observations and for the purpose of this study, we focus on countries with sufficiently long periods. This reduces the 
sample to only 15 African countries with complete data from 1985 to 2007. The selection criteria for the countries used 
in this analysis is thus based on data availability. 
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3.5  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
The study employs the augmented mean group (AMG) estimator that accounts for slope 
heterogeneity in non-stationary macro panel time series developed by (Eberhardt and Teal, 2010) 
and Eberhardt (2012). The AMG estimator is feasible to analyse non-stationary panel data with 
heterogeneous slope even if the variables are not co-integrated. 
Empirical framework of heterogeneous panel 
Using the Eberhardt (2012, 62) empirical modelling: for i = 1 . . ., N and t = 1… T, 
ititiit uxβy   …(3.1) 
where 
itt1iit εαμ  fi  …(3.2) 
ittitiiit egfx  2  
 …(3.3) 
where itx and yit are observables and βi is the country specific slope on the observable regressor, itu  
contains the unobservables and 
it  is the error term. The unobservables in Equation 3.2 comprised 
of country fixed effects i1 , which capture time-invariant heterogeneity across countries as well as 
an unobserved common factors tf  with country specific factor loadings i , which capture time-
variant heterogeneity and cross-section dependence. The factors tf  
and tg  can develop in a linear 
and nonlinear manner over time and can be non-stationary with obvious implications for 
cointegration (Equation 3.3). Further problems arise because the regressors are driven by some of 
the same common factors as the observables. That is, the presence of tf  
in Equations 3.2 and 3.3 
induces endogeneity in the estimation equation where the regressors are correlated with the 
unobservables ( itu ) preventing the true identification of i  separately from i  (Eberhardt, 2012, 
62).  
Some panel heterogeneous techniques developed to handle these challenges include the Swamy 
(1970) random coefficient model (RCM), Pesaran and Smith (1995) mean group (MG), Pesaran 
(2006) common correlated effect mean group (CCEMG), and recently Eberhardt and Teal (2010) 
augmented mean group (AMG). The choice of AMG over others is based on the weaknesses 
highlighted in Eberhardt (2012, 63). Firstly, the Pesaran and Smith (1995) does not account for 
cross-sectional dependence. Secondly, the Pesaran (2006) solves the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence, time-variant unobservables with heterogeneous impact across panel members and 
identification by augmenting the group-specific regression equation with cross-section averages of 
dependent and independent variables as additional regressors. However, the estimated coefficients 
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on the cross-section averaged variables as well as their average estimates are not interpretable in a 
meaningful way in empirical application. These averages are merely included to cancel out the 
biasing impact of the unobservable common factor (Eberhardt, 2012: 64). Finally, although 
Swamy’s (1970) RCM account for country-specific parameters, not much empirical discussion is 
available on how the issue of cross-sectional dependence is addressed. 
The AMG solves the identification problem by the inclusion of a common dynamic process 
extracted from the year dummy coefficients of a pooled regression in first differences and 
represents the levels-equivalent mean evolution of unobserved common factors across all countries 
(Eberhardt and Teal, 2010: 7). Effectively, the AMG uses a two-stage regression procedure where 
the common dynamic process is extracted in the first stage and included in the second stage as an 
another regressor for all countries. See the formulation below. 
AMG Stage (i): 

  ttitt
T
t
titit cDcxby  ˆˆ
2
/  …(3.4) 
AMG Stage (ii): 
ittiiitiiit dtcxby  
ˆ/  …(3.5) 

i
iAMG bNb
ˆˆ 1        
Stage (i) represents an OLS regression with T-1 year dummies in first differences from which the 
coefficients of the year dummies are collected and relabelled as 
tˆ . In stage (ii)

tˆ  
is included in 
each of the N standard country regressions with a linear trend to account for omitted idiosyncratic 
processes evolving in a linear fashion over time. Also 
tˆ can be subtracted from the dependent 
variable, meaning a common process is imposed on each country with a unit coefficient (Eberhardt 
and Teal, 2010: 7; Eberhardt 2012: 64).  
3.5.1 Model specification    
The study adopts the empirical specification of Clarke et al. (2013: 501) given as: 
itit2iit1iiiit εCVβ)(financeβtδαnet LogGini   …(3.6) 
where αi are country-specific fixed effects, δit represents country-specific time trends, which 
captures any country-specific omitted variables that are either relatively stable over time or evolve 
smoothly over time. LogGini net represents the natural log of Gini net, the measure of income 
inequality. Finance is measured by two proxies: domestic credit to GDP and bank deposits to GDP, 
CV is a set of control variables i and t represent country and time period respectively and Ɛit is the 
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error term. The focus is on finance and following the theoretical discussion in Section 3.2.1, the 
functional form for estimation is: 
itit8it7iit6i
it5i
2
it4iit3i
2
it2iit1iiiit
εlogGSlogtradeβinfβ
logmodsecβlogYβlogYβlogfinβlogfinβtδαnet LogGini


i  
…(3.7)
 
Modsec, used as a proxy for the modern sector, is value added by the manufacturing sector to GDP, 
Y is the natural log of GDP per capita. For the negative linear hypothesis to hold, 1  is expected to 
be negative and significant and 2  not significantly different from zero. Secondly, for the inverted 
u-shape hypothesis, 1  should be positive and significant while 2  should be negative and 
significant. However, if the coefficient of 1  is negative and significant and 2  positive and 
significant, a u-shape relationship is suggested (below threshold). For the Kuznets inverted u-shape 
hypothesis, the coefficient of 3  should be positive and significant while 4
  should be negative 
and significant. If 5  is positive and significant it means inequality is likely to be higher in 
countries with large modern sectors and vice versa. 
A set of control variables are included to account for other factors that are likely to influence 
income inequality. For example, inflation is included in order to capture macroeconomic instability, 
since a high inflation rate hurts the poor more than the rich because the rich can easily hedge their 
exposure with sophisticated financial instruments. In addition, if prices increase the purchasing 
power of the poor will be impacted more severely than that of the rich. Thus, we expect higher 
inflation to have a positive effect on income inequality. Trade openness captures the effect of 
globalisation on income inequality and government spending captures the redistributive role of the 
government. The exact effect of these two variables on income inequality is less clear. However, if 
7  is negative and significant, it means globalisation reduces income inequality. The choice of 
these variables is guided by the various theories discussed in Section 3.2 and previous studies in this 
area such as Clarke et al. (2006 and 2013). 
3.5.2 Panel unit root tests 
Two panel unit root tests for stationarity can be distinguished from the literature: the first generation 
test, which assumes cross-sectional independence in the panel, and the second-generation test, 
which allows for cross-sectional dependence in the panel (Baltagi, 2008: 275-284). We employ the 
first generation Im et al. (2003) and second-generation Pesaran (2007) cross-sectional augmented 
(CIPS) panel unit root tests to determine the order of integration of the variables. The starting point 
of Im et al. (2003) (henceforth IPS) is to assume that the stochastic process yit is generated by the 
first order autoregressive process which is given as: 
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,1,)1( ittiiiiit yy    i=1… N, t = 1… T 
where initial values yi0 are given, the interest will be to test the null hypothesis of unit roots 1i  
for all i then the equation can be expressed as: 
,1, ittiiiit yy     
where )1(,)1( iiiii    and 1,  tiitit yyy . The null hypothesis under the IPS is that 
each series has a unit root, 0:0 iH   for all i against the alternative hypothesis that some but not 
all of the individual series have a unit root, 0:1 iH  ,i = 1, 2… N, ,0i  
i = .,...,2,1 11 NNN   This alternative formulation allows the autoregressive coefficients ( i ) to 
vary across groups (Im et al., 2003: 56). 
The study also conducted the Pesaran (2007) cross-sectional augmented (CIPS) panel unit root test. 
This test augments the standard ADF regression with cross-sectional averages of lagged levels and 
first differences of the individual series. The standard panel unit root tests are then based on the 
simple averages of individual cross-sectional augmented ADF (CADF) statistics. Separate cross-
sectional augmented ADF (CADF) regressions are estimated for each country, which allows for 
different autoregressive parameters for each panel member (Pesaran, 2007: 265). The CADF model 
is given as: 
itjti
p
j
ijjt
p
j
ijtitiiiit yydycybay  



  ,
10
11,   …(3.8) 
where ty is the cross-sectional mean of yit, it
N
it yNy   11 . The null hypothesis is that all series 
are non-stationary (H0: bi = 0) for all i and is tested against the alternative hypothesis that at least 
one of the individual series in the panel is stationary (H1: bi < 0) for at least one i. The CIPS statistic 
is calculated as the averages of the individual CADF statistics as follows: 



iN
i
itNCIPS
1
1  …(3.9) 
where ti is the OLS t-ratio of bi in Equation 3.8 above 
3.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As a pre-testing condition, the study performed visual inspection of the entire variables to ascertain 
the possibility of a trend in the series. The evidence from the visual plots (not reported in the thesis) 
suggests a weak positive and negative trend at levels. However, once the variables are differenced, 
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the trend falls away. Hence, the unit root tests are conducted at levels with a constant and trend and 
at first difference only with a constant. Table 3.2 reports these results. The Im et al. (2003) test 
failed to reject the null of unit root at levels only for Gini net and inflation rate at 10% and 1% 
respectively, while the CADF test rejected the null of unit root at levels for all the variables but 
failed to reject the null of unit root at first difference. Thus, the overall evidence suggests that the 
variables are integrated of order I (1) except for Gini net and inflation rate in the case of Im et al. 
(2003). This suggests the possibility of a long-run relationship between the two measures of income 
inequality and financial development. 
Table 3.2: Panel unit root tests 
Variables Deterministic terms CADF test (Pesaran, 2007) Im et al. (2003) 
Levels   Z(t-bar) W-t-bar 
Log Gini net 
Log primary school enrolment 
Constant  
Constant and trend 
0.49 (0.69) 
-0.46 (0.32) 
-1.58 (0.06)* 
1.46 (0.93) 
Log domestic credit/GDP Constant and trend 4.47 (1.00)  3.91 (1.00) 
Log domestic credit/GDP Sq Constant and trend 5.35 (1.00)  3.85 (0.99) 
Log bank deposit/GDP Constant and trend 1.69 (0.95) -0.59 (0.27) 
Log bank deposit/GDP Sq Constant and trend  1.58 (0.94) -0.59 (0.28) 
Log government spending Constant and trend 2.19 (0.99) -0.97 (0.17) 
Log trade Constant and trend 3.44 (1.00)  0.43 (0.67) 
Inflation Constant 1.50 (0.93) -4.87 (0.00)*** 
Log GDP per capita Constant and trend 1.67 (0.95)  1.87 (0.97) 
Log GDP per capita sq Constant and trend 1.85 (0.97)  2.01 (0.98) 
Log modern sector/GDP Constant and trend 3.47 (1.00) -1.02 (0.15) 
First differences    
Log Gini net Constant -4.05 (0.00)*** -2.75 (0.00)*** 
Log primary school enrolment Constant -3.01 (0.00)*** -7.07 (0.00)*** 
Log domestic credit/GDP Constant -6.88 (0.00)*** -8.25 (0.00)*** 
Log domestic credit/GDP Sq Constant -6.88 (0.00)*** -8.17 (0.00)*** 
Log bank deposit/GDP Constant -3.81 (0.00)*** -7.80 (0.00)*** 
Log bank deposit/GDP Sq Constant -3.78 (0.00)*** -7.68 (0.00)*** 
Log trade Constant -7.18 (0.00)*** -9.33 (0.00)*** 
Government spending Constant -4.99 (0.00)*** -9.25 (0.00)*** 
 Inflation Constant -9.02 (0.00)*** --- 
Log GDP per capita Constant -6.13 (0.00)*** -7.26 (0.00)*** 
Log GDP per capita Sq Constant 5.81 (0.00)*** -7.15 (0.00)*** 
Log modern sector/GDP Constant -3.17 (0.00)*** -9.59 (0.00)*** 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.  
The null hypothesis of all three tests is that the panels contain unit roots.  is the first difference operator.  
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Lag selection in IPS is automatic using AIC and 2 lags for CADF at levels. 
Source: By Authors 
A second concern for macro-panel time series data (large N and T dimensions) is the problem of 
cross-section dependence. That is, there are inter-dependences across countries and this is likely to 
influence movements in macro-economic variables across countries over time. Consequently, each 
of the variables used in the analysis was tested for cross-sectional dependence using the Pesaran 
(2004) test and the results are reported in Table 3.3 below. Apart from Gini net and government 
spending, the rest of the variables show evidence of cross-sectional dependence, justifying the use 
of the AMG.  
Table 3.3: Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence tests 
Variables CD test P-value 
Log Gini net  -0.44 0.66 
Log domestic credit to GDP   7.91 0.00 
Log bank deposits to GDP   6.37 0.00 
Log GDP per capita   19.39 0.00 
Log government spending to GDP   -0.79 0.52 
Inflation   10.45 0.00 
Log primary enrolment 12.86 0.00 
Log trade openness   9.47 0.00 
Log modern sector to GDP   3.70 0.00 
Source: By Authors 
Next, the results of Equation 3.7 as specified in Section 3.5.1 are discussed. First, summary country 
aggregate results for the two proxies of financial development: domestic credit to GDP and bank 
deposits to GDP is presented. Using domestic credit to GDP, the result suggests no long-run 
relationship between financial development and income inequality in this group of African 
countries. Furthermore, the coefficient of the linear term of GDP per capita is negative and not 
significant and the squared term positive but significant, thus rejecting the Kuznets (1955) inverted 
u-shaped hypothesis. When bank deposits are used to measure financial development, the linear 
term is negative and not significant while the squared term is positive and significant at 10%. Thus, 
at the aggregate level, both proxies of financial development reject the existence of a common long-
run relationship between financial development and income inequality in this group of countries. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of the linear term of GDP per capita is negative and significant at 10% 
whereas the squared term is positive and significant at 5%. This rejects Kuznets (1955) inverted u-
shaped relationship and instead supports a u-shaped relationship, indicating that GDP per capita 
growth reduces income inequality up to a certain level after which further increases in GDP per 
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capita will increase income inequality (Table 3.4). Both models performed relatively well as shown 
by the root mean square error (RMSE) of 0.010 and 0.009 for the model with domestic credit and 
bank deposits respectively. Diagnostic tests for the models were performed by generating the 
residuals and testing for cross-sectional dependence and stationarity. The Pesaran (2004) and (2007) 
tests confirmed that there is no evidence of cross-sectional dependence and that the residuals are 
stationary. See output at the bottom of Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The next paragraph discusses country-
specific results. 
Table 3.4: The effect of financial development on income inequality: country averages 
Dependent variable Log Gini net Log Gini net 
Log Domestic Credit to GDP 0.004  
 (0.02)  
Log Domestic Credit to GDP squared 0.004  
 (0.06)  
Log Bank Deposits to GDP  -0.810 
  (-1.11) 
Log Bank Credit to GDP squared  0.488* 
  (1.65) 
Log GDP per capita -0.823 -1.572** 
 (-1.27) (-2.42) 
Log GDP per squared 0.175 0.306** 
 (1.50) (2.53) 
Log Government Spending to GDP 0.030 0.007 
 (1.36) (0.30) 
Inflation 0.0003 -0.000 
 (1.35) (-0.43) 
Log trade (imports + exports/GDP) -0.073** -0.056 
 (-2.38) (-1.55) 
Log Value added by manufacturing/GDP 0.018 0.020 
 (0.62) (0.73) 
Common Dynamic Process 0.873* 0.680**** 
 (1.84) (3.34) 
Trend 0.002 -0.001 
 (1.37) (-0.49) 
Constant 2.922*** 4.295**** 
 (3.12) (3.44) 
Number of observations 344 322 
t- statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
 
Source: By Authors 
First, the study finds no statistically significant evidence for the negative linear hypothesis for all 
the countries studied except for weak evidence in Côte d’Ivoire only when financial development is 
measured using bank deposits to GDP (Table 3.6). Secondly, using domestic credit to GDP as a 
measure of financial development, the inverted u-shape hypothesis of Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) was statistically significant at least at 5% level of significance in Botswana and Lesotho. 
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Meanwhile for Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and South Africa, the evidence suggests a u-shape 
relationship that corroborates Tan and Law’s (2012) findings from a sample of 35 developing 
countries. Tan and Law (2012) argue that financial development will reduce income inequality even 
at the early stages of financial development up to a certain threshold level, beyond which further 
financial development will increase income inequality. Thus, the point where further financial 
development increases income inequality is what Clarke et al. (2006) term the inequality-widening 
hypothesis of financial development. This hypothesis is re-enforced in countries with weak 
institutions where the rich can influence policy-making and restrict new firms from gaining access 
to finance. This effectively increases barriers and reduces the ability of the poor to improve their 
economic situation (Clarke et al., 2006). Thirdly, the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis is supported only 
in Lesotho and Uganda. This suggests that income inequality will increase in the early phase of 
development in these countries and decline as the countries attain higher levels of development 
(Table 3.5). The period under analysis coincided with episodes of banking and financial crises in 
Africa in the 1980s to 2000s (Section 2.2, Table 2.1), and within this period, many African 
countries implemented structural adjustment programmes. From the fifteen countries analysed, 
eight had banking crises and six financial crises and only Mauritius managed to stay safe but must 
have suffered from spill over effects. Hence, it is obvious that the u-shape results are capturing the 
deteriorating welfares of consumers during and after the crises as national governments continue 
with reforms in pursuit of financial sector development.  
We used a second proxy for financial development to ascertain whether the finance-inequality 
relationship is sensitive to the choice of financial development proxy. When bank deposits are used 
as a measure for financial development, the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) hypothesis is 
supported in Botswana and Rwanda, while Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia and 
Uganda support the u-shape relationship. The u-shape relationship between finance and inequality 
continue to hold and is likely to trace the evolution of financial market policies and negative 
unforeseen consequences of these reforms in Africa. Furthermore, privatisation of state-owned 
banks probably put an end to the era of social banking and state funding models for under-
privileged resource-constrained rural areas. Commercial banks shifted focus and concentrated their 
lending activities in the urban areas on some wealthy elites, government and big corporate firms, 
which led to bank concentration, limited competition, and shallow outreach of banking services 
especially in the rural areas. 
Only Botswana and Lesotho support the Kuznets (1955) inverted u-shape hypothesis (Table 3.6). 
The credit and deposits market channels yield similar results. Botswana is the only country that 
displayed a robust inverted u-shape relationship using both measures of financial development. This 
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is likely to reflect government’s effort to subsidise rural agriculture and welfare improvement in 
rural areas that has supported income growth in the rural areas. This supported the observed decline 
in poverty rate and income inequality. Finally, Botswana also experience improved financial access 
for the poorest 40% from 16% in 2011 to about 34% in 2014, a positive step to support share 
prosperity. 
Finally, the study failed to find any significant statistical evidence of the finance-inequality nexus in 
Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritania or Mauritius. This suggests that the link between income inequality 
and financial development as measured by domestic credit and bank deposits to GDP is rather weak 
in these countries. Although these results contradict previous evidence, they corroborate recent 
empirical evidence reviewed in Section 3.2.2 (Law and Tan, 2009; Kim and Lin, 2011; Law et al., 
2014) and strongly reflect the outcomes of financial reforms in Africa. Honohan (2007), in a sample 
of 160 developed and developing countries, found that domestic credit lacks the explanatory power 
to explain variation in income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. These recent findings 
of no relationship between finance and income inequality has been associated with the quality of 
institutions and it is not surprising that the weak institutional quality in Africa may play a role in the 
above findings. However, this aspect was not the focus of the study, but serves as a potential area 
for further research. 
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Table 3.5: Country-specific parameters using domestic credit to GDP 
Variables Domestic 
credit 
Domestic 
credit Sq 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita Sq 
Modern 
sector 
Common 
dynamic 
process 
Country 
trend 
Botswana  0.509** -0.265** 0.384 0.066 -0.138** -0.543 0.003* 
 (2.02) (-2.13) (1.00) (-1.19) (-2.01) (-0.77) (1.67) 
Côte d’Ivoire  -3.230*** 1.242*** -2.346 0.384 0.077 2.271** 0.004** 
 (-4.75) (4.95) (-0.65) (0.61) (0.95) (2.33) (2.19) 
Egypt -0.041 0.037 -0.814 0.139 -0.070 0.220 -0.003** 
 (-0.09) (0.27) (-1.04) (1.13) (-1.00) (0.51) (-2.70) 
Ethiopia 0.282 -0.161 -0.229 0.074 -0.077 3.716** -0.002 
 (0.47) (-0.56) (-0.05) (0.08) (-0.65) (2.26) (-0.54) 
Ghana  -0.746** 0.514*** 0.838 -0.138 0.993** 1.381 0.001 
 (-2.44) (2.91) (0.52) (-0.47) (2.09) (0.83) (0.25) 
Lesotho  0.912*** -0.413*** 2.107*** -0.364*** 0.078 1.769*** -0.008*** 
 (2.90) (-2.81) (3.04) (-2.74) (0.82) (2.66) (-3.07) 
Malawi 0.177 -0.065 -2.317 0.544 0.299*** 0.094 -0.007*** 
 (0.46) (-0.30) (-0.74) (0.80) (3.89) (0.15) (-4.59) 
Mauritania -0.006 0.023 -3.479 0627 -0.033 -0.436 -0.002 
 (-0.16) (1.21) (-1.01) (1.02) (-0.45) (-0.43) (-1.16) 
Mauritius 0.846 -0.256 -6.429*** 0.943*** 1.501*** 4.444** 0.004 
 (0.36) (-0.38) (-2.80) (2.79) (4.05) (4.07) (0.84) 
Morocco -0.077 0.022 -1.923*** 0.300*** -0.002 0.575** 0.003*** 
 (-0.63) (0.51) (-4.85) (4.90) (-0.02) (1.95) (2.81) 
Nigeria -1.002* 0.389* 0.464 -0.102 0.011 -0.392 0.003 
 (-1.89) (1.69) (0.93) (-1.01) (0.08) (-0.34) (1.17) 
Rwanda -0.325 0.159 -2.640 0.529 0.056 2.441** 0.016*** 
 (-0.24) (0.20) (-1.33) (1.27) (0.63) (2.41) (9.84) 
South Africa -0.675* 0.164* 0.001 0.000 -0.050 -0.235** 0.001** 
 (-1.93) (1.93) (0.00) (0.00) (-1.33) (-2.54) (2.09) 
Tunisia  0.688 -0.174 -0.693 0.089 0.081 1.210*** 0.003* 
 (0.18) (-0.16) (-2.27) (1.13) (0.71) (3.81) (1.90) 
Uganda -0.224 0.169 4.883*** -1.035*** 0.079 -1.590 0.004 
 (-1.23) (0.90) (3.60) (-3.60) (0.67) (-1.57) (1.07) 
No of countries 
Total of obs 
15 
345 
15 
345 
15 
345 
15 
345 
15 
345 
15 
345 
15 
345 
Diagnostic test  
Pesaran xtcd test:- 0.16; P-value:0.872  
PESCADF test: Z(t-bar): -7.30; P-value: 0.00  
RMSE 0.010  
Note: t-stats are in brackets, ***,** and* represent 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
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Table 3.6: Country-specific parameters using deposits to GDP 
Variables Bank 
deposit 
 
Bank 
deposit Sq 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita Sq 
Modern 
Sector 
Common 
dynamic 
process 
Country 
trend 
Botswana  0.827*** -0.322*** 0.603*** -0.086** -0.082 0.470 -0.0004 
 (3.70) (-3.98) (2.55) (-2.48) (-1.60) (1.44) (-0.30) 
Côte d’Ivoire  -4.587* 1.680 -5.769** 1.025** 0.061 0.309 -0.002*** 
 (-1.83) (1.53) (-2.15) (2.20) (0.65) (0.46) (-2.73) 
Egypt -11.024** 3.061** -2.300*** 0.386*** 0.052 0.718*** -0.003** 
 (-2.56) (2.56) (-3.04) (3.10) (1.01) (2.99) (-2.10) 
Ethiopia  -0.385 0.098 -3.315 0.750 -0.108 1.931 -0.005 
 (-0.09) (0.07) (-0.98) (1.00) (-0.98) (1.55) (-1.20) 
Ghana  -1.773*** 0.880*** -1.199 0.233 0.711 1.192 0.003 
 (-3.64) (2.99) (-0.66) (0.67) (1.48) (0.92) (0.37) 
Lesotho  0.817 -0.115 3.687*** -0.677*** 0.074 0.765* -0.003 
 (0.32) (-0.13) (3.14) (-3.07) (0.73) (1.90) (-1.26) 
Malawi 0.573 -0.226 -2.499 0.576 0.287*** -0.343 -0.006*** 
 (0.62) (-0.49) (-0.70) (0.74) (4.04) (-0.57) (-3.24) 
Mauritius 0.509 -0.110 -5.707* 0.828* 1.448*** 3.668*** 0.003 
 (0.08) (-0.07) (-1.71) (1.75) (3.94) (5.75) (0.82) 
Morocco -0.831** 0.231** -1.484*** 0.229*** 0.072 0.393*** 0.005*** 
 (-2.56) (2.23) (5.07) (4.92) (1.42) (4.41) (5.40) 
Nigeria -0.250 0.042 -0.448 0.074 0.074 0.033 0.003 
 (-0.44) (0.17) (-1.36) (1.09) (0.76) (0.04) (1.20) 
Rwanda 5.446*** -2.778*** -2.293** 0.459** -0.008 1.084*** 0.017*** 
 (-4.85) (-4.82) (-2.40) (2.31) (-0.18) (2.95) (20.58) 
South Africa -2.789*** 0.851*** 0.035 -0.004 -0.003 -0.138*** 0.0002* 
 (-2.89) (2.96) (0.20) (-0.18) (--0.12) (-3.02) (1.71) 
Tunisia  -5.625** 1.721** -0.456 0.055 -0.019 1.182*** 0.002 
 (-2.18) (2.15) (-0.89) (0.72) (-0.17) (5.31) (1.24) 
Uganda -1.296*** 0.892*** -0.992 0.198 -0.054 1.322 -0.006 
 (-3.78) (3.57) (-0.55) (0.52) (-0.53) (1.36) (-1.28) 
No of countries 
Total of obs 
14 
322 
      
Diagnostic test  
Pesaran xtcd test:-0.18; P-value:0.861  
PESCADF test: Z(t-bar): -9.37; P-value: 0.00  
RMSE:0.009  
Note: t-stats are in brackets, ***,** and* represent 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
Source: By Authors 
 
Financial sector reforms define the functioning of the financial sector and even without modelling 
such effects, the outcomes of these reforms characterised by banking and financial crises in almost 
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all African countries signal deteriorating welfare. As demonstrated by Aziakpono (2016: 9) in his 
inaugural lecture on 8th September 2016 at Stellenbosch University, sub-Saharan Africa recorded 
the lowest performance in the 1980s and 1990s in terms of GDP growth and GDP per capita. The u-
shape suggests that prior to 1980s, financial development had a negative relationship with income 
inequality but with the adoption of financial reforms, diseconomies kick in offsetting this 
relationship. The negative relationship reverses into positive with continuation of these reforms 
giving rise to the u-shape. A possible way forward is to ensure the financial sector serves the 
interest of everyone by expanding access, as is currently the policy priority for many African 
countries. However, necessary institutional structures to support financial consumer protection are a 
prerequisite to empower and educate consumers. Table 3.7 provides a summary of the current effort 
to increase financial inclusion with a focus on the countries covered in this chapter.  
Table 3.7: Financial inclusion 
Countries 2011 
Account 
40% 
poorest 
60% 
richest 
2014 
Account 
40% 
poorest 
60% 
richest 
Botswana 30.26 16.13 39.87 51.96 33.52 59.82 
Côte d’Ivoire    15.14 6.41 20.96 
Egypt 9.72 3.99 13.56 13.65 4.97 19.53 
Ethiopia    21.79 15.93 25.70 
Ghana 29.43 16.67 38.10 34.62 24.35 41.55 
Lesotho 18.50 9.60 24.65    
Malawi 16.54 10.75 20.46 18.09 9.61 20.58 
Mauritania 17.46 8.49 23.25 20.45 9.93 27.66 
Mauritius 80.12 69.95 86.90 82.21 71.42 89.33 
Morocco 39.07 27.28 47.40    
Nigeria 29.67 12.82 40.91 44.17 33.81 51.46 
Rwanda 32.76 32.04 33.25 38.14 14.65 54.85 
South Africa 53.65 38.79 63.64 68.76 56.47 77.32 
Tunisia    27.43 17.20 33.91 
Uganda 20.46 10.91 27.07 27.78 13.52 37.39 
 
Source: Global Findex, 2014 
Table 3.7 illustrates account penetration between 2011 and 2014 from the Global Findex dataset. 
Each year has three columns: overall account penetration, the proportion of overall account 
penetration held by the 40% poorest and 60% richest of the total population aged 15 and above 
respectively.  
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Apart from Mauritius, South Africa and Botswana, which had above 50% financial inclusion by 
2014, other countries have less than 50% account penetration. The 40% poorest, who constitute a 
significant share of the total population, are largely excluded and this reduces the potential market 
size and obscures the link between finance and inequality. However, some countries are making 
significant efforts to increase financial access for the 40% poorest segment of the population. This 
is a positive step to foster shared prosperity, increase income shares of the poor, and hence 
encourage inclusive growth. Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) showed that a one-percentage point increase 
in the income shares of the 20% bottom poor has a greater impact on GDP growth than the same 
increase in the income shares of the top 20% richest. This is evidence of welfare enhancement at the 
bottom of the pyramid and serves as a suitable pointer for tailor-made financial services for the 
poor, the underserved and rural dwellers. For the poor, financial inclusion provides a convenient 
and reliable means to save for education of their children, plan for retirement and accumulate assets 
to insure against risk. Poor talented and underserved small micro-entrepreneurs can borrow to 
finance their investment projects rather than depending on their meagre savings. Rural farmers can 
borrow to buy inputs for the farming season such as seeds, pesticides or fertilisers and this will 
increase rural agricultural outputs.  
Overall, successful financial inclusion strategies have the potential to connect the informal rural 
area to the formal sector and this ensures shared prosperity that is associated with a reduction in 
poverty and income inequality. Development and growth strategies in Africa need to recognise and 
account for the informality of African economies. Hence, connecting the informal to the formal 
sector through financial services and other basic services will certainly be an optimal strategy to 
enhance welfare and support share prosperity. This will entail well-coordinated efforts from both 
the private and the public sector. The public sector will need to build the necessary institutions to 
support financial inclusion initiatives and ensure financial inclusion does not compromise consumer 
welfare and hence affect financial stability negatively. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This study has examined the relationship between financial development and income inequality in a 
balanced panel of 15 African countries from 1985-2007. We examine whether financial 
development in Africa has an effect on income inequality and whether this effect depends on the 
level of financial development or economic development. The analysis used SWIID version 4.1 
created by Solt (2009) while acknowledging the limitations of the dataset discussed earlier. We 
failed to find evidence of a statistically significant negative linear relationship between finance and 
income inequality for the African countries studied except for weak evidence in Côte d’Ivoire. The 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) inverted u-shape hypothesis was supported in Botswana, Lesotho 
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and Rwanda but this relationship varied depending on the measure of financial development. The u-
shape relationship between finance and income inequality was supported in Egypt, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Uganda but the results were not statistically 
significant across the two measures of financial development. These results are likely to capture the 
deteriorating state of welfare in the 1980s to late 1990s characterised by banking and financial 
crises that reversed some of the welfare gains in the pre-1980s. None of the credit and deposit 
channels showed any discernible evidence of reducing income inequality. The Kuznets (1955) 
inverted u-shape relationship between GDP per capita and income inequality was supported in 
Botswana and Lesotho using both measures of financial development and in Uganda using only 
domestic credit. Finally, there is no statistically significant evidence for the finance-inequality 
nexus in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritania and Mauritius.  
Overall, the results echoed the limitations of imposing the homogeneity assumption in long-run 
analysis and emphasised the importance of country-specific analysis in panel studies. One does not 
need to think out of the box to realise that the previous negative long-run relationship between 
financial development and income inequality in Africa, particularly from 1980 to 2004, is highly 
unstable. It would have been difficult for financial development to reduce income inequality during 
this period when almost all African countries were experiencing banking and financial crises which 
are often associated with loss of output and increased unemployment resulting in deterioration in 
the quality of life (see Laeven and Valencia, 2013).  
The study recommends the following policies based on the finding. First, the u-shape relationship 
observed signals the existence of financial market imperfections. Regulators should redirect 
attention to reduce market imperfections and increase competition within the financial sector. That 
is, African governments should increase investment in physical and financial infrastructure 
development such as credit bureaus, credit registry and credit rating and improve the payment 
system. This will reduce information asymmetry in the credit market and assist banks to price risk 
appropriately. Secondly, given the rural nature of most African countries and their heavy reliance 
on rural agriculture for subsistence livelihoods, there is a need for a well-thought-through public 
private partnership to deliver financial services in the rural areas in order to support rural 
agricultural productivity and boost rural income. Innovation in the delivery of financial services to 
the poor and rural dwellers is essential in order to reduce costs and increase outreach, as Chapter 2 
identified cost and distance as major barriers to financial inclusion. However, financial outreach 
policies should focus on the quality and suitability of financial products to ensure usage and avoid 
dormant accounts 
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This chapter investigated the long-run relationship between the depth dimension of the financial 
system and welfare as measured by Gini coefficient across a selected number of African countries. 
This revealed the dynamic relationship between the credit and deposits channels of the financial 
system and income inequality in Africa. Chapter 4 examines the second aspect of the financial 
system: outreach of financial services and its association with welfare. It expands the number of 
welfare indicators to include the poverty headcount as measured by less than US$1.25 day, the 
under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births and the HDI. 
Table 3.1a: Pairwise correlation coefficient between Gini net and financial development 
Botswana 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP -0.28(.19) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.56(0.01) 0.90(0.00) 1 
Cote d’Ivoire 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP -0.74(0.00) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.90(0.00) 0.88(0.00) 1 
Egypt 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.07(0.76) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.69(0.00) 0.40(0.06) 1 
Ethiopia 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP -0.71(0.00) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.62(0.00) 0.81(0.00) 1 
Ghana 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.16(0.46) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.11(0.62) 0.87(0.00) 1 
Lesotho 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.79(0.00) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP 0.29(0.17) 0.36(.09) 1 
Malawi 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
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Table 3.1a: Pairwise correlation coefficient between Gini net and financial development 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.46(0.03) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP 0.91(0.00) 0.56(.01) 1 
Mauritania 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.63(0.00) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP . . 1 
Mauritius 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.52(0.01) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP 0.46(0.03) 0.97(0.00) 1 
Morocco 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.79(0.00) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP 0.78(0.00) 0.92(0.00) 1 
Nigeria 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
Log domestic credit/GDP -0.50(0.02) 1   
Log bank deposits/GDP -0.79(0.00) 0.65(0.00) 1 
Rwanda 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
Log domestic credit/GDP -0.57(0.01) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.78(0.00) 0.79(0.00) 1 
South Africa 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.38(0.08) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.79(0.00) 0.57(.005) 1 
Tunisia 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
 
  
log domestic credit/GDP 0.52(0.01) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.20(0.37) -0.29(0.18) 1 
Uganda 
  Log Gini net log domestic credit/GDP log bank deposits/GDP 
Log Gini net 1 
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Table 3.1a: Pairwise correlation coefficient between Gini net and financial development 
log domestic credit/GDP -0.13(0.56) 1   
log bank deposits/GDP -0.00(0.99) 0.96(0.00) 1 
P-values are in parenthesis 
Table 3.1b: Summary statistics of dependent and control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Log Gini net 322 1.623 0.088 1.375 1.784 
Log domestic credit/GDP  322 1.270 0.413 0.082 2.224 
Log domestic credit/GDP squared 322 1.784 1.091 0.007 4.947 
Log bank deposits/GDP 322 1.371 0.323 0.416 1.947 
Log bank deposits/GDP squared 322 1.984 0.864 0.173 3.793 
Log GDP per capita 322 2.854 0.477 2.050 3.798 
Log GDP per capita squared 322 8.371 2.778 4.203 14.43 
Log Government spending/GDP 322 1.168 0.171 0.684 1.585 
Inflation  322 13.60 21.86 -9.809 215.4 
Log modern sector/GDP 322 1.073 0.242 0.402 1.403 
Log trade/GDP 322 1.783 0.240 1.031 2.322 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND 
WELFARE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM 
DISAGGREGATED DATA12 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
One important role of financial inclusion13 is its potential to support inclusive economic growth by 
encouraging everyone to participate in economic activities through saving and running micro-
enterprises. As such, international bodies such as the World Bank, the G2014 and more than 50 
national governments in developing and emerging economies have committed to increase financial 
access to the world’s 2.5 billion unbanked adults (AFI, 2013: 1). This move is supported by 
emerging empirical evidence linking financial inclusion to poverty reduction – allowing households 
to save for retirement and reduce the risk of dealing in cash only and the development of 
entrepreneurship (Burgess and Pande, 2005; AFI, 2013; Cull et al., 2014). 
However, despite this renewed interest to provide financial access to everyone who can use it, 
between 2011 and 2014 as analysed in Chapter 2, the level of financial inclusion in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) and across countries/regions is low. For example, account ownership in SSA 
increased from 24% in 2011 to 34% in 2014, but access to credit increased only slightly from 4.8% 
to 6% over the same period (Global Findex, 2014). This reflects financial underdevelopment and 
the existence of market imperfections such as limited competition, information asymmetry and 
other institutional factors such as interest rate caps that still exist in many SSA countries 
(Sexagaard, 2006; Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014). 
On the other hand, there has been a shortage of empirical studies on the effect of financial inclusion 
on welfare, partially because of data limitation on access and use of financial services by 
individuals or households. Although some studies are available in SSA on this topic, they focused 
on the effect of microfinance on households’ welfare such as household income, business income, 
asset accumulation, health, education, food security and nutrition, child labour, job creation, women 
empowerment and housing. See van Rooyen et al. (2012) for a systematic review. Furthermore, at 
the country level, scholars such as Copestake (2002), Kai and Hamori (2009) and Tchouassi (2011) 
have examined the effect of microfinance on income inequality in Africa. However, evidence from 
                                               
12 The paper based on this chapter has been accepted for publication in the African Review of Economics and Finance. 
13 Financial inclusion or financial access here refers to making financial services accessible, available and affordable to 
everyone, with a particular focus on the poor, underserved and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). 
14 G20 is “the group of twenty”, an international forum for governments and central bank governors from 19 individual 
countries and the European Union. 
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such studies is likely to be incomplete as microfinance offers only selective financial access as 
opposed to access for everyone. From the developed countries, evidence has shown that financial 
access improves welfare of the poor (Aportela, 1999; Burgess and Pande, 2005; Honohan, 2007; 
Beck et al., 2007b). Nevertheless, such evidence is lacking in SSA. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to take advantage of a data set that is comparable across countries – the 
global financial inclusion dataset (Global Findex) 2011 and examine the association between 
financial inclusion and welfare in a cross-section of 37 SSA countries. The Global Findex is the 
first-ever household survey dataset that contains information on both the demand and supply sides 
at individual level on access and use of financial services across countries. The dataset provides a 
new set of indicators collected by surveying about 150,000 adults in 148 economies, focusing on 
how they borrow, manage risk, save and make payments. The data can be disaggregated into 
geographical regions and individual characteristics, facilitating analysis and comparability across 
countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013: 282 and 286). Studies based on this dataset 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a, 2012b; Allen et al., 2014) have mainly provided a general 
overview of financial inclusion across countries. Hence, the questions of interest are: what is the 
relationship between financial inclusion and welfare? Which aspects of financial inclusion are 
instrumental in affecting welfare either negative or positive? By providing empirical answers to 
these questions, this chapter fills an important gap in the financial inclusion and welfare space in 
SSA. 
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents some stylised facts about 
SSA. Section 4.3 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature. Section 4.4 discusses the 
methodology and data sources. Section 4.5 reports and discusses results and Section 4.6 draws 
conclusions, makes recommendations and suggests areas for further research. 
4.2 STYLISED FACTS ABOUT SSA 
Chuhan-Pole et al. (2014) predict that the economic growth rate for SSA in 2015-2016 will be about 
5.2%, up from 4.6% in 2014, and that it will rise further to 5.3% by 2017. However, the main 
concern is how to ensure that such a prospective growth is inclusive as past experience has shown 
that economic growth seems to have historically benefited only a few elites as evidenced by the 
high proportion of people in SSA (46.85% as of 2011) surviving on US$1.25 or less a day 
(PovcalNet, 2014). The resultant wealth concentration in the hands of a few individuals in the 
region has resulted in a millionaire growth boom. For example, it is projected that after ten years, 
the increase in percentage of millionaires in Africa including SSA will reach 59% – higher than any 
other region in the world (Frank, 2015). This continued increase in wealth concentration is probably 
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the reason why income inequality keeps rising despite robust growth over two decades (see Figure 
4.1). 
Figure 4.1: 10 years predicted regional growth in millionaires 
North America 
23%
Latin 
America 
50%
Africa 59%
Europe 
25%
Middle 
East 40%
Russia/CIS 
25%
Asia 
48%
Australiasia 
23%
Source: By Authors using data from Frank, 2015:19  
Figure 4.2: Access and use of formal financial services in SSA 
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The information presented in Figure 4.2 reveals that about 40.3% and 60% of adults 15 years and 
older in sub-Saharan Africa had saved some money in the past 12 months in 2011 and 2014 
respectively. However, only 14.3% and 16% indicated saving at formal institutions. Furthermore, 
about 55% of adults 15 years and older had initiated a loan in the past 12 months in 2014 and only 
6.3% managed to secure a formal loan. Unfortunately, this question was not asked in the 2011 
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survey. Apparently, individuals who cannot save and borrow formally tend to the informal sector as 
is evident by the growth in informal savings and borrowings illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.3: The 40% poorest access and use of formal financial services in SSA 
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Accordingly, SSA has a huge unmet demand for financial services, which therefore suggest high 
potential for financial sector expansion, as illustrated by Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Overall, account 
penetration has increased from 24% in 2011 to 34.2% in 2014, although there is a huge unmet 
demand for loans and saving facilities both by the poorest 40% of the population and in the rural 
areas. The poorest 40% of the population and rural dwellers, who are often excluded from the 
formal financial system, show strong demand for borrowing and saving facilities (see Figures 4.3 
and 4.4). This suggests unexplored opportunities presented by the poorest and informal sector that 
can be harnessed to promote inclusive economic growth. 
Figure 4.4: Formal versus informal use of financial services in SSA 
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The growth potential of the informal sector has largely remained unrealised due to the sector’s 
limited access to economic resources. As such, the current growth model in SSA, which focuses on 
the formal sector and is driven mainly by mining, oil and gas, is not sufficiently broad-based as it 
employs very few people. The Chuhan-Pole et al. (2014) report pointed out that such a narrow focus 
has serious implications for poverty reduction and that growth in the agricultural and services 
sectors in SSA has led to more poverty reduction than growth in industry. Thus, the integration of 
the informal sector, with a particular focus on increasing rural agricultural productivity to boost 
rural income, will play a critical role in reducing poverty and income inequality. Such a structural 
transformation requires more investment in rural public goods and services such as education, 
health care, rural roads and electrification. The financial sector can drive this process of inclusive 
growth by providing financial access to all who can use it and have a need for it, in particular the 
poorest 40% and rural SMEs. 
4.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.3.1 Conceptual framework  
There is no universally accepted definition of financial inclusion since the term is multidimensional 
by nature and varies depending on the specific agenda of countries. Generally, however, financial 
inclusion covers all initiatives directed towards making formal financial services available, 
accessible and affordable to everyone in a given society with a particular focus on those previously 
excluded from the formal financial sector (AfDB, 2013: 25). This includes activities of participants 
in the formal and semi-formal sectors such as commercial banks, development finance institutions, 
post offices, microfinance banks, credit unions and cooperatives. The concept of financial inclusion 
therefore stretches beyond improving access to credit to include facilitating access to savings, 
enhancing risk management and ensuring the development of an efficient financial infrastructure 
that allows individuals and firms to participate fully in the economy while protecting consumer 
rights (AfDB, 2013: 25)15.  
It is worth noting that access to financial services and the actual use thereof are two distinct 
concepts. Voluntary financial exclusion may occur because of indirect usage through a family 
member or lack of demand for financial services, or some individuals may have the need for 
financial services but face serious physical barriers to access. Such involuntary exclusion is a 
problem and can be associated with one of the following reasons: (i) remoteness of the places where 
households live, (ii) unfavourable conditions attached to financial products, (iii) the prices of the 
                                               
15 See World Bank (2008); AFI (2010); ACCION (2009) and Gardeva and Rhyne (2011) for other definitions. 
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products offered are not affordable, (iv) lack of knowledge of available financial products due to a 
lack of marketing, and (v) self-exclusion for fear of rejection (Kempson and Whyley 1999: 2). 
4.3.2 The theoretical linkages between financial inclusion and welfare 
One of the biggest challenges of financial inclusion studies is that the theoretical linkages with 
welfare are still at the early stages of development. According to Ellis et al. (2010: 4) several 
mechanisms exist that connect financial access to growth, which in turn leads to welfare 
improvement, and this varies depending on the types of financial access concerned. Typically, this 
can occur through formal account ownership, saving or deposits, credit, insurance and the payment 
system. 
Firstly, ownership of a formal bank account can increase asset accumulation and serve as a means 
of greater economic empowerment, particularly among women. Thus, a formal account serves as 
the entry point into the formal financial system. It provides an opportunity for households to 
accumulate lump sums to invest in income-generating activities such micro-enterprises, purchase-
farming inputs such as tractors and fertilisers, plan for their retirement, invest in the education of 
their children, and manage day-to-day risk. Hence, a basic account serves as a store-of-value, for 
precautionary purposes and a safe place to store money outside the home to avoid temptation 
spending and lending to friends and family members (Radcliffe and Voorhies, 2012: 5). 
Secondly, access to health insurance will improve the welfare of the poor, particularly as they have 
limited financial resources to afford out-of-pocket expenditure for health care services. In the 
absence of access to health insurance, the poor will have to pay medical bills from their own 
pockets. This increased cost of health services may push the poor to resort to informal sources of 
health services such as drug stores or to rely on self-medication with potential adverse 
consequences. Thus, a financial system that provides tailor-made services such as micro-insurance 
schemes will improve access to health care services for the poor, thereby improving health-related 
outcomes. The reduction in out-of-pocket expenditure will reduce asset loss, increase savings and 
induce higher demand and use of health care services. Finally, participation in personal health 
insurance schemes may also alert beneficiaries about preventive care and encourage them to go for 
regular check-ups (Pham and Pham, 2012). 
Thirdly, the theoretical links through which electronic payments can influence welfare centre 
around improved efficiency, cost reduction and minimisation of leakages and connectivity. In the 
absence of an electronic payment system, individuals and employers have to queue in a bank to 
collect salaries or collect money to pay workers. The introduction of an electronic payment system 
reduces the transaction cost of carrying cash around and time spent in queues in banks, and creates a 
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reliable connection between government, employers, employees and families for direct payment of 
social grants, wages, and remittances to friends and families abroad. More importantly, an 
electronic payment system can create a platform for other institutions to provide additional services 
to rural households as well as creating new business opportunities (Ehrbeck et al., 2010).  
Finally, the exact effect of improved access to credit on welfare is not clear-cut, particularly with 
regard to income inequality. According to the World Bank (2008), improved access to credit is 
likely to increase income inequality in the short run but the magnitude of the effect will depend on 
the number of people with access to credit. If a large number of people gain financial access, the 
effect on income inequality would be spread over a larger population and its effect may start to 
materialise almost immediately. Wider access to financial services entails increased competition 
within financial intermediaries, which in turn is likely to reduce intermediation costs and improve 
access to credit for potential entrepreneurs. This will lead to increased productivity over time as the 
new entrants use their new fortunes to create jobs through the expansion of their businesses and 
inequality will decline in the long run (Klapper et al., 2006). Giné and Townsend (2004) in the case 
of Thailand used general equilibrium models with micro data to confirm that the greatest 
quantitative effect of financial access on the welfare of the poor comes through this indirect labour 
market channel. However, depending on the distribution of entrepreneurial ability, wealth and the 
productivity of labour and capital, income inequality will fall in the long run. Since the desired 
effect on welfare can only be observed over the long run, financial inclusion may increase income 
inequality in the short run, particularly when the financial sector is highly exclusive. 
This theoretical exposition suggests that in the absence of financial market imperfections, 
individuals with the greatest entrepreneurial ability will gain access to credit to finance their 
projects, implying that entrepreneurial activity will be a function of ability and not parental wealth. 
As such, the return on investment for entrepreneurship will be a function of ability and not of 
dynastic assets and connection. Hence, in an efficient and competitive financial market 
environment, the resources of the society will flow to talented and innovative individuals and not to 
those with the most assets historically (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). This breaks down into a 
situation where individual’s talent and ability determine their occupational choices to become either 
wage earners or entrepreneurs (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). The above analogy suggests that the 
effect of financial inclusion on some dimensions of welfare such as income inequality may be 
positive in the short run.  
4.3.3 Empirical literature  
While early evidence (Beck et al., 2007a) suggests that financial inclusion reduces poverty and 
income inequality, such evidence is still in its infancy. A very limited number of empirical studies 
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have examined the effect of financial inclusion on income inequality. In the interest of readability, 
the literature review is divided into two sections: African studies, and studies outside Africa. 
Furthermore, since there are limited empirical studies on the effects of financial access on income 
inequality, the literature review will also include some relevant country-specific studies that 
examine the effect of financial access on household income.  
At the time of writing, just three empirical studies have examined the effect of microfinance on 
income inequality in Africa (Copestake, 20021; Kai and Hamori, 2009; Tchouassi, 2011). The 
conventional belief from the donor community is that by improving access to finance for the poor, 
microfinance reduces market distortion, which in turn reduces income inequality. However, because 
of the quest to achieve financial sustainability, microfinance can both reduce and increase income 
inequality. Copestake (2002), following this line of argument, developed a group base lending 
model to examine the divergent effects of the Christian Enterprise Trust of Zambia microcredit 
scheme operated on the Zambian Copperbelt on income distribution. The author regressed the real 
household income per adult equivalent against the value of the loan before multiplying the answer 
by a dummy set of one for households below the poverty line, and zero for those above the poverty 
line. The results suggest that access to loans exerts a significantly greater impact on those below the 
poverty line than on those above it. Moreover, the overall evidence reveals that the effect of 
microcredit varies depending on who gets a loan, who graduates to a bigger loan, and who drops 
from the programme, as well as the dynamism of the group. This implies that microfinance has a 
polarising effect on income inequality. 
Tchouassi (2011) also examined the effect of microfinance on income inequality and vulnerability 
in eleven central African countries. The author used the degree of microfinance intensity to capture 
the effect of microfinance on inequality and employed OLS and random effect. The results show 
that a dense network of microfinance reduces income inequality. This finding corroborates the 
results of Kai and Hamori (2009), who employed the same methodology for 61 developing 
countries, including African countries, to examine the effect of microfinance on income inequality. 
These two studies suggest that a denser network of microfinance institutions reduces income 
inequality. 
The lack of access to financial services such as a basic bank account experienced by the rural poor 
has been identified as a major limitation to accumulating assets, smoothing consumption and 
investing in the education of their children. This has resulted in an ever-growing income inequality 
between the rich and the poor. Allen et al. (2012) used household surveys and bank penetration data 
at district level in 2006 and 2009 to explore the effect of Equity Bank’s branch expansion in rural 
Kenya. Using OLS, ordered probit model and GMM to control for endogeneity: their results show 
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that Equity Bank’s branch expansion into underserved rural districts had the greatest effect on low-
income households with no salaried job, those who had lower than secondary education, and those 
who were homeless. The study further found that the penetration of Equity Bank into rural areas 
increased the chances of having a bank account and securing a loan by four and one percentage 
points respectively. Dupas and Robinson (2013) also found that the use of a commitment saving 
account increased the average daily investment for market women in the treatment group by 38% to 
56% after four to six months compared to market women without the commitment saving account. 
Evidence further showed that the electronic platform created by the mobile phone based money 
transfer (M-Pesa) has an indirect effect on income inequality. This is transmitted through domestic 
and international remittances, job creation, risk sharing and management as well as subsidiary 
businesses that have developed to use the platform (Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Mbiti and Weil, 2011; 
Ondiege, 2013; Buku and Meredith, 2013; Jack and Suri, 2014). 
The Mzansi account implemented in South Africa’s commercial banks to correct the injustice of the 
previous government is another suitable example of promoting access to financial services. Using 
the financial diaries dataset, Bankable Frontier Associates (2010) constructed a set of indictors to 
describe changes in saving behaviour and usage, accumulation within a month as a ratio of monthly 
income, and monthly balances as a ratio of total financial assets, and measured changes to these 
indicators for other instruments such as retirement annuities and informal instruments. Their results 
revealed an overall increase in income across the financial diary sample from 2004 to 2009 when 
the effect of inflation was taken into account. The median per capita income of households in the 
sample increased by 2.4% on average adjusted for inflation but this increase varied across sample 
sites. Evidence suggests this increase in per capita income raised the overall monthly saving rate in 
the sample from 20% of income in 2004 to 23% of income in 2009, while the frequency of bank use 
increased on average from 2.9 to 5 transactions per month. In terms of bank balances, per capita 
income increased from 33% to 48% of financial assets in 2004 and 2009 respectively, whereas 
saving ‘under the mattresses declined slightly from 19.3% to 17% of financial assets over the same 
period. However, the evidence is not strong enough to attribute the entire increase in formal 
financial use to the Mzansi account offering only. Also in the South African context, Karlan and 
Zinman (2007) confirmed that access to consumer credit for households whose applications had 
previously been rejected significantly improved welfare. Households in the treatment group were 
more likely to retain their jobs, increase income, and improve food consumption quality and 
quantity than the control group. 
Country-specific studies outside Africa have produced similar results, particularly on the extension 
of financial services and physical access such as rural bank branch expansion into rural areas. For 
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instance, the Mexican Saving Institute and Banco Aztco of Mexico’s expansion into rural areas in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s increased average savings of low-income earners by 3% to 5% and 
informal business growth by 7% (Aportela, 1999; Bruhn and Love, 2013). Burgess and Pande 
(2005) found similar results in India using evidence from the Indian social banking experiment. 
They employed regression analysis using two dependent variables: headcount poverty and rural 
agricultural wages. Their results showed a drop in poverty headcount ratio by 4.10 percentage 
points for every additional bank branch opened in a rural area. The evidence suggests that easy 
access to loans encourages long-term investments, which in turn increases wages for rural 
agricultural labourers.  
In a cross-country study, Honohan (2007) examined variation in households’ access to financial 
services by constructing new access indicators using information from commercial banks and 
microfinance institutions. The new access indicator was then tested to examine its effect on income 
inequality. The results from OLS estimation suggest that the access indicator is strongly correlated 
with income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, suggesting that countries with better 
financial access have lower income inequality. Similarly, Beck et al. (2007b) and Bae et al. (2012) 
found that liberalising the intrastate bank branching restriction in the United States reduced income 
inequality. More specifically, bank branch deregulation reduced income inequality by improving 
the incomes of lower income workers because deregulation increased bank efficiency, which in turn 
enhanced the per capita income growth rate of each state. Similarly, Mookerjee and Kalipioni 
(2010) found in a cross-country study that a higher number of bank branches per 100,000 adults 
reduced income inequality. 
Park and Mercado (2015) and García-Herrero and Turégano (2015) examined whether financial 
inclusion contributes to reducing income inequality. The former constructed a financial inclusion 
index, which they used to examine the relationship between poverty and income inequality in 
developing Asia. Their results show that financial inclusion reduces poverty and lowers income 
inequality. Meanwhile, the latter measured financial inclusion from various dimensions such as 
adults with bank accounts and credit to SMEs as percentage of GDP using Honohan’s (2007) access 
indicator and Sarma’s (2012) financial inclusion index. After controlling for a host of other factors, 
their results also revealed that financial inclusion reduced income inequality, whereas after 
controlling for the effect of fiscal policy and economic development, private sector credit to GDP 
did not.  
However, Randomised Control Trials (RCT) seem not to support these positive effects of access to 
finance on welfare. For example, there are allegations of increased suicide attempts in India linked 
to over-indebtedness of microfinance participants (Duflo et al., 2013). Specifically, empirical 
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updates of the Spandana study in Hyderabad, India, show no improvement in the welfare of 
participants. Fifteen to eighteen months after gaining access, households are less likely to be 
entrepreneurs but they invest more in existing businesses. Moreover, average profit increased only 
for businesses that had existed before the launch of the microcredit programme, and the increases 
generally concentrated on bigger businesses (Duflo et al., 2013). This suggests widening income 
inequality. 
From the foregoing review, one can draw the following conclusions: first, there is no empirical 
cross-country evidence at the macro level in the African context on the relationship between 
financial inclusion and income inequality, although a few micro-level studies exist. Second, 
available country-specific and cross-country studies on access consistently show that greater access 
to financial services, such as saving and bank branch extension into rural areas, reduces income 
inequality. However, RCT studies focusing on microfinance challenged these results. Thus, there is 
a considerable gap at the macro level on the relationship between financial inclusion and income 
inequality in SSA, and this accordingly deserves attention giving the rising level of income 
inequality in the face of the robust economic growth rate achieved by the region in the last two 
decades.  
4.4 METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Model specification 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the study is based on a cross-section of 37 SSA countries from the 
Global Findex (2011) dataset. The study adopts the empirical model of Clarke et al. (2006: 584) 
with some modification, specified as: 
ii2i1i εcontrolsβFIβαY   …(4.1) 
where Y represents proxies of welfare used in the study such as income inequality, poverty 
headcount measured as less than US$1.25 a day, under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births and 
HDI. FI represents financial inclusion as measured by account ownership, account use for business, 
electronic payment, loans from formal financial institutions, formal loans to pay school fees, health 
insurance and formal savings, disaggregated according to gender and locality (rural and urban). β1 
are the coefficients of financial inclusion, β2 represents the coefficients of the control variables and 
Ɛi is the white noise error term. We expect the coefficient of β1 to be negative, suggesting that 
greater financial inclusion improves welfare. However, the coefficient of β1 can also be positive, 
particularly in SSA where evidence of excess liquidity has been documented (Saxegaard, 2006; 
Asongu, 2014). This is reinforced by the existence of institutional factors such as interest rate caps 
(Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014). Interest rate caps provide incentives for banks to hold excess 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
71 
 
liquidity because lending may not be profitable enough to cover the costs and concomitant risk. The 
control variables used include the inflation rate, to condition for the effect of the macroeconomic 
environment since high inflation hurts the poor more than the rich as the latter can hedge their 
exposure. The gross national income (GNI) per capita and GDP per capita annual growth 
(GDPPKG) rate are used to control for mean income and economic growth rate respectively. Mean 
years of schooling are used to control for the effect of education, governance index, derived using a 
principal component analysis from six governance indicators16 to control for institutional influence. 
Finally, expenditure on health and assets are used to condition for the effect of public sector 
spending on basic health care and non-financial assets accumulation respectively. Financial 
inclusion data are accessed from the Global Findex (2011), mean years of school and income 
inequality from UNDP (2011) and the other variables from World Bank Development Indicators 
(2014). The choice of these control variables is based on the theoretical discussion in Section 4.3.2 
and previous studies such as Dabla-Norris et al. (2015). Meanwhile, Table 4.1b at the end of the 
chapter provides summary statistics of the welfare proxies (dependent) and the control variables. 
Simple correlation analysis is then performed to determine correlated variables and highly 
correlated variables are not included in the same model (see Table 4.1a for details). The analysis 
also controls for heteroskedasticity by using robust standard error options in the estimation of all the 
models. From Equation 4.1, three different models are estimated and only models that are 
significant and make economic sense, with R-squared equal to or greater than 20%, are reported. 
Model 1: 
ii6i5i4i3i2i1i εinfβlogtradeβhealthexpβGDPPKGβlogGNIβFIβαY   
Model 2: 
ii6i5i4i3i2i1i εinfβlogtradeβhealthexpβGDPPKGβhumkβFIβαY   
Model 3: 
ii6i5i4i3i2i1i εlogassetsβlogtradeβhealthexpβGDPPKGβhumkβFIβαY   
The association between financial inclusion and welfare is estimated, by regressing each measure of 
welfare against all the seven aspects of financial inclusion. For example, HDI and financial 
inclusion, this will amount to 3x5x7 = 105 models estimated for all the aspects of financial 
inclusion disaggregated by gender, rural and urban. Complete results are presented at the end of this 
chapter (Tables 4.2a to 4.13a). 
                                               
16 Control of corruption, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The correlation analysis showed that the livestock production index (assets) correlates at 1% level 
of significance with inflation rate and with gross domestic product per capita annual growth at 5% 
level of significance. Governance index, health expenditure, primary school enrolment and gross 
national income per capita are both correlated at 5% level of significance. Meanwhile gross national 
income per capita correlates at 1% level of significance with primary school enrolment. None of 
these highly correlated variables are included in the same equation to avoid the problem of multi-
collinearity. We also controlled for the possibility of heteroskedasticity by using robust standard 
error options in the estimation of all the models. 
Table 4.1a: Correlation coefficients between control variables 
Variables Assets GDPPKG Governance 
Index 
Health 
Expenditure 
Human 
Capital 
Inflation Log GNI 
Assets 1.000 -0.436 0.287* 0.077 -0.083 -0.655*** 0.025 
Prob ----- 0.007** 0.085 0.649 0.622 0.000 0.885 
GDPPKG  -0.436** 1.000 0.113 0.174 -0.001 0.400* -0.179 
Prob 0.007 ----- 0.506 0.304 0.996 0.014 0.289 
Governance  
Index 
 0.287* 0.113 1.000 0.477** 0.425** -0.319* 0.478** 
Prob  0.085 0.506 ----- 0.003 0.009 0.055 0.003 
Health  
Expenditure 
0.077 0.174 0.477** 1.000 0.208 -0.186 0.099 
Prob    0.649 0.304 0.003 ----- 0.217 0.271 0.562 
Human capital   -0.084 -0.001 0.425** 0.208 1.00 0.179 0.669*** 
Prob   0.622 0.996 0.009 0.217 ----- 0.288 0.000 
Inflation -0.655*** 0.400* -0.319* -0.186 0.179 1.000 -0.130 
Prob 0.000 0.014 0.055 0.271 0.288 ----- 0.445 
Log GNI 0.025 -0.179 0.478** 0.099 0.669*** -0.130 1.000 
Prob 0.885 0.289 0.003 0.562 0.000 0.445 ----- 
 
Note: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
 
Four welfare indicators are used to examine their association with seven aspects of financial 
inclusion and the result of significant models are reported and discussed. Starting with HDI, four 
aspects of financial inclusion (account ownership, electronic payments, formal loan and saving) 
show a positive association with HDI. Tables 4.2 to 4.5 report these results.  
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Table 4.2: HDI and account  
Models Account Account 
female 
Account 
male 
Account 
rural 
Account  
urban 
Model 1 
 
0.002** 
(2.10) 
0.002** 
(1.99) 
0.001** 
(2.09) 
0.001** 
(1.98) 
0.001** 
(2.46) 
Model 2 0.002*** 
(3.45) 
0.002*** 
(3.15) 
 0.002*** 
 (3.53) 
0.002*** 
(3.31) 
0.001** 
(1.93) 
Model 3 0.002*** 
(3.03) 
0.002*** 
(2.84) 
0.002*** 
(3.14) 
0.002*** 
(2.87) 
0.001* 
(1.80) 
No. observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.76 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
Table 4.2 shows that the HDI has a positive association with account ownership, implying that 
formal account ownership may help to improve the overall welfare of individuals regardless of 
gender and geographical region. Since the dependent and independent variables are in their original 
scale, this means that a one unit increase in formal account ownership will lead to 0.002 units in 
overall HDI, holding other factors constant. However, the improvement is smaller for males, and in 
rural as well as urban areas (0.001 units). All nine models estimated are statistically significant at 
least at 10% level, with an average goodness of fit of above 75%.  
Table 4.3: HDI and electronic payment 
Models E-pay 
devices 
 
E-pay 
devices 
female 
E-Pay 
devices 
male 
E-pay 
devices 
rural 
E-pay 
devices 
urban 
Model 1 
 
-0.003 
(-1.28) 
-0.003* 
(-1.76) 
-0.002** 
(-0.82) 
-0.004** 
(-2.20) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
Model 2 0.004*** 
(2.85) 
0.003*** 
(2.95) 
0.005*** 
(2.25) 
0.004*** 
(2.80) 
0.003** 
(2.92) 
Model 3 0.004*** 
(2.66) 
0.002** 
(2.19) 
0.004** 
(2.10) 
0.003** 
(2.57) 
0.002** 
(2.51) 
No. of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses 
  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
When it comes to the association between HDI and electronic payment devices (Table 4.3), the 
results are mixed, with the first model estimated suggesting a negative association whereas the other 
two models indicate positive and significant association between electronic payment and HDI. This 
is likely to reflect the reality that not everyone derives the same level of satisfaction and gain from 
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using financial services. Some individuals may find themselves in debt because of using financial 
services, hence the negative relationship holds. On the other hand, others may benefit significantly 
by using financial services, for example by using electronic payment systems to receive payment 
from the sale of goods and remittances and to pay quickly for goods rather than standing in a queue 
to get cash from a teller. Overall, these outcomes are expected from using financial services.  
Table 4.4: HDI and formal loan 
Models Formal 
loan 
Formal loan 
female 
Formal loan 
male 
Formal loan 
rural 
Formal loan 
urban 
Model 1 
 
0.006** 
(2.24) 
0.005 
(1.60) 
0.006** 
(2.66) 
0.006** 
(2.55) 
0.002 
(0.92) 
Model 2 0.007* 
(1.66) 
0.003 
(0.95) 
0.007** 
(2.34) 
0.007* 
(1.86) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
Model 3 0.007 
(1.56) 
0.002 
(0.72) 
0.008** 
(2.28) 
0.007* 
(1.70) 
0.002 
(0.76) 
No. of observations  37  37   37    37     37 
Adj-R-square 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
 
Finally, for the association between HDI and formal loan and saving, the results are positive, as 
expected, but weak as most of the results are not significant (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). However, it 
should be noted that the HDI is a composite index comprising life expectancy at birth, years of 
schooling and the standard of living as measured by gross national income per capita (PPP$). As 
such, it may be difficult to determine the true association and thus other welfare indicators are 
considered. Furthermore, evidence from the results suggests that the magnitude of the association 
between HDI and financial inclusion is small, as indicated by the estimated coefficients. 
Table 4.5: HDI and formal saving 
Models Formal 
saving 
Formal saving 
female 
Formal saving 
male 
Formal saving 
rural 
Formal saving  
urban 
Model 1 
 
0.001 
(1.02) 
0.004** 
(2.08) 
0.002* 
(1.88) 
0.003* 
(1.89) 
0.001 
(1.63) 
Model 2 0.001 
(0.65) 
0.003* 
(1.65) 
0.003* 
(1.78) 
0.003 
(1.48) 
0.001 
(1.09) 
Model 3 0.000 
(0.47) 
0.003 
(1.37) 
0.002 
(1.52) 
0.002 
(1.15) 
0.001 
(1.01) 
No. of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
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A second measure of welfare discussed in this chapter is headcount poverty ratio as measured by 
less than US$1.25 a day. We expect financial inclusion to reduce the number of people living on 
less than US$1.25 a day by offering them the opportunity to accumulate assets through saving for 
retirement or small microenterprise activities, smoothing consumption and managing risk. 
However, from the seven aspects of financial inclusion examined only health insurance shows a 
negative association with poverty headcount ratio. This means that holding other factors constant, a 
one unit increase in access to health insurance will reduce the overall headcount poverty ratio by 2.8 
units, and between gender, it reduces the headcount poverty ratio by 2.7 units for female and 2.4 
units for male. Across the regions and particularly in the rural areas, a one unit increase in access to 
health insurance reduces the headcount poverty ratio by 2.9 units, holding other factors constant. 
Health insurance also reduces headcount poverty in urban areas but the effect is insignificant (see 
Table 4.6, model 2). This relationship is significant at least at the 10% level with a goodness of fit 
of above 35%. This demonstrates the importance of health insurance for the poor, such as micro-
insurance to reduce out-of-pocket expenditure on health care services and to avoid asset loss. 
Another aspect of financial inclusion that had a negative association with headcount poverty ratio is 
loans to pay school fees. Although only three out of the fifteen models estimated are statistically 
significant at most at the 5% level, the rest display a negative relationship with headcount poverty 
ratio except in urban areas where the relationship is positive but insignificant (Table 4.7).  
Table 4.6: Poverty headcount ratio and health insurance 
Models Health 
insurance 
 
Health 
insurance 
female 
Health 
insurance 
male 
Health 
insurance 
rural 
Health 
insurance 
urban 
Model 1 
 
-0.718 
(-0.79) 
-0.677 
(-0.82) 
-0.600 
(-0.72) 
-0.871 
(-0.98) 
-0.326 
(-0.63) 
Model 2 -2.831** 
(-2.36) 
-2.743* 
(-1.94) 
-2.351** 
(-2.46) 
-2.905** 
(-2.03) 
-1.069 
(-1.09) 
Model 3 -2.058 
(-1.62) 
-1.919 
(-1.55) 
-1.777 
(-1.62) 
-2.026 
(-1.30) 
-0.857 
(-0.92) 
No. of observations 37     37    37  37     37 
Adj-R-square  0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.33 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
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Table 4.7: Poverty headcount ratio and loan to pay school fees 
Models Educloan 
 
Educloan 
female 
Educloan 
male 
Educloan 
rural 
Educloan 
urban 
Model 1 
 
-0.845 
(-1.18) 
-0.616 
(-0.86) 
-0.875 
(-1.27) 
-0.916 
(-1.46) 
0.312 
(0.44) 
Model 2 -1.24 
(-1.60) 
-0.758 
(-0.89) 
-1.392* 
(-1.85) 
-1.282** 
(-1.99) 
0.433 
(0.53) 
Model 3 -1.006 
(-1.29) 
-0.562 
(-0.63) 
-1.184 
(-1.61) 
-1.069* 
(-1.67) 
0.587 
(0.71) 
No. of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.36 0.32 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
These results suggest that financial inclusion, specifically health insurance and loans to pay school 
fees, are essential strategies to reduce the number of people living on less than $1.25 a day. That is, 
improving access to these essential financial services across the entire population will enhance 
welfare of the society. 
Thirdly, we also examined the association between the under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live 
births and the seven aspects of financial inclusion: only account ownership, formal loan and health 
insurance showed significant results. We expect financial inclusion to assist individuals build assets 
as a cushion for adverse economic conditions. The results reported in Tables 4.8 to 4.10 confirm our 
a priori expectations in Section 4.4.1 of a negative association. For example, account ownership 
serves as the entry level into the formal financial system, enabling individuals to accumulate 
savings that can be used to mitigate negative shocks such as illness. It also enables users to create a 
transaction history, facilitating easy access to credit for emergencies. From Table 4.8 model 1, the 
estimates mean that a one unit increase in account ownership will reduce the overall under-five 
mortality rate per 1,000 live births by 0.84 units, holding other factors constant. Disaggregating the 
data, a one unit increase in account ownership reduces the under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live 
births by 0.81 units for females, 0.82 units for males and 0.83 units for residents in rural areas, 
holding other factors constant. 
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Table 4.8: Under five mortality and account 
Models Account Account 
female 
Account 
male 
Account 
Rural 
Account  
urban 
Model 1 
 
-0.839** 
(-2.24) 
-0.806* 
(-1.94) 
-0.815** 
(-2.38) 
-0.828** 
(-2.42) 
-0.263 
(-0.79) 
Model 2 -0.741* 
(-1.71) 
-0.695** 
(-2.46) 
-0.745** 
(-1.98) 
-0.774** 
(-2.00) 
-0.154 
(-0.41) 
Model 3 -0.755* 
(-1.74) 
-0.707 
(-1.43) 
-0.757** 
(-2.01) 
-0.786** 
(-2.02) 
-0.176 
(-0.48) 
No. of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.42 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.36 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
Table 4.9: Under five mortality per 1,000 live births and formal loans 
Models Formal 
loan 
Formal Loan 
female 
Formal Loan 
male 
Formal Loan 
rural 
Formal Loan 
urban 
Model 1 
 
-3.706** 
(-2.27) 
-3.008 
(-1.61) 
-3.422*** 
(-2.82) 
-3.684*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.394 
(-0.27) 
Model 2 -3.286* 
(-1.69) 
-2.374 
(-1.27) 
-3.196** 
(-2.17) 
-3.475** 
(-2.14) 
-0.095 
(-0.07) 
Model 3 -3.529* 
(-1.85) 
-2.647 
(-1.46) 
-3.361** 
(-2.32) 
-3.788** 
(-2.40) 
-0.131 
(-0.10) 
No. of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.47 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 
Source: By authors 
The interpretation of formal loan and health insurance are similar, as shown above. However, it is 
important to observe that is the magnitude of the coefficient for formal loans and health insurance is 
higher than that of account ownership, suggesting that the effect of financial inclusion on welfare is 
felt more when individuals use financial access. Comparing the results between rural and urban 
areas, the evidence revealed rural dwellers benefit more than urban areas. This reflects a shortage of 
services in the rural areas. A look at the World Bank World Development Indicators database 
(WDI) reveals that rural population (% of total population) in sub-Saharan Africa is between 56% 
and 88% with the exception of countries such as South Africa, Djibouti, Gabon, Botswana, 
Mauritania and Cape Verde. Furthermore, access to electricity in rural areas (% of rural population) 
ranged from 1.2% to 23% with the exception of South Africa (67%), Ghana, Cape Verde and Sao 
Tome above 40%, and Mauritius (100%). This highlights the need for service delivery in the rural 
areas and the impact this will have on welfare. For example, from Table 4.9 model 1, it can be seen 
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that a one unit increase in formal loans reduces the under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births in 
rural areas by 3.7 units and the same increase will only reduce the under-five mortality rate per 
1,000 live births in urban areas by 0.39 units: the effect is not significant. Similarly, holding other 
factors constant, a one unit increase in access to health insurance reduces the under-five mortality 
rate per 1,000 live births in rural areas by 3.6 units compared to an insignificant 1.4 unit reduction 
reported in urban areas (see Table 4.10).  
Table 4.10: Under five mortality per 1,000 live births and health insurance 
Models Health 
insurance 
 
Health 
insurance 
female 
Health 
insurance 
male 
Health 
insurance 
rural 
Health 
insurance 
urban 
Model 1 
 
-3.122 
(-1.51) 
-1.064 
(-0.66) 
-3.738** 
(-2.14) 
-3.583* 
(-1.78) 
-1.391 
(-1.34) 
Model 2 -3.049 
(-1.45) 
-1.442 
(-0.76) 
-3.472** 
(-2.46) 
-4.045* 
(-1.72) 
-0.495 
(-0.51) 
Model 3 -2.837 
(-1.42) 
-1.273 
(-0.68) 
--3.286** 
(-2.23) 
-3.841* 
(-1.66) 
-0.513 
(-0.53) 
No. of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.50 0.53 0.47 0.51 0.48 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
 ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
The final indicator of welfare examined is the association of financial inclusion with income 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. As discussed earlier in the theoretical linkages 
section 4.3.2, financial inclusion is likely to increase income inequality in the short run particularly 
when the level is low (as analysed in Chapter 2). Thus, based on the analysis, three aspects of 
financial inclusion – account use for business purposes, electronic payment and formal saving – 
have a positive association with Gini coefficient. This means that these aspects of financial 
inclusion will increase income inequality in the short run. The interpretation of the inequality 
income results is somewhat different from the previous results because the dependent variable Gini 
coefficient is log-transformed and the independent variable-financial inclusion is in its original 
state. Hence, as shown in Table 4.11, a one unit increase in access to account use for business 
purposes will increase the overall income inequality by 1.1% (100*0.011 = 1.1%), (100*0.016 = 
1.6% for female, (100*0.006 = 0.6) for male and (100*0.009 = 0.9 in the rural areas (model 1)) 
holding other factors constant.  
For electronic payment and formal saving, the magnitude of the increase in income inequality is 
between 0.1% and 0.6% at the aggregate and disaggregated between female, male and in the rural 
areas (Tables 4.12 and 4.13). The association is again positive and statistically significant in the 
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rural areas for account use for business purposes, electronic payment and formal saving reiterating 
the importance alluded to earlier (Column 5: Tables 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13). The same economic 
interpretation applies for electronic payment and formal saving. 
Table 4.11: Gini coefficient and account use for business 
Models Account 
bus17 
Account 
Bus female 
Account 
Bus male 
Account 
Bus rural 
Account 
Bus urban 
Model 1 
 
0.011*** 
(3.14) 
0.016*** 
(3.33) 
0.006** 
(2.65) 
0.009*** 
(2.82) 
0.001 
(1.05) 
Model 2 0.011** 
(2.61) 
0.016*** 
(2.85) 
0.006** 
(2.24) 
0.009** 
(2.58) 
0.001 
(0.68) 
Model 3 0.011*** 
(2.69) 
0.016*** 
(2.95) 
0.006** 
(2.30) 
0.009*** 
(2.69) 
0.001 
(0.71) 
No. of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.32 0.26 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
Table 4.12: Gini and electronic payment 
Models E-pay 
devices 
 
E-pay 
devices 
 female 
E-Pay 
devices 
male 
E-pay 
devices 
rural 
E-pay 
devices 
urban  
Model 1 
 
0.005** 
(2.03) 
0.006** 
(2.32) 
0.004 
(1.55) 
0.005* 
(1.79) 
0.003 
(1.22) 
Model 2 0.006*** 
(2.85) 
0.007*** 
(3.51) 
0.005* 
(1.93) 
0.006** 
(2.57) 
0.003 
(1.43) 
Model 3 0.006*** 
(2.77) 
0.007*** 
(3.40) 
0.005* 
(1.93) 
0.006** 
(2.50) 
0.003 
(1.46) 
No. of observations   37   37   37 37     37 
Adj-R-square 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.30 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
                                               
17 Percentage of adults who report using their accounts for business purposes only or for both business and personal 
transaction according to the Global Financial Inclusion Survey 2011. 
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Table 4.13: Gini and formal saving 
Models Formal 
saving 
Formal saving 
female 
Formal saving 
male 
Formal saving 
rural 
Formal saving 
urban 
Model 1 
 
0.001 
(1.41) 
0.004** 
(2.31) 
0.003** 
(2.13) 
0.004** 
(2.37) 
0.001 
(1.34) 
Model 2 0.001 
(1.33) 
0.003** 
(1.95) 
0.003* 
(1.92) 
0.004** 
(2.09) 
0.001 
(1.24) 
Model 3 0.001 
(1.39) 
0.005** 
(2.07) 
0.003** 
(2.05) 
0.004** 
(2.27) 
0.001 
(1.31) 
No. of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
Adj-R-square 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.27 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
The positive relationship between financial inclusion and welfare can be explained with the urban 
governance and practice literature in Africa. Anchoring this result within the “Africa on the rise 
narrative” suggests that the growth has not translated into discernible improvement in the welfare 
of ordinary people. While the headcount poverty ratio in SSA has fallen from 56.75% in the 1990s 
to 42.65% by 2012, the levels of income inequality have been rising. For economic growth to 
translate into welfare improvement, poverty and income inequality should both decline over time 
with a rising level of economic growth. However, from the growth experienced so far in SSA, only 
Mauritius and Botswana have witnessed rising economic growth with declining trends in poverty, 
income inequality and unemployment (Obeng-Odoom, 2015). This suggests that the economic 
growth recorded so far by sub-Saharan African countries have benefited a few elites. Borrowing 
from the urban governance and practice, the following are likely to drive these results. First, most 
African governments continue to operate on inherited colonial institutions that focus on a top-down 
approach to urban governance and practices, which fail to account for the complexities of the 
informal nature of African economies. This creates a scenario where cities are the main drivers of 
growth as oppose to national economies, leading to unequal access to and control of resources (see 
Obeng-Odoom, 2016). 
Second, the colonial institutional architecture also defines financial sector development and shapes 
economic opportunities with British common law conducive for financial development (banks and 
stock exchanges) relative to French civil law (see Gwama, 2014). This constrains financial sector 
development, especially equity and bond markets, and reduces banks’ lending options, and coupled 
with interest caps in some SSA countries, increased banks’ desire to hold excess non-remunerated 
liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014; Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014). This translates into an 
argument that although account ownership has improved in sub-Saharan Africa, it does not 
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necessarily imply an increase in credit accessibility. This is possibly because some of the account 
holders may be first time users of financial services and thus have no transaction history. As such, 
banks will not lend to them even though they have accounts because the problems of information 
asymmetry, uncertainty and risk of default continue to hold. These reasons are likely to drive the 
positive relationship between financial inclusion and income inequality observed in the analysis. 
The results from income inequality found in this study contradict the negative relationship between 
financial inclusion and income inequality documented in Asia, the developed and developing 
regions (Park and Mercado, 2015; García-Herrero and Turégano, 2015). The emerging evidence 
suggests that SSA is yet to experience inclusive and sustainable growth as the ‘Africa rising’ 
concept currently has a narrow focus on the formal sector and neglects the informal sector that 
supports livelihoods for millions of Africans.  
4.6 CONCLUSION  
This chapter analysed the relationship between four measures of welfare and seven aspects of 
financial inclusion in a cross-section of 37 SSA countries using the Global Findex 2011 dataset. The 
welfare measures are HDI, headcount poverty ratio, under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births 
and income inequality, and financial inclusion aspects are account ownership, account use for 
business, formal loans for school fees, electronic payment devices, health insurance, formal loan 
and formal saving. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter are summarised as follows: first, HDI has a positive 
relationship with account ownership, formal loan and saving. However, not all the models estimated 
for formal loan and saving were statistically significant, particularly in urban areas. Electronic 
payment showed both positive and negative association with HDI. The positive and negative 
relationships are expected since not everyone will derive the same benefit from using financial 
services.  
Secondly, headcount poverty had a negative relationship with health insurance and loan to pay 
school fees. The relationship is negative across all segments of the population except in urban areas 
where the relationship is positive for loan to pay school fees.  
Thirdly, the evidence showed that the under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births has a negative 
and statistically significant relationship with account ownership, formal loan and health insurance. 
The relationship is stronger in rural areas, and when males have access to formal loan and insurance 
compared to females.  
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Finally, income inequality showed a positive and statistically significant association with account 
use for business purposes, electronic payment and formal loan. These results are consistent with the 
long-run U-shape relationship found in Chapter 3 and reflect the true reality in SSA: robust 
economic growth with rising income inequality. This is very interesting as the two chapters used 
different datasets. Anchoring these results within the “Africa rising narrative” confirmed Obeng-
Odoom’s (2015 and 2016) findings that urban governance in Africa suffers from internal and 
externally imposed and colonial inherited problems. That is, colonial institutions principally 
designed to suppress Africans left behind institutions that propagate uneven development and this 
has been re-enforced by current urban governance and practice in Africa after independence.  
The findings have several implications for development policy makers in SSA and in Africa as a 
whole. Literature has established that the operation of the financial system can determine who starts 
a business and who cannot, as well as who can and cannot pay for education. Thus, finance 
influences the gap between the rich and the poor and the extent of persistence across generations. 
Consequently, by influencing capital allocation, the financial system can change both the rate of 
economic growth and the demand for labour, with serious implications on poverty and income 
distribution (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009: 2). Given the established link between colonial 
institutions and financial development highlighted in Section 4.5, policy makers in SSA are strongly 
encouraged to engage in genuine democratic governance to improve the quality and functioning of 
institutions to support financial sector development. Furthermore, a comprehensive approach to 
development and growth encompassing both top-down and bottom-up approaches should override 
the previous narrow focus on the formal sector in order to promote interaction and dialogue across 
all sectors of the economy. A bottom-up approach encourages local community participation in 
development initiatives, ensures community ownership of development projects, and enhances 
commitment and accountability to the development project (see Kaiser, 2012). This will stimulate 
viable economic activities in the formal and informal sectors of the economy and encourage 
financial service providers to take advantage of these opportunities and expand outreach. Finally, 
telecommunication technology and innovation in financial services delivery is encouraged to 
overcome the infrastructure deficiency. The successful models of M-Pesa and Equity Bank in 
Kenya demonstrate that banking the poor is a viable business and this model is therefore worthy of 
emulation. Hence, for development to have a trickle-down effect, the poor should be the centre of 
concern of development efforts. Given the cross-sectional nature of our dataset, these should be 
interpreted as associative and not causal effects. Although we draw insights from excess liquidity 
and institutional influence to advance possible underlying factors driving the results, none were 
modelled, hence these serve as potential areas for further research. 
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In the next chapter, because of data limitation, the analysis zoomed on South Africa to provide more 
insights of emerging evidence from Chapter 4 at the individual level. The focus will be to examine 
how financial inclusion changes asset ownership for those at the bottom end of assets distribution 
with implications for targeted social welfare policy interventions. 
Table 4.1b: Summary statistics of dependent and control variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Headcount poverty (< $1.25 a day) 37 45.76 23.38 1 87.70 
HDI 37 0.440 0.105 0.286 0.728 
Under-5 mortality rate per 1000 live birth 37 100.7 41.98 15.10 185.3 
GINI coefficient 37 44.66 7.829 33.30 64.30 
Log GNI per capita 37 1.644 0.0729 1.522 1.808 
GDP per capita growth 37 2.267 3.142 -6.866 9.400 
Human capital 37 4.557 2.120 1.200 8.900 
Health expenditure/GDP 37 2.981 1.550 0.600 8.500 
Log trade/GDP 37 1.889 0.176 1.522 2.184 
Log assets (livestock production index) 37 2.033 0.399 -0.301 2.283 
Inflation  37 10.15 16.16 -3.704 99.25 
Source: By Authors
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Table 4.2a: Human development index and account 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Account 0.002b 0.002a 0.002a 
            
 
(2.10) (3.43) (3.03) 
            Account 
   
0.002c 0.002a 0.002a 
         female 
   
(1.99) (3.15) (2.84) 
         Account 
      
0.001b 0.002a 0.002a 
      Male 
      
(2.09) (3.53) (3.14) 
      Account 
         
0.001b 0.002a 0.002a 
   Rural 
         
(1.98) (3.31) (2.87) 
   Account 
            
0.001b 0.001c 0.001c 
Urban 
            
(2.46) (1.93) (1.80) 
LogGNI 0.171a 
  
0.172a 
  
0.173a 
  
0.178a 
  
0.179a 
  
 
(6.02) 
  
(6.15) 
  
(6.09) 
  
(6.59) 
  
(8.31) 
  GDPPKG -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(-0.91) (-0.89) (-0.94) (-0.90) (-0.88) (-0.92) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.92) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-0.72) (-0.59) (-0.69) 
Health -0.001 -0.009c -0.007 -0.001 -0.009c -0.007 -0.001 -0.009c -0.007 -0.001 -0.009c -0.007 -0.002 -0.011c -0.009 
expenditure (-0.22) (-1.93) (-1.50) (-0.21) (-1.90) (-1.50) (-0.20) (-1.94) (-1.51) (-0.12) (-1.82) (-1.43) (-0.47) (-1.82) (-1.47) 
Logtrade 0.016 -0.041 -0.040 0.017 -0.039 -0.038 0.016 -0.043 -0.043 0.019 -0.039 -0.039 0.028 -0.019 -0.020 
 
(0.42) (-0.74) (-0.70) (0.44) (-0.67) (-0.63) (0.41) (-0.82) (-0.77) (0.46) (-0.72) (-0.66) (0.70) (-0.31) (-0.32) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.002a 
 
-0.001 -0.002a 
 
-0.001 -0.002a 
 
-0.001 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
 
(-1.33) (-5.03) 
 
(-1.24) (-4.72) 
 
(-1.30) (-5.24) 
 
(-1.20) (-5.06) 
 
(-1.02) (-3.90) 
 human 
 
0.037a 0.037a 
 
0.037a 0.037a 
 
0.038a 0.037a 
 
0.039a 0.038a 
 
0.040a 0.039a 
capital 
 
(8.38) (8.33) 
 
(8.57) (8.55) 
 
(8.43) (8.38) 
 
(8.57) (8.49) 
 
(9.58) (9.95) 
logAssets 
  
0.070a 
  
0.070a 
  
0.071a 
  
0.072a 
  
0.065b 
   
(3.90) 
  
(3.77) 
  
(4.01) 
  
(3.92) 
  
(3.10) 
Constant -0.120 0.358a 0.193c -0.121 0.359a 0.194 -0.126 0.358a 0.192c -0.141 0.357a 0.188 -0.170c 0.313a 0.162 
 
(-1.29) (3.73) (1.65) (-1.30) (3.57) (1.57) (-1.37) (3.87) (1.72) (-1.49) (3.68) (1.58) (-1.90) (2.89) (1.15) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj 0.74 0.82 0.79 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.74 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.78 0.75 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.3a: Human development index and electronic payment (EP) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
EP -0.003 0.004a 0.004a 
            
 
(-1.28) (2.87) (2.66) 
            EP 
   
-0.003c 0.003a 0.002b 
         female 
   
(-1.76) (2.95) (2.19) 
         EP 
      
-0.002 0.005b 0.004b 
      Male 
      
(-0.82) (2.25) (2.10) 
      EP 
         
-0.004b 0.004b 0.003b 
   rural 
         
(-2.20) (2.80) (2.57) 
   EP 
            
0.000 0.003a 0.002b 
Urban 
            
(0.02) (2.92) (2.51) 
LogGNI 0.218a 
  
0.217a 
  
0.216a 
  
0.219a 
  
0.206a 
  
 
(8.98) 
  
(9.18) 
  
(9.28) 
  
(9.77) 
  
(7.61) 
  GDPPKG -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(-0.08) (-0.03) (-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.03) (-0.17) (-0.03) (-0.08) (-0.22) (-0.03) (-0.07) (-0.20) (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.22) 
Health 0.000 -0.010c -0.009 0.000 -0.010 -0.009 -0.000 -0.010c -0.009 -0.000 -0.010c -0.008 -0.000 -0.011 -0.009 
expenditure (0.02) (-1.70) (-1.39) (0.05) (-1.66) (-1.37) (-0.02) (-1.77) (-1.44) (-0.02) (-1.63) (-1.35) (-0.08) (-1.74) (-1.42) 
Logtrade 0.045 -0.039 -0.035 0.046 -0.031 -0.028 0.043 -0.044 -0.041 0.049 -0.038 -0.034 0.035 -0.029 -0.028 
 
(0.89) (-0.60) (-0.51) (0.88) (-0.47) (-0.38) (0.87) (-0.70) (-0.61) (0.97) (-0.60) (-0.49) (0.72) (-0.45) (-0.39) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.002b 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
 
(-0.25) (-3.59) 
 
(-0.21) (-3.46) 
 
(-0.34) (-3.83) 
 
(-0.11) (-3.53) 
 
(-0.60) (-3.49) 
 human 
 
0.044a 0.044a 
 
0.045a 0.044a 
 
0.043a 0.043a 
 
0.045a 0.044a 
 
0.044a 0.043a 
capital 
 
(9.05) (8.88) 
 
(8.70) (8.45) 
 
(9.24) (9.18) 
 
(8.88) (8.70) 
 
(9.04) (8.81) 
LogAssets 
  
0.077a 
  
0.076a 
  
0.078a 
  
0.079a 
  
0.072a 
   
(2.94) 
  
(2.85) 
  
(3.12) 
  
(2.92) 
  
(2.79) 
Constant -0.286b 0.354a 0.167 -0.286b 0.341a 0.156 -0.276b 0.364a 0.176 -0.295b 0.351a 0.159 -0.238b 0.339a 0.168 
 
(-2.60) (3.13) (1.06) (-2.62) (2.85) (0.93) (-2.62) (3.33) (1.20) (-2.74) (3.10) (1.00) (-2.10) (2.96) (1.04) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.72 0.71 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.76 0.73 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.4a: Human and formal loan 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Formal 0.006b 0.007c 0.007 
            Loan (2.24) (1.66) (1.56) 
            formal 
   
0.005 0.003 0.002 
         Loan-fem 
   
(1.60) (0.95) (0.72) 
         formal 
      
0.006a 0.007b 0.008b 
      Loan-male 
      
(2.66) (2.34) (2.28) 
      formal 
         
0.006b 0.007c 0.007 
   Loan rural 
         
(2.55) (1.86) (1.70) 
   formal 
            
0.002 0.002 0.002 
loan urban 
            
(0.92) (0.75) (0.76) 
logGNI 0.191a 
  
0.202a 
  
0.183a 
  
0.192a 
  
0.203a 
  
 
(8.92) 
  
(9.21) 
  
(8.08) 
  
(9.30) 
  
(9.08) 
  GDPPKG -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.73) (-0.54) (-0.65) (-0.45) (-0.27) (-0.37) (-0.84) (-0.72) (-0.83) (-1.07) (-0.80) (-0.91) (-0.08) (-0.13) (-0.23) 
health -0.000 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.010 -0.008 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 0.000 -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 -0.010 -0.008 
expenditure (-0.06) (-1.59) (-1.29) (-0.17) (-1.60) (-1.34) (0.16) (-1.43) (-1.09) (0.07) (-1.56) (-1.22) (-0.13) (-1.56) (-1.32) 
Logtrade 0.012 -0.039 -0.040 0.022 -0.024 -0.023 0.008 -0.049 -0.051 0.005 -0.049 -0.051 0.036 -0.015 -0.014 
 
(0.28) (-0.71) (-0.69) (0.50) (-0.39) (-0.33) (0.20) (-0.92) (-0.92) (0.12) (-0.93) (-0.90) (0.75) (-0.23) (-0.20) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
 
(-0.35) (-3.67) 
 
(-0.47) (-3.37) 
 
(-0.32) (-3.93) 
 
(-0.19) (-3.69) 
 
(-0.55) (-3.28) 
 human 
 
0.042a 0.042a 
 
0.045a 0.044a 
 
0.040a 0.040a 
 
0.042a 0.042a 
 
0.045a 0.044a 
capital 
 
(8.69) (8.81) 
 
(8.71) (8.59) 
 
(8.54) (8.73) 
 
(9.10) (9.16) 
 
(8.42) (8.37) 
LogAssets 
  
0.059a 
  
0.069a 
  
0.053a 
  
0.054a 
  
0.071a 
   
(2.93) 
  
(2.83) 
  
(3.00) 
  
(2.83) 
  
(2.78) 
Constant -0.179b 0.337a 0.201 -0.218b 0.321a 0.158 -0.155c 0.349a 0.229b -0.169c 0.355a 0.231c -0.246b 0.304* 0.135 
 
(-2.02) (3.40) (1.59) (-2.17) (2.88) (1.02) (-1.76) (3.69) (2.01) (-1.90) (3.74) (1.93) (-2.20) (2.44) (0.82) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.71 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.5a: Human development index and formal saving 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Save formal 0.001 0.001 0.000 
            
 
(1.02) (0.65) (0.47) 
            Save formal 
   
0.002c 0.003c 0.002 
         male 
   
(1.88) (1.78) (1.52) 
         Save formal 
      
0.004b 0.003c 0.003 
      female 
      
(2.08) (1.65) (1.37) 
      Save formal 
         
0.003c 0.003 0.002 
   rural 
         
(1.89) (1.48) (1.15) 
   Save formal 
            
0.001 0.001 0.001 
urban 
            
(1.63) (1.09) (1.01) 
LogGNI 0.203a 
  
0.185a 
  
0.179a 
  
0.187a 
  
0.192a 
  
 
(9.17) 
  
(7.73) 
  
(7.03) 
  
(7.88) 
  
(8.09) 
  GDPPKG -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-0.38) (-0.21) (-0.29) (-0.64) (-0.50) (-0.61) (-0.96) (-0.68) (-0.73) (-0.84) (-0.59) (-0.64) (-0.65) (-0.37) (-0.46) 
Health 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 0.000 -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.009c -0.008 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 
expenditure (0.29) (-1.41) (-1.18) (0.02) (-1.53) (-1.19) (-0.13) (-1.58) (-1.25) (-0.19) (-1.66) (-1.33) (0.15) (-1.37) (-1.13) 
Logtrade 0.028 -0.020 -0.018 0.020 -0.029 -0.029 0.019 -0.026 -0.026 0.024 -0.023 -0.023 0.023 -0.022 -0.021 
 
(0.59) (-0.29) (-0.25) (0.50) (-0.50) (-0.47) (0.46) (-0.42) (-0.40) (0.58) (-0.39) (-0.36) (0.51) (-0.33) (-0.30) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.001 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
-0.000 -0.002a 
 
 
(-0.67) (-3.24) 
 
(-0.96) (-3.75) 
 
(-1.18) (-3.72) 
 
(-1.12) (-3.68) 
 
(-0.52) (-3.19) 
 human 
 
0.045a 0.045a 
 
0.041a 0.040a 
 
0.040a 0.040a 
 
0.041a 0.041a 
 
0.043a 0.043a 
capital 
 
(8.83) (8.60) 
 
(8.76) (8.80) 
 
(8.10) (8.02) 
 
(8.48) (8.36) 
 
(8.39) (8.56) 
LogAssets 
  
0.073a 
  
0.066a 
  
0.068a 
  
0.070a 
  
0.067b 
   
(2.76) 
  
(2.96) 
  
(2.98) 
  
(2.99) 
  
(2.60) 
Constant -0.253b 0.305b 0.136 -0.171c 0.328a 0.175 -0.149 0.331a 0.170 -0.179b 0.324a 0.161 -0.196c 0.318a 0.162 
 
(-2.28) (2.45) (0.81) (-1.92) (3.16) (1.28) (-1.62) (3.07) (1.19) (-2.00) (3.03) (1.12) (-1.84) (2.71) (0.99) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.72 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.6a: Poverty headcount ratio and health insurance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Insurance -0.718 -2.831b -2.058 
            
 
(-0.79) (-2.36) (-1.62) 
            Health insu 
   
-0.600 -2.351b -1.777 
         male 
   
(-0.72) (-2.46) (-1.62) 
         Health insu 
      
-0.677 -2.743c -1.919 
      female 
      
(-0.82) (-1.94) (-1.55) 
      Health insu 
         
-0.871 -2.905b -2.026 
   rural 
         
(-0.98) (-2.03) (-1.30) 
   Health insu 
            
-0.326 -1.069 -0.857 
urban 
            
(-0.63) (-1.09) (-0.92) 
logGNI -40.578a 
  
-40.586a 
  
-41.195a 
  
-40.925a 
  
-41.643a 
  
 
(-5.77) 
  
(-5.51) 
  
(-6.72) 
  
(-6.57) 
  
(-6.57) 
  GDPPKG -1.656 -1.337 -0.785 -1.618 -1.184 -0.669 -1.690 -1.467 -0.883 -1.650 -1.303 -0.785 -1.616 -1.110 -0.591 
 
(-1.55) (-0.84) (-0.46) (-1.50) (-0.74) (-0.40) (-1.59) (-0.92) (-0.51) (-1.54) (-0.82) (-0.46) (-1.50) (-0.68) (-0.35) 
Health 2.075 3.748 2.523 2.020 3.519 2.386 2.041 3.735 2.504 2.166 3.957 2.668 1.798 2.608 1.731 
expenditure (1.21) (1.38) (0.92) (1.19) (1.34) (0.89) (1.19) (1.33) (0.90) (1.24) (1.43) (0.95) (1.07) (1.00) (0.65) 
Logtrade 23.410 14.686 19.037 24.069 17.148 20.914 22.919 12.886 17.856 24.120 18.576 21.559 23.912 15.145 19.935 
 
(1.50) (0.66) (0.76) (1.54) (0.76) (0.84) (1.47) (0.57) (0.71) (1.53) (0.80) (0.85) (1.54) (0.63) (0.76) 
Inflation 0.086 0.599a 
 
0.075 0.551a 
 
0.074 0.578b 
 
0.108 0.630b 
 
0.019 0.330 
 
 
(0.49) (2.74) 
 
(0.44) (2.95) 
 
(0.43) (2.25) 
 
(0.64) (2.64) 
 
(0.13) (1.48) 
 human 
 
-3.603 -3.763 
 
-3.582 -3.697 
 
-4.022c -4.112c 
 
-4.284c -4.302 
 
-3.983 -3.947 
capital 
 
(-1.55) (-1.59) 
 
(-1.51) (-1.53) 
 
(-1.82) (-1.80) 
 
(-1.97) (-1.92) 
 
(-1.54) (-1.52) 
LogAssets 
  
-11.18 
  
-10.05 
  
-10.39 
  
-12.13 
  
-3.21 
   
(-1.08) 
  
(-1.06) 
  
(-1.00) 
  
(-1.02) 
  
(-0.36) 
Constant 121.83a 29.36 50.57 120.77a 25.23 44.704 124.41a 33.439 51.574 121.203a 23.278 48.925 124.64a 31.479 32.636 
 
(3.51) (0.75) (0.86) (3.37) (0.64) (0.78) (3.74) (0.84) (0.86) (3.47) (0.55) (0.80) (3.72) (0.75) (0.56) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj 0.58 0.30 0.23 0.58 0.29 0.23 0.58 0.28 0.22 0.59 0.28 0.22 0.58 0.23 0.20 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.7a: Poverty headcount ratio and loan to pay school fees (Eduloan) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Eduloan -0.845 -1.240 -1.006 
            
 
(-1.18) (-1.60) (-1.29) 
            Eduloan 
   
-0.616 -0.758 -0.562 
         female 
   
(-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.63) 
         Eduloan 
      
-0.875 -1.392c -1.184 
      male 
      
(-1.27) (-1.85) (-1.61) 
      Eduloan 
         
-0.916 -1.282b -1.069c 
   rural 
         
(-1.46) (-1.99) (-1.67) 
   Eduloan 
            
0.312 0.433 0.587 
male 
            
(0.44) (0.53) (0.71) 
LogGNI -44.200a 
  
-44.302a 
  
-43.8a 
  
-44.239a 
  
-42.401a 
  
 
(-7.67) 
  
(-7.62) 
  
(-7.81) 
  
(-7.76) 
  
(-7.50) 
  GDPPKG -1.946c -1.684 -1.028 -1.867c -1.484 -0.872 -1.906c -1.680 -1.045 -1.684c -1.300 -0.712 -1.347 -0.763 -0.185 
 
(-1.96) (-1.08) (-0.63) (-1.86) (-0.96) (-0.54) (-1.91) (-1.07) (-0.63) (-1.72) (-0.84) (-0.44) (-1.07) (-0.42) (-0.10) 
Health 1.709 2.775 1.823 1.629 2.584 1.717 1.756 2.886 1.921 1.816 2.936 1.948 1.789 2.572 1.909 
expenditure (1.09) (1.08) (0.69) (1.03) (0.99) (0.65) (1.12) (1.14) (0.74) (1.18) (1.15) (0.75) (1.04) (1.00) (0.73) 
Logtrade 24.374 21.322 25.126 25.98c 22.02 25.321 21.562 17.57 21.98 22.163 18.417 22.803 24.822 18.36 21.784 
 
(1.76) (1.00) (1.06) (1.88) (0.93) (0.99) (1.51) (0.86) (0.96) (1.57) (0.90) (0.99) (1.49) (0.69) (0.78) 
Inflation 0.029 0.349 
 
0.008 0.302 
 
0.035 0.365c 
 
0.038 0.359c 
 
-0.038 0.211 
 
 
(0.19) (1.62) 
 
(0.05) (1.39) 
 
(0.23) (1.67) 
 
(0.26) (1.68) 
 
(-0.24) (0.89) 
 human 
 
-6.22a -5.74a 
 
-5.89a -5.45b 
 
-6.32a -5.85a 
 
-6.271a -5.790a 
 
-4.93b -4.53b 
capital 
 
(-3.20) (-2.88) 
 
(-2.88) (-2.62) 
 
(-3.28) (-2.96) 
 
(-3.22) (-2.89) 
 
(-2.49) (-2.32) 
LogAssets 
  
-3.369 
  
-2.190 
  
-4.085 
  
-3.674 
  
-0.328 
   
(-0.40) 
  
(-0.25) 
  
(-0.50) 
  
(-0.45) 
  
(-0.04) 
Constant 138.86a 37.56 37.712 134.14a 30.68 29.31 143.23a 46.49 47.42 142.65a 42.004 42.28 120.57a 21.09 14.74 
 
(3.86) (0.99) (0.68) (3.74) (0.74) (0.50) (3.94) (1.24) (0.87) (3.93) (1.13) (0.78) (2.86) (0.43) (0.23) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj 0.52 0.09 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.02 0.53 0.12 0.07 0.54 0.11 0.06 0.50 0.04 0.02 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.8a: Under-five mortality per 1,000 live births and account 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Account -0.839b -0.741c -0.755c 
            
 
(-2.24) (-1.71) (-1.74) 
            Account 
   
-0.806c -0.695 -0.707 
         female 
   
(-1.94) (-1.40) (-1.43) 
         Account 
      
-0.815b -0.745b -0.757b 
      male 
      
(-2.38) (-1.98) (-2.01) 
      Account 
         
-0.828b -0.774c -0.786b 
   rural 
         
(-2.42) (-2.00) (-2.02) 
   Account 
            
-0.263 -0.154 -0.176 
urban 
            
(-0.79) (-0.41) (-0.48) 
LogGNI -30.33* 
  
-31.49b 
  
-30.421b 
  
-32.785b 
  
-43.211a 
  
 
(-2.13) 
  
(-2.26) 
  
(-2.10) 
  
(-2.35) 
  
(-3.09) 
  GDPPKG 1.109 0.761 0.974 1.045 0.697 0.885 1.094 0.771 0.984 1.412 1.106 1.324 0.320 0.055 0.245 
 
(0.58) (0.43) (0.54) (0.54) (0.39) (0.49) (0.57) (0.44) (0.56) (0.72) (0.60) (0.71) (0.17) (0.03) (0.14) 
Health -10.242a -8.052b -8.236b -10.25a -8.038b -8.188b -10.267a -8.056b -8.245b -10.48a -8.197a -8.390b -10.143b -7.703 -7.818b 
expenditure (-3.19) (-2.58) (-2.53) (-3.10) (-2.49) (-2.45) (-3.23) (-2.63) (-2.56) (-3.32) (-2.69) (-2.63) (-2.60) (-1.95) (-1.95) 
Logtrade 39.456 57.938c 60.814 38.581 56.816 59.47 40.168 59.250c 62.149c 38.97 58.31c 61.16c 30.996 50.161 52.647 
 
(1.43) (1.73) (1.70) (1.36) (1.64) (1.61) (1.50) (1.83) (1.80) (1.42) (1.75) (1.72) (1.04) (1.33) (1.32) 
Inflation -0.617a -0.277 
 
-0.631a -0.283 
 
-0.616a -0.274 
 
-0.624a -0.265 
 
-0.725a -0.286 
 
 
(-3.29) (-1.14) 
 
(-3.29) (-1.14) 
 
(-3.27) (-1.14) 
 
(-3.39) (-1.12) 
 
(-3.47) (-0.99) 
 human 
 
-10.02a -9.903a 
 
-10.20a -10.10a 
 
-10.03a -9.92a 
 
-10.31a -10.20a 
 
-12.12a -11.97a 
capital 
 
(-3.63) (-3.69) 
 
(-3.50) (-3.56) 
 
(-3.85) (-3.92) 
 
(-4.05) (-4.13) 
 
(-3.92) (-3.97) 
LogAssets 
  
14.430 
  
14.283 
  
14.345 
  
13.996 
  
14.273 
   
(1.41) 
  
(1.37) 
  
(1.42) 
  
(1.40) 
  
(1.20) 
Constant 168.31b 77.211 39.448 171.32b 77.85 40.727 168.73b 76.546 38.976 174.36b 76.097 39.391 216.23a 91.645 54.952 
 
(2.49) (1.29) (0.51) (2.50) (1.26) (0.51) (2.51) (1.32) (0.52) (2.57) (1.28) (0.51) (3.01) (1.35) (0.62) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj. 0.45 0.55 0.56 0.44 0.54 0.55 0.46 0.56 0.57 0.46 0.56 0.57 0.41 0.50 0.51 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.9a: Under five mortality per 1,000 live births and formal loan 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Formal loan -3.706b -3.286c -3.529c 
            
 
(-2.27) (-1.69) (-1.85) 
            Formal loan 
   
-3.008 -2.374 -2.647 
         female 
   
(-1.61) (-1.27) (-1.46) 
         Formal loan 
      
-3.42a -3.196b -3.36b 
      male 
      
(-2.82) (-2.17) (-2.32) 
      Formal loan 
         
-3.684a -3.475b -3.788b 
   rural 
         
(-2.71) (-2.14) (-2.40) 
   Formal loan 
            
-0.394 -0.095 -0.131 
urban 
            
(-0.27) (-0.07) (-0.10) 
logGNI -39.79a 
  
-45.76a 
  
-35.61a 
  
-40.24a 
  
-48.48a 
  
 
(-3.14) 
  
(-3.33) 
  
(-2.68) 
  
(-3.27) 
  
(-3.23) 
  GDPPKG 0.950 0.704 1.008 0.625 0.387 0.694 1.089 0.836 1.108 1.525 1.290 1.715 -0.018 -0.137 -0.005 
 
(0.56) (0.42) (0.58) (0.35) (0.21) (0.37) (0.63) (0.51) (0.68) (0.86) (0.73) (0.96) (-0.01) (-0.07) (-0.00) 
health -10.61a -8.19a -8.41a -10.21a -7.689b -7.90b -11.24a -8.87a -9.075a -11.02a -8.55a -8.870a -10.49b -7.794c -7.880c 
expenditure (-3.48) (-2.70) (-2.65) (-3.05) (-2.23) (-2.24) (-3.68) (-3.01) (-2.95) (-3.79) (-3.00) (-2.97) (-2.64) (-1.93) (-1.92) 
Logtrade 43.60c 60.93b 65.39b 38.27 55.651c 59.76c 45.096c 63.52b 67.794b 48.027b 66.37b 72.18b 29.269 49.798 51.88 
 
(1.79) (1.96) (1.99) (1.50) (1.65) (1.68) (1.75) (2.03) (2.04) (1.97) (2.21) (2.26) (0.95) (1.29) (1.26) 
Inflation -0.840a -0.420c 
 
-0.807a -0.344 
 
-0.848a -0.46b 
 
-0.885a -0.465c 
 
-0.756a -0.275 
 
 
(-4.17) (-1.70) 
 
(-3.84) (-1.21) 
 
(-4.19) (-1.96) 
 
(-4.25) (-1.89) 
 
(-3.62) (-0.93) 
 human 
 
-11.147a -10.96a 
 
-12.10a -11.94a 
 
-10.60a -10.43a 
 
-11.25a -11.01a 
 
-12.79a -12.74a 
capital 
 
(-4.30) (-4.41) 
 
(-4.54) (-4.66) 
 
(-4.11) (-4.15) 
 
(-4.65) (-4.77) 
 
(-4.58) (-4.73) 
LogAssets 
  
21.347b 
  
18.27 
  
22.52b 
  
24.347b 
  
13.249 
   
(2.08) 
  
(1.55) 
  
(2.35) 
  
(2.39) 
  
(1.09) 
Constant 194.94a 80.92 25.21 216.65a 87.53 39.635 181.93a 77.216 18.88 187.35a 71.54 6.858 231.94a 91.878 58.22 
 
(3.10) (1.41) (0.35) (3.18) (1.41) (0.49) (2.76) (1.35) (0.26) (3.00) (1.30) (0.10) (2.97) (1.28) (0.62) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj. 0.46 0.55 0.56 0.43 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.57 0.58 0.47 0.57 0.58 0.40 0.50 0.50 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.10a: Under five mortality per 1,000 live births and health insurance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Insurance  -3.122 -3.049 -2.837 
            
 
(-1.51) (-1.45) (-1.42) 
            Health insur 
   
-3.738b -3.472b -3.286b 
         male 
   
(-2.14) (-2.29) (-2.23) 
         Health insur 
      
-1.064 -1.442 -1.273 
      female 
      
(-0.66) (-0.76) (-0.68) 
      Health insur 
         
-3.583c -4.045c -3.84c 
   rural 
         
(-1.78) (-1.72) (-1.66) 
   Health insur 
            
-1.391 -0.495 -0.513 
urban 
            
(-1.34) (-0.51) (-0.53) 
logGNI -37.188b 
  
-32.14b 
  
-45.68a 
  
-39.26a 
  
-41.97b 
  
 
(-2.39) 
  
(-2.07) 
  
(-2.91) 
  
(-2.81) 
  
(-2.56) 
  GDPPKG -0.129 -0.316 -0.154 0.064 -0.156 0.011 -0.118 -0.294 -0.144 -0.097 -0.320 -0.208 0.042 -0.110 0.044 
 
(-0.07) (-0.18) (-0.09) (0.04) (-0.10) (0.01) (-0.06) (-0.16) (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.19) (-0.12) (0.02) (-0.06) (0.02) 
Health -8.842b -6.482 -6.813c -8.442b -6.331b -6.698 -9.98b -7.164c -7.384c -8.56b -5.805c -6.133c -10.06b -7.762c -7.90c 
expendi ture (-2.41) (-1.80) (-1.84) (-2.51) (-1.95) (-2.01) (-2.55) (-1.83) (-1.83) (-2.39) (-1.67) (-1.73) (-2.58) (-1.94) (-1.94) 
Logtrade 25.341 45.621 47.093 27.718 47.684 48.908 27.129 46.843 48.824 28.482 49.797 50.055 27.56 48.25 50.37 
 
(0.83) (1.29) (1.24) (0.91) (1.42) (1.37) (0.87) (1.24) (1.19) (1.00) (1.51) (1.42) (0.85) (1.23) (1.21) 
Inflation -0.275 0.107 
 
-0.141 0.178 
 
-0.597c -0.098 
 
-0.212 0.262 
 
-0.574b -0.233 
 
 
(-0.64) (0.24) 
 
(-0.37) (0.51) 
 
(-1.80) (-0.24) 
 
(-0.52) (0.56) 
 
(-2.00) (-0.73) 
 human 
 
-10.93a -10.98a 
 
-10.20a -10.24a 
 
-12.11a -12.14a 
 
-11.33a -11.32a 
 
-12.18a -12.11a 
capital 
 
(-4.32) (-4.30) 
 
(-4.04) (-4.06) 
 
(-4.47) (-4.41) 
 
(-4.86) (-4.86) 
 
(-4.18) (-4.13) 
LogAssets 
  
-0.618 
  
-3.226 
  
7.005 
  
-7.555 
  
11.89 
   
(-0.04) 
  
(-0.23) 
  
(0.41) 
  
(-0.39) 
  
(0.90) 
Constant 203.53a 93.15 92.86 185.11b 87.76 93.99 224.97a 94.33 75.36 202.43a 85.24 102.88 216.04a 93.06 62.31 
 
(2.75) (1.49) (0.98) (2.48) (1.47) (1.13) (2.93) (1.40) (0.75) (2.81) (1.44) (1.13) (2.83) (1.34) (0.66) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj. 0.32 0.45 0.44 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.28 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.47 0.46 0.30 0.40 0.41 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.11a: Gini coefficient and account use for business 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Account  0.011a 0.011b 0.011a 
            Business (3.14) (2.61) (2.69) 
            Account  
   
0.016a 0.016a 0.016a 
         business-female 
   
(3.33) (2.85) (2.95) 
         Account for 
      
0.006a 0.006b 0.006b 
      business-male 
      
(2.65) (2.24) (2.30) 
      Account for 
         
0.009a 0.009b 0.009a 
   business-rural 
         
(2.82) (2.58) (2.69) 
   Account  
            
0.001 0.001 0.001 
Business urban 
            
(1.05) (0.68) (0.71) 
LogGNI 0.036 
  
0.033 
  
0.041 
  
0.041 
  
0.050 
  
 
(1.23) 
  
(1.24) 
  
(1.32) 
  
(1.33) 
  
(1.64) 
  GDPPKG -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-0.94) (-1.07) (-1.27) (-1.19) (-1.37) (-1.63) (-0.69) (-0.79) (-0.93) (-1.00) (-1.13) (-1.26) (-0.43) (-0.47) (-0.55) 
Health 0.015b 0.014b 0.015b 0.015b 0.014b 0.014b 0.015b 0.014b 0.014b 0.014b 0.013c 0.013b 0.015b 0.012c 0.012c 
expenditure (2.37) (2.19) (2.34) (2.30) (2.08) (2.22) (2.26) (2.08) (2.20) (2.08) (1.87) (1.99) (1.99) (1.67) (1.75) 
Log trade 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.024 0.018 0.016 0.049 0.040 0.038 
 
(0.24) (0.22) (0.15) (0.32) (0.33) (0.26) (0.32) (0.27) (0.21) (0.37) (0.30) (0.26) (0.68) (0.59) (0.55) 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
 
(0.74) (0.34) 
 
(0.61) (0.22) 
 
(0.92) (0.46) 
 
(0.70) (0.22) 
 
(1.36) (0.75) 
 human 
 
0.006 0.006 
 
0.005 0.005 
 
0.008 0.008 
 
0.008 0.008 
 
0.010c 0.010c 
capital 
 
(1.15) (1.10) 
 
(0.99) (0.94) 
 
(1.48) (1.42) 
 
(1.54) (1.50) 
 
(1.82) (1.79) 
Log Assets 
  
-0.014 
  
-0.012 
  
-0.016 
  
-0.009 
  
-0.021 
   
(-0.83) 
  
(-0.75) 
  
(-0.87) 
  
(-0.54) 
  
(-1.08) 
Constant 1.42a 1.51a 1.55a 1.42a 1.50a 1.53a 1.41a 1.51a 1.55a 1.402a 1.51a 1.53a 1.34a 1.48a 1.53a 
 
(11.04) (15.07) (11.94) (12.09) (15.22) (12.37) (10.21) (14.49) (11.26) (10.28) (14.71) (11.45) (9.30) (12.92) (10.48) 
No of obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.26 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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Table 4.12a: Gini coefficient and electronic payment (EP) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
EP 0.005b 0.006a 0.006a 
            
 
(2.03) (2.83) (2.77) 
            EP 
   
0.006b 0.007a 0.007a 
         female 
   
(2.32) (3.51) (3.40) 
         EP 
      
0.004 0.005c 0.005c 
      male 
      
(1.55) (1.93) (1.93) 
      EP 
         
0.005c 0.006b 0.006b 
   rural 
         
(1.79) (2.57) (2.50) 
   EP 
            
0.003 0.003 0.003 
urban 
            
(1.22) (1.43) (1.46) 
LogGNI 0.029 
  
0.033 
  
0.032 
  
0.035 
  
0.038 
  
 
(0.93) 
  
(1.11) 
  
(1.04) 
  
(1.12) 
  
(1.21) 
  GDPPKG -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(-0.33) (-0.27) (-0.38) (-0.27) (-0.20) (-0.33) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.45) (-0.37) (-0.33) (-0.44) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-0.46) 
Health 0.013c 0.011 0.011 0.013c 0.010 0.011 0.013c 0.011 0.011 0.013c 0.011 0.011c 0.012c 0.010 0.011 
expenditure (1.78) (1.47) (1.61) (1.81) (1.47) (1.62) (1.77) (1.48) (1.60) (1.84) (1.53) (1.66) (1.76) (1.43) (1.56) 
Logtrade 0.031 0.008 0.004 0.031 0.007 0.003 0.034 0.012 0.009 0.031 0.005 0.002 0.041 0.025 0.020 
 
(0.45) (0.13) (0.07) (0.46) (0.11) (0.05) (0.48) (0.20) (0.15) (0.43) (0.08) (0.04) (0.60) (0.41) (0.33) 
inflation 0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
 
(0.82) (0.29) 
 
(0.84) (0.24) 
 
(0.90) (0.38) 
 
(0.80) (0.18) 
 
(1.15) (0.60) 
 human 
 
0.009b 0.009c 
 
0.010b 0.010b 
 
0.009b 0.009c 
 
0.010b 0.010b 
 
0.009b 0.009b 
capital 
 
(2.00) (1.92) 
 
(2.25) (2.15) 
 
(1.98) (1.90) 
 
(2.19) (2.12) 
 
(2.07) (1.96) 
LogAssets 
  
-0.013 
  
-0.012 
  
-0.015 
  
-0.009 
  
-0.021 
   
(-0.67) 
  
(-0.70) 
  
(-0.68) 
  
(-0.48) 
  
(-1.12) 
Constant 1.442a 1.537a 1.572a 1.431a 1.537a 1.570a 1.429a 1.530a 1.569a 1.424a 1.538a 1.563a 1.400a 1.509a 1.566a 
 
(10.09) (14.74) (11.24) (10.54) (15.12) (11.82) (10.08) (14.48) (10.91) (9.77) (14.31) (10.95) (9.95) (14.55) (11.40) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-sq Adj. 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.31 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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 Table 4.13a: Gini coefficient and formal saving 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Save formal 0.001 0.001 0.001 
            
 
(1.41) (1.33) (1.39) 
            Save formal 
   
0.003b 0.003c 0.003b 
         male 
   
(2.13) (1.92) (2.05) 
         Save formal 
      
0.004b 0.004b 0.005b 
      female 
      
(2.31) (1.95) (2.07) 
      Save formal 
         
0.004b 0.004b 0.004b 
   rural 
         
(2.37) (2.09) (2.27) 
   Save formal 
            
0.001 0.001 0.001 
urban 
            
(1.34) (1.24) (1.31) 
LogGNI 0.048 
  
0.027 
  
0.018 
  
0.026 
  
0.041 
  
 
(1.57) 
  
(0.95) 
  
(0.64) 
  
(0.96) 
  
(1.30) 
  GDPPKG -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-0.57) (-0.63) (-0.74) (-0.76) (-0.82) (-1.01) (-1.22) (-1.33) (-1.57) (-1.16) (-1.27) (-1.56) (-0.59) (-0.65) (-0.77) 
Health 0.016b 0.014c 0.014b 0.015b 0.013b 0.014b 0.014c 0.013c 0.013b 0.013c 0.012c 0.013b 0.015b 0.013c 0.013c 
Expenditure (2.26) (1.90) (2.00) (2.19) (2.04) (2.26) (1.94) (1.85) (2.02) (1.91) (1.78) (2.00) (2.07) (1.80) (1.91) 
Logtrade 0.040 0.031 0.028 0.032 0.025 0.018 0.029 0.026 0.019 0.035 0.029 0.022 0.040 0.033 0.029 
 
(0.60) (0.50) (0.44) (0.54) (0.43) (0.32) (0.50) (0.45) (0.34) (0.59) (0.50) (0.39) (0.59) (0.51) (0.45) 
inflation 0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
 
(1.38) (0.77) 
 
(1.17) (0.82) 
 
(0.95) (0.74) 
 
(0.93) (0.62) 
 
(1.44) (0.90) 
 human 
 
0.010c 0.010c 
 
0.006 0.006 
 
0.004 0.003 
 
0.005 0.005 
 
0.008 0.008 
capita 
 
(1.90) (1.84) 
 
(1.17) (1.05) 
 
(0.66) (0.55) 
 
(1.11) (0.98) 
 
(1.51) (1.44) 
LogAssets 
  
-0.022 
  
-0.029 
  
-0.027 
  
-0.026 
  
-0.027 
   
(-1.17) 
  
(-1.49) 
  
(-1.39) 
  
(-1.34) 
  
(-1.33) 
Constant 1.328a 1.458a 1.513a 1.424a 1.497a 1.574a 1.456a 1.504a 1.576a 1.426a 1.496a 1.566a 1.379a 1.487a 1.556a 
 
(9.01) (13.14) (10.65) (10.83) (14.86) (11.73) (10.78) (15.08) (11.66) (10.80) (14.89) (11.58) (9.76) (13.82) (11.01) 
No obs 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-Sq Adj. 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.28 0.27 0.28 
t statistics in parentheses, a, b and c indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
AND ASSETS ACCUMULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA18 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recently asset building and financial inclusion have been used as a strategic intervention to achieve 
multiple outcomes: consumption smoothing and capacity development of the poor through asset 
accumulation. This innovative approach to social policy is gaining support as scholars argue that 
income transfer alone is not a sufficient condition to assist the poor to escape poverty completely 
(Sherraden and Boshara, 2007: 3). Analysis presented in Chapter 4 revealed that financial inclusion 
improves welfare by reducing the headcount poverty ratio and under-five mortality rate per 1,000 
live births. Elsewhere in the literature, evidence suggests that financial inclusion encourages 
individuals to accumulate assets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a). Based on this emerging 
positive evidence, there is growing concern that savings and asset building opportunities should be 
extended to everyone both the poor and rich for two reasons. First, from a moral point of view, 
everyone should have a fair chance and opportunity to develop his or her capacity to lead a stable 
and satisfactory life. Secondly, from a practical perspective, everyone will be better off if 
individuals, communities and societies accumulate assets, invest in themselves and their children, 
and become productive and engaged in meaningful economic activities (Sherraden and Boshara, 
2007: 3). As such, individuals and families need to build savings and assets, which they can invest 
to improve their economic well-being over time. 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, this chapter focuses the analysis on South Africa to provide more 
insights into the relationship between financial inclusion and asset ownership at the individual level, 
building from the analysis in Chapter 4. Several factors, such as an effective welfare system, a well-
developed financial system and data availability makes South Africa a perfect choice to examine the 
connection between financial inclusion and assets ownership. Financial inclusion and assets 
ownership is gaining grounds in social policy circles as a strategic intervention to redress poverty 
and inequality through capacity development of the poor. However, this recent approach is yet to be 
tested in the context of South Africa. Social policy is solely transfer-based, with about 16.9 million 
poor individuals receiving income transfers, of whom 11.9 million are children receiving child 
support grants (SASSA, 2016). Meanwhile, South Africa has made significant progress towards 
                                               
18 Part of this chapter focusing on saving and insurance has submitted for peer-review at the International Journal of 
Social Economics. 
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improving financial access for the previously excluded and by 2014, financial inclusion of adults 15 
years and older is estimated at 75% (FinScope, 2014). This indicates an active and efficient 
financial sector that can support asset building social welfare programmes. Chapters 3 and 4 
examined the long-run relationship and association between financial depth and access versus 
welfare at the aggregate level. This chapter builds on Chapter 4 to extend the analysis at the 
individual level by exploring the relationship between individual assets ownership and financial 
inclusion in an attempt to understand ways in which financial inclusion can assist the poor to build 
assets.  
Several strategies exist to accumulate assets; however, savings play a critical role. For example, in 
South Africa, the government assists low-income and poor households earning R3,500 per month or 
less to own decent houses (Rust, 2012). Other public policy initiatives include water and electricity 
subsidies for poor households, particularly in rural areas, solar power generation, and education 
subsidies through the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). However, these initiatives 
have not been targeted through the formal financial sector, underemphasising the importance of 
saving and asset building in economic and social development circles in South Africa. Although the 
poor may pay some money to gain ownership of assets, there are no incentives for the poor to 
accumulate assets, as it exists for the working class through the tax system. These discrepancies 
help propagate inequality in asset accumulation between the poor and the rich. If these institutional 
constraints are addressed based on the principle of equal opportunity for all, everyone should have 
access to public subsidies and financial services should be equitable (Sherraden and Boshara, 2007: 
3). From an empirical perspective, evidence on saving and asset building is limited in South Africa 
with the exception of Adato et al. (2006) who explore the dynamics of assets, poverty and social 
exclusion in South Africa. This clearly shows a considerable knowledge gap on how financial 
inclusion and assets building can assist the poor and low-income families in South Africa to find a 
sustainable pathway out of poverty. 
The main objective of this chapter is to explore the relationship between financial inclusion and 
asset ownership using FinScope (2014) consumer survey. The interest of the analysis is on 
individuals at the bottom of asset ownership. Consequently, the analysis adopt a quantile regression 
technique because it offers a mechanism to estimate the conditional median function and the full 
range of other conditional quantile functions. This gives the researcher the flexibility to examine 
variations in assets ownership with the level of financial inclusion (Koenker, 2000 and 2005). The 
findings of this chapter will have serious implications for asset building social welfare programmes 
for the poor and low-income families in South Africa.   
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The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides the conceptual definition 
of asset building. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 present the theoretical and empirical literature. Section 5.5 
discusses the empirical strategy and data. Section 5.6 presents and discusses the results and Section 
5.7 draws conclusions. 
5.2 CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF ASSET BUILDING  
Sherraden (1991) proposed the term asset building as a strategy to assist individuals at the bottom 
of the income pyramid to build assets. Sherraden (1991) advocates asset building for low-income 
families to complement the government’s income transfer assistance to enable the poor to break out 
of poverty. He argued that government should subsidise the poor and low-income families in the 
same way it supports the working class to enable them to save for their children’s education, down 
payment on a house, pension and retirement savings. Since the 1990s, the concept of assets building 
has expanded and now means physical or man-made capital, financial capital, human capital, social 
capital and natural resources capital (Moser, 2005). During a three-day symposium organised by the 
Global Assets Project in June 2007, asset building was consistently used to refer to efforts to build 
savings and productive assets, including education, home ownership, livestock, investment and 
pensions. Elsewhere it refers to asset accumulation, asset development and wealth building 
(Sherraden and Boshara, 2007: 2). For this study, asset building will refer to man-made capital such 
as television sets, cell phones, microwaves, fridges and many others. 
By design, asset-building programmes do not offer credit to participants but are rather crafted 
financial incentives intended to stimulate and encourage low-income households to save. 
Historically, their existence and success are in developed economies because of a well-developed 
financial sector and an effective welfare state including, for instance, individual development 
accounts (IDAs) in USA, EduSave in Singapore, child trust accounts in UK and many others. The 
few footprints of asset building programmes in Africa include YouthSave in Ghana, account for 
orphans in Uganda and orphan and vulnerable children in Zimbabwe (Sherraden and Boshara, 2007; 
Crea et al., 2013). These programmes provide incentives to save for specific purposes by matching 
the saving with official or private subsidies on a 1:1 or 2:1 basis or even higher depending on the 
amount agreed by the programme. Savers have restricted access to the fund but can access only the 
amount saved and not the matched amount. At maturity, savers gained full access to the saved and 
matched funds and accumulated funds can be used to buy a house, fund post-secondary education or 
start a small business. In addition, participants can use money accumulated to buy work-related 
assets such as cars and laptops (OECD, 2003; Boshara, 2005). 
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5.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND ASSETS 
BUILDING 
The theory of asset based social welfare developed on the argument that income transfer alone is 
not a sufficient condition to enable the poor to break out of poverty. Borrowing heavily from 
psychology, sociology and economics, Sherraden (1991) argues that assets provide a variety of 
social, economic and psychological effects that income alone cannot provide. Sherraden (1991: 
148) postulates that assets improve economic stability, connect people with a viable and hopeful 
future, stimulate development of human and other capital, enable people to focus and to specialise, 
provide a foundation to take risk, yield personal, social and political dividends, and enhance the 
welfare of offspring.  
Firstly, assets cushion against economic instability such as major illness, job loss or marital 
breakup. When these events occur, families near the income poverty line are likely to fall into 
poverty. Asset accumulation protects against such economic shock by providing back-up resources 
to smooth consumption. Consequently, families with asset holdings are less likely to fall into deep 
crisis and are more likely to maintain a stable life during adverse economic periods until their 
economic situation is normalised. Thus, assets provide a shield against poverty because the assets 
are not immediately consumed but are a stock that endures and generate economic and social 
returns (Ford Foundation, 2004: 9). 
Secondly, asset accumulations influence future orientation and ensure that people are forward-
looking (Ford Foundation, 2004). Sherraden (1991: 151) argues that future orientation is a critical 
factor to achieve success and without positive thinking towards the future, hopes are lost, visions 
are not created, plans are not made, and struggles and sacrifices are not undertaken. Thus, asset 
accumulation influences the way people think and behave. For instance, first time homeowners will 
begin to pay more attention to real estate values, property tax and maintenance. Furthermore, 
holding of financial assets such as certificates of deposit increases financial knowledge such as 
factors driving changes in interest rates. The main idea here is that positive thinking about the future 
begins in part with assets, which in turn influence future opportunities, which in turn are quickly 
internalised. Sherraden (1990: 585) calls this process social construction. That is, the whole 
processes of life changes, life courses are assessed, integrated and fixed at an early age unless 
something out of the ordinary breaks the pattern. For example, children from poor families are more 
likely to drop out of school because they believe their parents may not afford the cost of college 
education and even if they complete high school, it will not make a difference to their life chances. 
Conversely, children who know their parents have saved for their college education are forward-
looking and find it easier to make positive decisions and resist peer pressure. Therefore, if people 
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are to believe in a viable future, there must be some tangible link between now and the future and 
assets provide such a link (Sherraden, 1991). 
Thirdly, assets can be transferred to the next generation thereby increasing the welfare of offspring. 
That is, life becomes less stressful when individuals inherit some level of assets and this increases 
life opportunities. This is entrenched in the saying that “some people stand on their own two feet, 
but some stand on their parents’ shoulders” (Sherraden, 1991: 167). Saving theories such as 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) also emphasise the desire to leave bequests as one of the motives 
for asset accumulation. Asset building therefore draw the poor into the formal financial system 
thereby building inclusive societies while addressing market and institutional failures at the bottom 
of the income pyramid. Therefore, asset building addresses market distortion created by institutional 
structures such as public sector incentives for working class operated through the tax system. This 
includes mortgage subsidy, retirement annuity and health insurance. These structures completely 
exclude the poor from participating since they do not earn enough to pay tax and some are non-
working poor. As information asymmetry at the bottom of the income pyramid increases, it reduces 
the ability of financial markets to serve those at the bottom of the income pyramid (OECD, 2003). 
5.4 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Assets building social welfare programmes are growing fast in advanced economies such in the US, 
the UK, Canada, Korea, and Singapore but are still at the early stage in Africa. However, empirical 
evidence is mostly from the US (Li and Sherraden, 2010). Nevertheless, evidence from developing 
economies and Africa is gradually growing (see Han and Hong, 2011; Kim et al., 2010; Deng et al., 
2014; Austrian and Muthengi, 2014; Chowa et al., 2010; Chowa and Masa, 2015; Curley et al., 
2016; Lee et al., 2015; Ssewamala and Ismayilova, 2009). 
Literature on asset building can be grouped into three: asset building and home ownership, asset 
building and educational enrolment, and asset building and saving attitudes among poor families. 
Overall, empirical evidence from these dimensions are conflicting. Findings from studies in the US 
that examine the effect of asset building on poor and low-income income families to own houses are 
mixed. Mills et al. (2008) and Engelhardt et al. (2010) found that the effect of individual 
development account (IDA) on homeownership is not stable. Mills et al. (2008) used a controlled 
experiment to examine the effect of IDA on home purchase and found no strong evidence of low-
income households holding subsidised assets. Home ownership among renters increased by 7-11 
percentage points but the increase was offset by a reduction in non-retirement financial assets. 
Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2013b) found that home ownership rose more among rented households 
from 1998 to 2003 in the control relative to the treatment group, although the control group caught 
up with the treatment group and by the end of the experiment in 2009, the economic effect of the 
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programme was small and insignificant on home ownership rates. Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2008) 
found that IDA actually helped low-income families to save towards home purchases. Their logistic 
regression results showed that IDA helped participants who were renters at baseline to clear old 
debts within 18 months (wave 2) and raise homeownership rates among renters at wave 3. 
Quantitatively, IDA participants who cleared their debts had a higher probability of becoming 
homeowners in wave 3 (32%), while non-IDA participants with no debt obligation only had a 9.6% 
chance of owning a house. Huang et al. (2016) examined the long-term effect of IDA on 
homeownership by participants with disabilities in a randomised experiment. Their findings from a 
10-year follow-up indicate that rates of homeownership were almost 10 percentage points higher for 
the treatment group with disabilities relative to the control group with disabilities. This led them to 
conclude that the impacts of IDA are likely to vary depending on the baseline characteristics of the 
participants.  
However, the effect of asset building seems to be stronger on college education and the propensity 
to save among low-income families. The findings from studies that examined the effect of IDA on 
post-secondary enrolment suggest a positive effect on college enrolment (Loke, 2013; Grinstein-
Weiss et al., 2013a; Cheatham and Elliot, 2013; Huang, 2013; Zhan and Sherraden, 2011). For 
instance, Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2013a) found a significant impact on educational enrolment and a 
positive but insignificant impact on graduation from their 10-year follow-up randomised control 
trials experiment in the Tulsa-Oklahoma IDA project. Their results also show that IDA has a strong 
positive effect on educational attainment for men but not for women. Meanwhile, Loke (2013) and 
Chowa et al. (2013) found that college enrolment increased significantly for children born in homes 
with an asset base higher than zero. Nevertheless, once low-income households start to accumulate 
assets over time, college graduation rates for children from poor families converge at the same rate 
as youths from wealthier households. Zhan and Sherraden (2011) confirmed that when family 
income and other parent/child characteristics are controlled for, both financial and non-financial 
assets are associated with the increased likelihood of a child to complete college.  
Moving to asset building and the effects of saving accumulation, overall evidence suggests that 
low-income households can save when provided with structured opportunities. Such studies include 
Grinstein et al. (2006), Friedline et al. (2013), McKernan et al. (2010), Huang (2010) and 
Birkenmaier et al. (2012). Apart from encouraging low-income household to save, the compulsory 
financial education attached to IDA improves financial management skills of participants and can 
induce a change in saving behaviour (Huang, 2010; Huang et al., 2015). Participation and 
completion of asset building programmes improve the credit history and scores for participants 
compared to non-participants (Birkenmaier et al., 2012), which increases their chances of accessing 
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credit markets. Furthermore, extending saving accounts at adolescence improves saving outcomes 
for low-income households and is likely to extend to adulthood (Friedline et al., 2013). However, 
the experience of a small sample of ten Hispanic and Anglo low-income families living in an 
impoverished neighbourhood in Cleveland suggests that environmental conditions can threaten 
asset accumulation and retention. That is, poor families may sell accumulated assets if they reside in 
an extremely poor neighbourhood, making it difficult to evaluate the potential of assets to serve as a 
tool for upward mobility (Finn et al., 2015). 
Outside the US, qualitative evidence from the Hope Account in South Korea revealed that 
participation in asset building programmes changed saving behaviours, improved financial 
management skills, and helped old adults achieve economic security (Kim et al., 2010; Han and 
Hong, 2011). Furthermore, the compulsory financial education component attached to asset 
building helped participants to develop confidence and positive thinking and instilled hope for 
participants and their children. In China, Deng et al. (2014) used logistic regression analysis to 
compare how improvement in household assets (liquid assets and net wealth) relative to income 
affects the enrolment of boys and girls. Their results showed that household assets measured as 
liquid assets has a positive impact on the enrolment of girls but has a negligible effect on schooling 
of boys. Their results further suggest that improved household economic conditions in terms of 
family income or net worth increase parents’ aspiration for their children’s education regardless of 
gender. 
In Africa, asset building has been used to address vulnerability among orphan children who have 
lost their parents to HIV/AIDS as well as to redress gender inequality in education attainment. Such 
programmes are found in Zimbabwe and Uganda. For instance, Ssewamala and Ismayilova (2009) 
examined the effect of a family-centred assets-based intervention (Suubi Project) that encourages 
orphaned caregivers to save for post-primary or vocational education in rural Uganda. Using an 
experimental design the authors found that matched saving encourages poor families in rural 
Uganda to save, suggesting that matched saving related intervention can be used to address 
vulnerability. Recently, Curley et al. (2016) found that child development accounts, a strategy to 
empower girls in Uganda, has the potential to address the past effect of gender inequalities and 
enable young girls to think positively about the future. Austrian and Muthengi (2014) investigated 
the effect of a multidimensional intervention on social, health, economic assets and the experiences 
of sexual harassment among vulnerable adolescent girls between 10 to 19 years residing in low-
income areas in Kampala, Uganda. The authors compared the treatment group – girls who received 
full intervention (reproductive health counselling, financial education and savings account) and a 
comparison group – girls who received only a savings account. They found that girls who received 
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full intervention experienced improvement in health and economic assets while girls who only had a 
savings account increased their economic assets but were more likely to have been sexually touched 
and harassed by men. Crea et al. (2013) explored the effect of household asset ownership using data 
from poor households caring for orphans and vulnerable children in rural Manicaland, Zimbabwe, 
and their evidence-corroborated studies in Uganda. Household asset ownership greatly reduced 
social vulnerability in terms of school attendance and birth registration. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that ownership of fixed and movable assets has the potential to reduce the incidence of 
other social vulnerability risk factors for children.  
Chowa et al. (2010) conducted a review of available evidence on the effect of asset building on 
children’s well-being such as health, education and child labour in developing countries. Although 
the effect of asset building and child labour is conflicting because of lack of clarity on the exact 
definition of child labour, overall evidence suggests a positive effect on child well-being. 
Furthermore, asset ownership inspired people to think positively and look forward to the future. 
Evidence from Ghana showed that home ownership including television contributes to higher level 
of forward looking (Chowa and Masa, 2015). In addition, analysis from the Ghanaian YouthSave 
experiment suggests that constrained low-income families can save if access and opportunities are 
available to them (Lee et al., 2015). 
In South Africa, the focus of this study, some initiatives have been in place to assist the poor build 
assets as discussed in Section 5.1. However, public sector initiatives that encourage the poor to save 
through the formal financial system towards acquiring these assets have received less attention. The 
only exception is the fundisa matched savings account that allows low-income parents earning less 
than R180, 000 per annum to save for tertiary education for their children led by the private sector19 
(Standard Bank, no date). Unfortunately, no empirical evidence exists at the time of writing. 
Overall, evidence suggests that asset building programmes are suitable complementary strategies to 
the income transfer approach to poverty reduction. However, this strategy is yet to be tested 
formally by the South African government. With a vibrant financial sector and a functioning social 
welfare system, an asset building social welfare programme is likely to be a good complement to 
the current income transfer approach to enable the poor to build assets and escape poverty. 
                                               
19 Standard Bank, ABSA, First National Bank and Nedbank. 
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5.5 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA 
5.5.1 Asset index  
The asset index was derived using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) from a list of 
individual asset indicators. MCA is an extension of correspondence analysis used to study the 
relationship between several categorical dependent variables. Thus, MCA is used to analyse 
qualitative variables and can be viewed as a generalisation of principal component analysis when 
the variables are categorical in nature but with the χ2- metric applied on row/column profiles instead 
of the usual Euclidean metric (Abdi and Valentin, 2007: 1; Asselin, 2002: 2). MCA is obtained 
using standard correspondence analysis on an indicator matrix whose entries are coded as 0 or 1, 
and the MCA extracts the first factorial axis which retains the maximum information contain in the 
matrix. According to Asselin (2002: 14), first the profile20 of the households relative to the 
indicators is computed. Secondly, the household profiles are applied to the category-weights given 
by the normalised scores of indicators on the first factorial axis coming from the MCA of the 
indicators. Then the composite assets indicator for individual is computed as the sum of each of the 
unit’s weighted responses as follows: 
,
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 …(5.1) 
where K is the number of categorical indicators, JK is the number of categories of indicator K, 
K
jK
W represents the weights (normalised first axis score) of category jk and 
K
jK
I is the binary variable 
(0/1) which takes the value 1 if household has category jk. One limitation of the MCA composite 
indicator is the tendency to have negative values at the lower end of the assets index, which makes 
interpretation difficult. Asselin (2002: 25) suggested an adjustment using the absolute value of the 
average Cmin of the minimal categorical weight 
K
minW to translate the index into positive values. The 
average Cmin is defined as: 
                                               
20 The primary data matrix is a 0-1 matrix and given K indicators, the profile of households is given as a line vector of 
number (1/K). The value of the composite indicator is simply the average of its category-weights for each household. 
With N households, the profile of a category (K,Jk) is a column vector of numbers k
jk
N
1
where 
k
jk
N is the number of 
household in the category (K, jk), jk = 1, Jk. The category-weights are the average of the normalised scores of the 
household belonging to this category (Asselin, 2002: 15). 
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That is, the absolute value of this average is added to each individual assets score to derive a new 
composite indicator. For this study, the composite indicator was computed using 22 indicators of 
individual asset ownership including cell phones, televisions, fridges and many others. Studies that 
have used an assets index to proxy well-being include Filmer and Pritchett (2001), Booysen et al. 
(2008), Asselin (2002) and McKenzie (2005). Several advantages exist for using assets indices as 
an alternative measure for well-being. Firstly, it is easy for individuals to answer questions on asset 
ownership compared to recalling the amount of money spent some weeks ago on every item. 
Secondly, information on individuals’ asset ownership is not subject to seasonality as income. For 
example, incomes of people working in the informal and agricultural sectors are highly variable and 
affected by economic outlook (Wietzke, 2015). However, a major limitation of assets indices is that 
they may not be broad enough to cover a wide range of indicators to permit differentiation in 
standard of living (McKenzie, 2005: 235). 
5.5.2 Analytical framework 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the relationship between financial inclusion and individual 
physical asset ownership. We are interested in the changes in the relationship along the conditional 
assets distribution function, hence quantile regression methods are used. Quantile regressions have 
been used in many settings such as in paediatric medicine to study the growth curve for children’s 
height and weight and are widely used in economics to study determinants of wages, discrimination 
effects and trends in income inequality (Koenker, 2000: 1).  
Notation framework 
Consider the effect of a binary treatment variable D on a continuous variable Y and let 1Yi  and 
0
iY  
be the potential outcomes of individual i. The outcome 1Yi will be realised if individual i receives 
treatment 1, and 0
iY  would be realised other. The observed outcome Yi is stated as: 
)1(YYY 0i
1
i iii DD   …(5.3) 
Very often the outcome variable, Y, the treatment, D, and also some covariates, X, are observed. 
The quantile treatment effect (QTEs) can either be defined conditioned on a set of covariates or 
unconditionally. For this study, the QTEs are conditioned on a set of observed covariates, thus we 
start with the standard linear quantile model and assume selection on observables. Two assumptions 
are required. 
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We assume that Y is a linear function in X and D, such that the potential outcome model is given 
as: 
id 
  i
d
i XY  
and 0Q
i
  …(5.4) 
For i = 1, ......, n and d  (0, 1). 

 i
Q refers to the th quantile of the unobservable random variable 
εi.. 
 and   are the unknown parameters of the model. Thus,  represents the QTEs at quantile 
 . However, the linearity assumption may not be sufficient to identify the QTEs because the 
observed Di  may be correlated with the error term, and so a second assumption is required. 
Secondly, we assume selection on observables with exogenous covariates, X (Frölich and Melly, 
2010: 425-426). 
ε || (D, X)  
This is the conditional independence assumption (CIA) which implies that treatment status is 
random conditioned on a set of control covariates, X. That is, after controlling for possible 
observables both treatment and non-treatment groups are the same in their remaining 
characteristics, apart from the fact that some individuals have access to financial service (treated) 
and others do not have access. This is a very strong assumption and requires a sufficiently large 
number of control variables (StataCorp, 2013: 153). Luckily enough the FinScope 2014 consumer 
survey provides a rich set of individual demographic characteristics as well as other socio-economic 
factors that will constitute the set of control variables. 
Thus, the linearity and the selection of observable assumptions imply that 
  DXQ DX,|Y  , 
such that the unknown parameters of the potential outcome equation can be recovered from the joint 
distribution of the observed variables Y, X and D. These unknown coefficients can by estimated 
using the classical quantile regression proposed by Koenker and Basset (1978) and defined as: 
)DX(Yminarg),( iii
,
 

  

 …(5.5) 
where  )(  x { )}0(1    is called the check function. Equation 5.3 is a convex linear 
programming problem solved using the built-in stata command qreg (Frölich and Melly, 2010: 425-
426). However, we employ Machado et al.’s (2011) wrapper qreg2 for qreg that estimates quantile 
regression and reports standard errors and t-statistics that are asymptotically valid under 
heteroskedasticity and misspecification (see Machado and Santos Silva, 2013 for details). The 
empirical model is specified as:  
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)(YQ i =
  iCVFI  210  …(5.6) 
where )(YQ i  is the assets index, 0 is the intercept at specific quantiles, FI captures three binary 
aspects of financial inclusion taking the value 1 if individuals use financial services (borrowing, 
saving and insurance) and 0 if individuals do not use financial services.  are the unknown 
coefficients to be estimated at each point on the conditional distribution, CV represents a set of 
exogenous control variables which include individual demographic characteristics as well as socio-
economic factors that are likely to affect asset ownership (see Table 5.1 for details) and i is the 
error term. 
Within this modelling framework, financial inclusion may be endogenously determined by 
covariates within the system. For instance, households that live near a financial services outlet are 
likely to access and use financial services. Furthermore, there is the likelihood of selection bias in 
the use of financial services, as assignment into treatment and control groups are not randomised 
and thus the two groups may differ. This is a common occurrence in observational studies, as the 
researcher has no control in the assignment of individuals into treatment and control groups. This 
problem can be addressed using the IV approach but the difficulties of getting a suitable instrument 
within the data makes it infeasible to pursue this approach. Thus, the results should be interpreted 
with some caution.  
5.5.3 Data 
The study used the FinScope 2014 consumer survey for South Africa that measures perception 
concerning access to and usage of formal and informal financial services across income groups and 
other demographic regions. The FinScope survey is a national representative and independent cross-
sectional survey, which has been conducted annually in South Africa since 2002. FinScope adopt a 
stratified multi-stage sampling and conduct face-to-face interviews with individuals who are 16 
years and above from their homes. A total of 3,900 individuals were interviewed during the 2014 
survey, of whom 57% were female, 43% male, 76% living in urban areas, 5% on farms, 19% in 
rural areas, 61% blacks, 16% coloured, 6% Asian and 17% white.  
Following FinScope (2014: 70) the study defines financial inclusion as “those who have access, use 
products from formal and informal financial sectors” and financially excluded as “those without 
access and do not use financial products from formal or informal sectors”. Financially excluded 
individuals borrow from friends/family and save at home if they want to save. In the survey 
questionnaire, individuals were asked if they have borrowed and saved in the past 12 months, 
from/at formal and informal sources such as friends and family, retail stores, stokvels and 
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pawnshops, and whether they keep money at home. Other questions seek to know whether 
individuals are insured by formal or informal financial sector such as burial societies. The responses 
to all these questions are categorical and binary, for example: “looking at this list of statements, 
please tell me which of these are true for you?” All the responses from the various forms of 
borrowing, saving and insurance are summarised by FinScope and reported as Q6004_ (credit 
strand), Q6027_ (saving strand) and Q6014_ (insurance strand). Each strand has information on 
individuals who use financial products and services from formal banking, non-bank, informal 
mechanism, friends and family and those do who not use financial services. From earlier 
discussions, individuals who use financial services from banks, non-banks and informal mechanism 
are coded as “1” (users/treatment group) and those do not borrow or save, borrow from 
friends/family and keep money at home are coded as “0” (non-users/control group). Figure 5.1 
summarises the financial inclusion strands. 
Figure 5.1: FinScope 2014 financial inclusion strands for South Africa 
 
Source: FinScope 2014 consumer survey 
Question 160_ asks how much each individual saves per month21. Figure 5.2 illustrates this 
information and shows that about 60% of the respondents reported not saving any money each 
month. The proportion of people who save at least R1 per month is just 0.56% and this proportion 
increases gradually to a maximum of 7.9% and declines steadily to 0.21% for those who save at 
least R10,000 per month.  
                                               
21 Individual monthly saving includes all the money paid to stokvels, saving clubs, investments and retirement products. 
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Figure 5.2: Individual saving per month in South Africa 
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Source: FinScope 2014 consumer survey 
Finally, Table 5.1 shows all the control variables and how there were recoded for the analysis.  
Table 5.1a: Variable description and coding 
Variables Description 
Household level  
Total household size Total number of people residing in a household 
Household size Total number of people age 15+ residing in a household 
Race (4 categories) 1 = black, 2 = coloured, 3 = Indians and 4 = white 
Gender 1 = female and 0 = male 
Married 1 = married and single not married but living with partner, 0 = others 
Single 1 = single not married and not living with partner, 0 = others 
Others 1 = widow, separated, divorced and not specified, 0 = others 
Primary 1 = primary or less education, 0 = others 
High school 1 = some high school education, 0 = others 
Matric 1 = completed matric education, 0 = others 
Post-matric 1 = completed post-matric education, 0 = others 
Age Natural log of household age 
Age squared Natural log of household age squared 
Geographic area 1 = metro area, 0 = rural area 
Full employment 1 = >30 hours work per week for self, individual and company, 0 = others 
Part time 1 = <30 hours work per week for self, individual and company, 0 = others 
Voluntary employed 1 = students, housewife/house husbands, 0 = others 
Unemployed 1 = active looking and discouraged job seekers, 0 = others 
Low income 1 = R1- R7,999 household monthly income, 0 = others 
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Variables Description 
Middle income 1 = R8,000 - R24,999 household monthly income, 0 = others 
High income 1 => R25,000 household monthly income, 0 = others 
Refuse 1 = refuse to declare income/uncertain, 0 = others 
Distance to ATM 1 =< 30 minutes’ walk from home to nearest ATM, 0 => 30 minutes 
Distance to bank branch 1 =< 30 minutes’ walk from home to nearest bank branch, 0 => 30 minutes 
Financial Inclusion  
Credit 1 = credit from banks, nonbank and informal financial sector, 0 = credit from 
friends/family and not borrowing 
Saving 1 = save at banks, nonbank and informally, 0 = keep money at home and no saving at all 
Monthly saving 1 = save some money each month, 0 = no saving each month 
Insurance 1 = insured by banks, nonbanks, other informal and burial society, 0 = no insurance 
Assets index Composite index derived from a list of household asset indicators using MCA 
By authors 
Source: FinScope 2014 consumer survey for South Africa 
Theory and related studies in this area, such as Chowa et al. (2013) and Chowa and Massa (2015), 
guide the choice of the control variables recoded in Table 5.1a. For example, married couples are 
more likely to accumulate assets over time by pooling resources together compared to singles. 
Theory further suggests that differences in individual assets ownership can be attributed to age, 
income, household size and education level. Table 5.1b at the end of the chapter provides summary 
statistics of these control variables.  
5.6 RESULTS 
Descriptive analysis 
We start the discussion with some descriptive statistics about the composite assets index derived 
using MCA. First, the percentile share density of assets distribution is shown using a histogram. 
Percentile density shows the amount of assets that each member in a group owns on average relative 
to the overall average (Jann, 2016: 25). 
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Figure 5.3: The percentile share densities of asset distribution 
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Source: By authors composite assets index 
Figure 5.3 above shows the average asset ownership of the bottom 20% is about 27% of the overall 
average, whereas individuals in the top richest 20% own assets that are about 7 times the average 
assets. However, within the 20%- 40%, 40%- 60% and 60%-80%, the gap in asset ownership is 
almost equal and is about 1.4 times on average between the groups.  
Regression results  
We estimated the relationship between financial inclusion and asset ownership using OLS and 
quantile regression. Following Huang et al. (2015), we control for individuals socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics such as marital status, gender, race, level of education, age, 
employment, geographic area, income status, household dependents and family size. Summary 
results are reported in Table 5.2 and Tables 5.4 – 5.7 at the end of the chapter report full results. 
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Table 5.2: Summary results of OLS and quantile regression 
 
OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Credit (1/0) 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
 (6.85) (4.87) (4.53) (5.06) (4.38) (4.03) (5.50) (5.10) (4.99) (4.66) 
Save (1/0) 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10** 0.12*** 
 (3.89) (3.19) (2.36) (3.09) (2.87) (2.66) (2.78) (2.60) (2.55) (2.95) 
Monthly 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 
Saving (1/0) (6.33) (4.21) (3.45) (4.83) (3.23) (3.73) (5.43) (5.57) (6.25) (4.31) 
Insurance 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
(1/0) (6.29) (4.60) (2.98) (6.33) (5.15) (3.42) (3.88) (4.84) (5.86) (5.11) 
 
Notes: t statistics in parenthesis  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: By authors 
Table 5.2 shows the summary results from OLS and quantile regression for the four aspects of 
financial inclusion analysed (credit, saving, monthly saving and insurance) with assets index as the 
dependent variable. The first column reports mean estimate from OLS and shows that financial 
inclusion (credit, general saving, monthly saving and insurance) has a positive relationship with 
asset ownership. These results are statistically significant at least at the 1% level. Holding all other 
factors constant, a one unit increase in access to credit is associated with a mean increase of 0.18 
units for individuals who borrow (formal and informal) compared to non-borrowers. A similar 
interpretation applies for the other aspects of financial inclusion. 
Quantile regression results 
Quantile regressions measure the change in a specified quantile of the dependent variable produced 
by a one unit change in the independent variable of interest. The interests in this analysis are those 
at the lower end of asset distribution and nine quantiles are estimated. Starting with credit and 
moving from the lower to upper quantile, the results indicate that financial inclusion has a positive 
relationship with asset ownership. The relationship is statistically significant at least at the 1% level 
and the magnitude of the estimated betas vary across all the deciles. Holding other factors constant, 
a one unit increase in access to credit can increase asset ownership by 21% at the 10th quantile, 16% 
at the 20th quantile, 12% at the 50th quantile and 17% at the 60th quantile of the conditional assets 
distribution for borrowers compared to non-borrowers. The response by individuals at the lower 
quantiles of the conditional assets distribution (10th to 30th) to a one unit increase in credit access on 
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asset ownership is higher than individuals at the 40th and median 50th quantiles. This is likely 
because those at the lower quantiles lack the means to acquire these basic assets and thus derive 
much benefit from any marginal increases in access to credit. Meanwhile, the low response by 
individuals at the 40th, median and 50th quantiles likely reflect the fact that they have acquired these 
basic assets. Hence, an increment in credit access does not add any incentive to acquire more of the 
same basic assets but such an increase in credit access may not be enough to acquire more luxury 
assets. Finally, the response of individuals at the upper quantiles (60th to 90th) is higher relative to 
those at the median because their basic assets needs have been met and the focus is shifting towards 
luxury wants. Consequently, a one unit increase in access to credit will increase the desire to 
acquire more luxury assets given their position on the conditional asset distribution.  
A second measure of financial inclusion analysed is saving at banks, nonbanks and informal saving 
per month. As the analysis revealed, a one unit increase in monthly saving can increase asset 
ownership by 20% at the 10th quantile, 15% at the 20th quantile, 13% at the median quantile and 
18% at the 60th quantile of the conditional asset distribution for savers compared to non-savers, 
holding all other factors constant. Again, the response by individuals at the lower quantile to an 
increment in monthly saving is higher probably because of the erratic nature of the income flow of 
this segment of the population compared to those with stable and reliable income sources. Hence, 
any opportunity to accumulate this lumpy savings per month can have a substantial positive effect 
on asset ownership particularly at the 10th quantile of the conditional asset distribution.  
The last aspect of financial inclusion analysed is insurance. The results again revealed that 
insurance and asset ownership are positively related. Just as the first two aspects analysed, the 
magnitude of the change in asset ownership is higher at the lower tail (10th, 20th and 30th quantiles) 
compared to the change at the median. This result demonstrates the importance of insurance to 
improve welfare thus supporting the results described in Chapter 4. As one moves from the lower 
quantile (10th) through to the upper quantile (90th), great heterogeneity exists in the change in asset 
ownership for all the aspects of financial inclusion analysed. This heterogeneity in the estimated 
slope coefficients reported for monthly saving and insurance has implications for asset building 
social policy. Specifically, the high magnitude of the relationship at the lower end of assets 
distribution suggests that marginal increases in financial inclusion can have a substantial effect on 
asset ownership at the lower tail. Consequently, asset building social welfare will be a viable 
strategy to complement the income transfer. Overall, this supports Adato et al.’s (2006) positive 
relationship between assets dynamic and poverty traps in South Africa. The authors identified 
dynamic assets thresholds in their analysis, which suggested to them that a large number of South 
Africans are trapped without a pathway out of poverty. The implications of the results of this study 
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are that well-designed incentives that encourage the poor to save, such as matched saving associated 
with asset building social policy, will have a long-term effect at the lower end of assets distribution. 
Encouraging the poor to save for post-secondary education and establishing asset building 
programmes such as individual development accounts and child development or child account at 
birth will give hope to the 11.9 million children currently receiving child support grants. It is likely 
that a greater proportion of them may face challenges financing post-secondary education and this 
can re-enforce intergenerational persistence of poverty and inequality. As a partial solution, the 
study recommends progressive asset building social welfare programmes as a complementary 
strategy to income transfer. That is, whilst assisting the poor and low-income families to smooth 
consumption, they should be incentivised through matched saving to save for post-secondary 
education of their children, purchase a house and start a small business using child account at birth / 
development account and individual development account. 
Assisting the poor to save for specific purposes such as starting a business, post-secondary 
education and buying a home has long-term implications to reducing the incidence of poverty and 
income inequality. Although empirical evidence on financial inclusion and asset ownership is still 
developing, available evidence from IDAs in the US shows that IDAs have a positive impact on 
education enrolment (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2013a). In addition, evidence from Ghanaian 
YouthSave showed that household asset possession has a positive effect on youth academic 
achievement (Chowa et al., 2013). Figure 5.4 shows a visual plot of dynamics across the quantiles.  
Figure 5.4: Visual plot of OLS and quantile regression results 
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The first block of Figure 5., reports mean estimates while the second to ninth blocks report 
estimation from the quantile regression for credit, saving, monthly saving and insurance. Monthly 
saving, credit and insurance display a u-shape relationship from the 30th to 80th quantile. 
Among the control variables used in the analysis, the level of income, education, geographic 
location and access as measured by distance to the nearest ATM or bank branch are important 
factors influencing individual asset ownership. For example, lower income has a negative 
relationship with individual asset ownership for the mean and across all the quantile regressions, 
whereas middle and high income have a positive relationship. Furthermore, primary or less and 
some high school education has a negative relationship with individual asset ownership whereas 
post-matric education is positively related to asset ownership. Thus, education and income are 
interrelated in that the level of education plays a vital role in determining at what price individuals 
will sell their skills in the labour market. This reiterates the importance of encouraging the poor and 
low-income families to save for post-secondary education of their children. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the relationship between financial inclusion and individual asset ownership 
in South Africa. Financial inclusion was captured by access to credit, saving, monthly saving and 
insurance, whereas a composite assets index derived using MCA from indicators of individual asset 
possession was used to measure individual asset ownership. The intention was to test the feasibility 
of asset building social welfare for South Africa using the FinScope 2014 using OLS and quantile 
regressions. Hence, the focus was on the change in individual asset ownership at the lower tail of 
the assets distribution. 
Overall, empirical analysis from mean estimator and quantile regression showed that the 
relationship between financial inclusion and asset ownership is positive and statistically significant 
at 1% level of significance across the entire assets distribution for all the measures of financial 
inclusion. This suggests that everyone, both poor and rich, can benefit from financial inclusion and 
asset building programmes. However, across the distribution, the change in asset ownership varies: 
higher at the lower tail (10th) quantile, lower at the median (50th) quantile and higher at the upper 
tail from the 60th quantile. As such, the poor and low-income families, some of whom may be first 
time users of the formal financial sector, may derive more satisfaction than frequent users such as 
the working class. This evidence provides a good case for progressive asset building social welfare 
programmes for the poor and low-income families in South Africa. With 11.9 million children 
currently receiving child support grants, the puzzle is whether income transfer alone can assist these 
children to break out of poverty.  
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The implications of this study are that social welfare in South Africa needs to extend beyond 
transfer and invest in capacity development of the poor. Asset building social policy that combines 
income transfer and asset building such as child development/saving accounts will help to provide a 
sustainable pathway out of poverty. This draws support from the empirical literature, which shows 
that financial inclusion, particularly savings, has a positive effect on welfare and economic 
outcomes (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Aportela, 1999; Bruhn and Love, 2013; Chiapa et al., 2015). 
Klapper et al. (2016) argued that achieving better education depends on the ability of individuals to 
invest in learning opportunities. Thus, given the direct link between economic growth and human 
capital, underinvestment in human capital undermines economic development. 
Table 5.1b: Summary statistics of control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Total household size 2,703 3.782 2.223 1 13 
Household size age 15 and older 2,703 2.701 1.447 1 12 
Gender 2,703 0.597 0.490 0 1 
Distance to the nearest bank branch from home 2,703 0.507 0.500 0 1 
Distance to the nearest ATM from home 2,703 0.609 0.488 0 1 
Geographical area 2,703 0.337 0.473 0 1 
Employed 2,703 0.452 0.498 0 1 
Full employed 2,703 0.326 0.469 0 1 
Part time employed 2,703 0.126 0.332 0 1 
Unemployed 2,703 0.267 0.442 0 1 
Log age 2,703 1.551 0.181 1.204 1.996 
Log age squared 2,703 2.440 0.564 1.450 3.983 
Low income 2,703 0.566 0.496 0 1 
Middle income 2,703 0.181 0.385 0 1 
High income 2,703 0.068 0.253 0 1 
Refused to answer 2,703 0.037 0.190 0 1 
Black 2,703 0.658 0.475 0 1 
Coloured 2,703 0.171 0.377 0 1 
Asian 2,703 0.048 0.216 0 1 
White 2,703 0.122 0.328 0 1 
Married 2,703 0.393 0.488 0 1 
Single 2,703 0.479 0.500 0 1 
Primary or less education 2,703 0.133 0.339 0 1 
High school education 2,703 0.425 0.494 0 1 
Post matric education 2,703 0.115 0.319 0 1 
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Table 5.3: List of household assets indicators used for the composite index 
Indicators Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Tap water in house or on property 3900 1.128 0.334 1 2 
Hot water from geyser 3900 1.536 0.499 1 2 
Flush toilet inside or outside 3900 1.240 0.427 1 2 
Built-in kitchen sink 3900 1.404 0.491 1 2 
Ordinary Telkom telephone 3900 1.895 0.307 1 2 
3 or more cell phones 3900 1.567 0.496 1 2 
More than 1 radio 3900 1.745 0.436 1 2 
TV set 3900 1.095 0.293 1 2 
Pay TV (m-net or top TV) 3900 1.581 0.494 1 2 
Air conditioner (not just a fan) 3900 1.921 0.271 1 2 
Any kind of DVD player 3900 1.357 0.479 1 2 
Home theatre 3900 1.584 0.493 1 2 
Personal computer 3900 1.775 0.417 1 2 
Fridge 3900 1.127 0.333 1 2 
Deep freezer 3900 1.676 0.468 1 2 
Electric stove 3900 1.099 0.299 1 2 
Microwave 3900 1.300 0.458 1 2 
Floor Polisher or vacuum cleaner 3900 1.746 0.435 1 2 
Washing machine 3900 1.508 0.500 1 2 
Tumble dryer 3900 1.860 0.347 1 2 
Dishwashing machine 3900 1.938 0.242 1 2 
Motor car 3900 1.640 0.480 1 2 
 
Source: FinScope 2014 consumer survey 
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Table 5.4: OLS and quantile regression for borrowing 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.6) Q(0.7) Q(0.8) Q(0.90) 
Credit (1/0) 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
 (6.85) (4.87) (4.53) (5.06) (4.38) (4.03) (5.50) (5.10) (4.99) (4.66) 
Total household size -0.02** 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03** -0.01 -0.03** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.03** 
 (-2.04) (0.16) (-0.60) (-1.48) (-2.35) (-1.28) (-2.38) (-2.75) (-2.37) (-2.02) 
Household size age 0.06*** 0.04 0.05* 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 
15 plus (4.10) (1.66) (2.07) (3.56) (4.05) (2.72) (3.89) (4.47) (4.37) (3.01) 
Full employment 0.15*** 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.17** 0.16** 0.09 
 (1/0) (2.83) (0.30) (1.03) (1.32) (1.49) (3.70) (2.92) (2.42) (2.37) (1.16) 
Part time employment 0.02 -0.16 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.00 
 (1/0) (0.41) (-1.45) (-0.77) (-0.62) (0.13) (1.44) (1.09) (0.62) (0.60) (0.01) 
Voluntary unemployed 0.27*** 0.18 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.17** 
 (1/0) (4.80) (1.46) (2.80) (2.73) (3.17) (5.08) (4.30) (3.72) (4.15) (2.01) 
Unemployed (1/0) 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.09* 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.13 
 (0.20) (-0.30) (0.41) (-0.02) (-0.02) (1.67) (0.70) (-0.17) (-0.54) (-1.55) 
Logage -5.38*** -2.24 -4.80*** -4.18** -4.81** -7.95*** -6.98*** -5.65*** -5.60*** -6.92*** 
 (-3.91) (-0.88) (-2.81) (-2.24) (-2.42) (-4.94) (-4.27) (-3.15) (-2.99) (-3.07) 
Logage squared 1.87*** 0.84 1.71*** 1.47** 1.67** 2.72*** 2.39*** 1.93*** 1.96*** 2.29*** 
 (4.19) (0.99) (3.07) (2.40) (2.54) (5.20) (4.56) (3.32) (3.31) (3.21) 
Low income (1/0) -0.33*** -0.23*** -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.29*** -0.37*** -0.39*** -0.56*** 
 (-8.65) (-3.53) (-4.88) (-4.39) (-5.49) (-5.78) (-6.10) (-6.55) (-6.46) (-7.83) 
Middle income (1/0) 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.18*** 0.16** -0.01 
 (4.61) (3.47) (5.00) (5.44) (5.69) (4.96) (4.49) (3.17) (2.28) (-0.10) 
High income (1/0) 0.52*** 0.70*** 0.72*** 0.68*** 0.65*** 0.60*** 0.53*** 0.45*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 
 (8.67) (4.39) (7.73) (7.50) (7.87) (7.94) (7.14) (6.66) (4.16) (2.99) 
Married (1/0)  -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
 (-0.64) (-0.36) (0.16) (0.32) (0.75) (0.79) (0.16) (-1.16) (-1.11) (-0.65) 
Single (1/0) -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 
 (-0.39) (-0.67) (-0.38) (-0.23) (0.19) (0.45) (0.16) (-0.93) (-0.31) (-0.41) 
Black (1/0) -0.66*** -0.73*** -0.74*** -0.76*** -0.67*** -0.65*** -0.61*** -0.57*** -0.54*** -0.42*** 
 (-13.08) (-6.19) (-10.86) (-13.63) (-12.27) (-12.40) (-10.97) (-9.50) (-8.26) (-4.56) 
White (1/0) 0.10* 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.12* 0.12* 0.16** 0.22** 
 (1.78) (0.20) (0.38) (0.56) (1.37) (1.63) (1.91) (1.88) (2.11) (2.17) 
Coloured (1/0) -0.33*** -0.38** -0.33*** -0.39*** -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.16* 
 (-6.20) (-2.93) (-4.68) (-6.65) (-6.00) (-5.73) (-5.01) (-4.40) (-3.77) (-1.71) 
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 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.6) Q(0.7) Q(0.8) Q(0.90) 
Post matric (1/0) 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 
 (6.57) (3.09) (5.47) (3.57) (4.87) (5.44) (5.57) (5.74) (4.29) (5.18) 
Distance to nearest  0.28*** 0.39*** 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 
ATM from home (1/0) (7.77) (6.76) (7.10) (5.92) (5.44) (5.49) (6.13) (4.97) (5.36) (5.77) 
Distance to nearest 0.11*** 0.06 0.09* 0.09** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.06 0.04 
Bank branch (1/0) (3.10) (0.91) (1.90) (2.21) (2.76) (3.10) (2.91) (2.63) (1.13) (0.85) 
Gender (1/0) 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06* 0.06* 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.05 
 (1.46) (0.47) (1.22) (1.75) (1.94) (1.36) (1.05) (0.95) (-0.04) (1.18) 
Primary or less -0.59*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.55*** -0.58*** -0.65*** -0.61*** 
Education (1/0) (-14.28) (-6.96) (-8.34) (-9.97) (-10.64) (-11.54) (-9.98) (-11.44) (-12.05) (-10.03) 
High school (1/0) -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.20*** 
 (-9.34) (-5.35) (-6.48) (-7.40) (-7.72) (-8.09) (-7.31) (-6.00) (-5.81) (-4.59) 
Geographical area  0.26*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 
 (1/0) (10.93) (6.25) (8.88) (8.68) (8.38) (10.18) (9.63) (8.15) (5.71) (3.76) 
Refuse to declare  0.12* 0.33*** 0.20* 0.17** 0.14* 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.00 
Income (1/0) (1.66) (3.64) (2.53) (2.15) (1.84) (1.21) (0.38) (0.32) (0.62) (-0.01) 
Constant  5.81*** 2.72 4.78*** 4.64*** 5.21*** 7.58*** 7.01*** 6.36*** 6.41*** 8.06*** 
 (5.62) (1.46) (3.77) (3.34) (3.57) (6.32) (5.65) (4.68) (4.44) (4.69) 
No. of observations 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 
R-square 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.65 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
120 
 
 
Table 5.5: OLS and quantile regression for saving 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.6) Q(0.7) Q(0.8) Q(0.90) 
Save (1/0) 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10** 0.12*** 
 (3.89) (3.19) (2.36) (3.09) (2.87) (2.66) (2.78) (2.60) (2.55) (2.95) 
Total household size -0.02** -0.00 -0.01 -0.02* -0.03** -0.01 -0.02* -0.03*** -0.03* -0.02* 
 (-2.00) (-0.08) (-0.58) (-1.64) (-2.43) (-1.48) (-1.87) (-3.01) (-1.83) (-1.68) 
Household size age 0.06*** 0.05* 0.05** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.04* 
15 plus (4.07) (1.79) (2.07) (3.01) (4.40) (3.32) (3.25) (4.25) (2.86) (1.91) 
Full employment (1/0) 0.16*** 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.17*** 0.17** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.10 
 (3.01) (0.01) (0.65) (1.53) (1.49) (2.82) (2.52) (3.43) (3.31) (1.32) 
Part time employment  0.02 -0.19* -0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.10 -0.05 
 (1/0) (0.36) (-1.77) (-1.17) (-0.12) (0.18) (1.05) (0.59) (1.05) (1.27) (-0.51) 
Voluntary unemployed 0.26*** 0.17 0.19* 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.11 
 (1/0) (4.71) (1.50) (1.93) (3.25) (3.21) (4.55) (3.95) (4.29) (3.99) (1.30) 
Unemployed (1/0) 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.15* 
 (0.14) (-0.52) (0.02) (0.11) (0.15) (0.99) (0.30) (0.60) (0.21) (-1.78) 
Log age -4.88*** -1.23 -4.06* -4.19** -4.46** -6.50*** -6.05*** -6.04*** -5.13** -6.68*** 
 (-3.53) (-0.50) (-1.92) (-2.24) (-2.24) (-3.93) (-3.97) (-3.41) (-2.06) (-3.53) 
Log age squared 1.72*** 0.53 1.45** 1.49** 1.56** 2.24*** 2.08*** 2.07*** 1.77** 2.21*** 
 (3.83) (0.66) (2.10) (2.46) (2.38) (4.14) (4.20) (3.64) (2.21) (3.69) 
Low income (1/0) -0.32*** -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.30*** -0.35*** -0.41*** -0.53*** 
 (-8.30) (-3.24) (-4.90) (-4.66) (-5.33) (-5.31) (-5.38) (-6.75) (-6.32) (-8.72) 
Middle income (1/0) 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.16* 0.02 
 (5.00) (3.33) (5.59) (5.16) (6.31) (6.12) (3.83) (3.55) (2.37) (0.37) 
High income (1/0) 0.53*** 0.69*** 0.74*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.41*** 0.27*** 
 (8.93) (6.20) (7.16) (6.77) (8.37) (9.07) (6.71) (7.03) (5.24) (3.67) 
Married (1/0) -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
 (-0.61) (-0.55) (-0.20) (-0.07) (0.67) (0.90) (0.77) (-0.72) (-1.19) (-0.21) 
Single (1/0) -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 
 (-0.31) (-0.76) (-0.72) (-0.61) (-0.04) (0.59) (0.24) (-0.77) (-0.46) (0.06) 
Black (1/0) -0.67*** -0.78*** -0.73*** -0.73*** -0.71*** -0.65*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.59*** -0.47*** 
 (-13.13) (-7.90) (-8.03) (-10.45) (-13.89) (-13.20) (-11.12) (-7.87) (-9.25) (-6.66) 
White (1/0) 0.10* 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.11** 0.17*** 0.14* 0.14* 0.21*** 
 (1.90) (0.56) (0.49) (0.66) (0.86) (1.97) (2.71) (1.81) (1.76) (3.08) 
Coloured (1/0) -0.34*** -0.41*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.26*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.18*** 
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 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.6) Q(0.7) Q(0.8) Q(0.90) 
 (-6.27) (-3.70) (-3.61) (-4.39) (-6.12) (-6.08) (-4.69) (-3.68) (-3.78) (-2.72) 
Post matric (1/0) 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.22** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.34*** 
 (6.21) (3.33) (3.87) (3.23) (4.71) (5.50) (5.16) (5.60) (3.90) (4.93) 
Distance to nearest 0.28*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 
ATM from home (1/0) (7.77) (6.12) (6.46) (5.97) (5.18) (5.60) (5.69) (6.39) (5.57) (4.85) 
Distance to nearest bank 0.11*** 0.07 0.11** 0.09** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.11** 0.08* 0.06 0.06 
Branch from home (1/0) (3.11) (1.18) (2.44) (2.00) (2.92) (3.26) (2.31) (1.92) (1.13) (1.01) 
Gender (1/0) 0.04* 0.03 0.06* 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (1.81) (0.74) (1.74) (1.18) (1.61) (0.95) (0.64) (1.18) (0.83) (0.89) 
Primary or less -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.53*** -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.62*** -0.60*** 
Education (1/0) (-14.32) (-7.16) (-8.55) (-10.32) (-9.96) (-12.19) (-12.24) (-11.96) (-10.54) (-9.47) 
High school (1/0) -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.17*** 
 (-9.34) (-4.77) (-6.47) (-7.10) (-8.18) (-8.49) (-8.07) (-6.93) (-5.30) (-4.03) 
Geographical area (1/0) 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 
 (11.13) (4.92) (9.11) (9.21) (8.88) (11.46) (9.52) (8.22) (5.35) (3.19) 
Refuse to declare income 0.13* 0.31*** 0.20** 0.12 0.13* 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.08 
 (1/0) (1.77) (3.53) (2.42) (1.35) (1.79) (1.00) (0.89) (0.17) (0.51) (0.45) 
Constant  5.44*** 2.00 4.32*** 4.63*** 4.98*** 6.53*** 6.37*** 6.62*** 6.20*** 7.94*** 
 (5.24) (1.10) (2.79) (3.26) (3.38) (5.34) (5.59) (4.86) (3.30) (5.45) 
No. of observations 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 
R-square 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.64 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 5.6: OLS and quantile regression for monthly saving 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.6) Q(0.7) Q(0.8) Q(0.90) 
Monthly saving (1/0) 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 
 (6.33) (4.21) (3.45) (4.83) (3.23) (3.73) (5.43) (5.57) (6.25) (4.31) 
Total household size -0.02** 0.00 -0.01 -0.02* -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
 (-2.07) (0.09) (-0.54) (-1.78) (-1.98) (-1.20) (-1.43) (-3.17) (-2.66) (-3.06) 
Household size age  0.06*** 0.05 0.06** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
15 plus (4.12) (1.47) (2.43) (3.45) (3.89) (2.90) (3.10) (4.02) (3.55) (3.50) 
Full employment (1/0) 0.13** 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.17*** 0.15** 0.16** 0.17** 0.17* 
 (2.43) (0.01) (0.78) (0.61) (1.26) (2.74) (2.30) (2.37) (2.37) (1.80) 
Part time employment (1/0) 0.01 -0.17 -0.13 -0.08 -0.01 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.01 
 (0.10) (-1.34) (-1.12) (-1.04) (-0.17) (1.31) (0.65) (0.21) (0.85) (0.08) 
Voluntary unemployment 0.27*** 0.15 0.21** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.22** 
 (1/0) (4.78) (1.32) (2.11) (2.80) (3.57) (4.61) (4.23) (4.47) (3.82) (2.38) 
Unemployed (1/0) 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.10 
 (0.26) (-0.37) (0.09) (-0.04) (-0.07) (1.41) (0.48) (0.39) (0.34) (-1.14) 
Log age -4.17*** -1.67* -3.27 -3.13 -3.69* -6.29*** -6.03*** -4.12** -3.43 -4.88** 
 (-2.97) (-0.57) (-1.47) (-1.54) (-1.90) (-3.69) (-3.81) (-2.39) (-1.48) (-2.57) 
Log age squared 1.48** 0.66 1.19 1.12* 1.29** 2.17*** 2.06*** 1.42** 1.25* 1.70** 
 (3.24) (0.68) (1.63) (1.69) (2.03) (3.91) (4.02) (2.56) (1.67) (2.83) 
Low income (1/0) -0.33*** -0.22** -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.36*** -0.46*** -0.54*** 
 (-8.33) (-2.57) (-5.26) (-4.29) (-5.10) (-5.39) (-5.15) (-6.57) (-6.76) (-7.60) 
Middle income (1/0) 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.13* -0.00 
 (5.11) (3.71) (5.07) (5.77) (6.87) (6.23) (4.71) (3.70) (1.86) (-0.04) 
High income (1/0) 0.52*** 0.64*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.62*** 0.49*** 0.36*** 0.21** 
 (8.14) (4.70) (6.54) (7.16) (9.01) (8.70) (8.31) (6.51) (4.22) (2.49) 
Married (1/0) -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 
 (-0.42) (-0.69) (-0.24) (0.52) (0.13) (0.87) (0.22) (-0.79) (-0.02) (-0.12) 
Single (1/0) -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.05 
 (-0.17) (-0.62) (-0.66) (-0.07) (-0.23) (0.31) (0.26) (-1.08) (0.53) (0.62) 
Black (1/0) -0.65*** -0.73*** -0.71*** -0.75*** -0.68*** -0.64*** -0.58*** -0.52*** -0.57*** -0.43*** 
 (-12.54) (-3.90) (-9.83) (-10.97) (-13.72) (-12.70) (-10.89) (-9.02) (-8.01) (-5.46) 
White (1/0) 0.14** 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.11* 0.14** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 
 (2.45) (0.77) (1.01) (0.92) (1.82) (2.38) (3.20) (3.47) (2.87) (3.60) 
Coloured (1/0) -0.30*** -0.40** -0.28*** -0.34*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.26*** -0.11 
 (-5.55) (-2.08) (-3.83) (-4.90) (-5.70) (-5.57) (-4.40) (-3.39) (-3.28) (-1.41) 
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 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.6) Q(0.7) Q(0.8) Q(0.90) 
Post matric (1/0) 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.34*** 
 (5.96) (3.59) (4.46) (3.66) (4.37) (4.63) (4.98) (4.81) (4.31) (3.61) 
Distance to nearest ATM 0.28*** 0.39*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
From home (1/0) (7.75) (5.85) (6.93) (5.72) (5.18) (6.15) (6.55) (5.90) (4.74) (5.60) 
Distance to nearest bank 0.10*** 0.06 0.08* 0.09* 0.09* 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.08 0.04 
Branch from home (1/0) (2.95) (0.96) (1.81) (1.85) (1.75) (3.20) (2.58) (2.59) (1.34) (0.85) 
Gender (1/0) 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
 (1.31) (0.64) (1.36) (1.19) (0.97) (0.57) (0.36) (0.27) (1.32) (1.03) 
Primary or less education  -0.57*** -0.53*** -0.55*** -0.53*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.65*** 
 (1/0) (-13.63) (-6.66) (-7.82) (-8.79) (-9.70) (-11.12) (-11.00) (-10.97) (-10.11) (-9.48) 
High school (1/0) -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.20*** 
 (-8.71) (-4.29) (-5.99) (-5.96) (-7.66) (-8.14) (-7.93) (-5.86) (-4.30) (-4.15) 
Geographical area (1/0) 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 
 (10.90) (4.66) (8.59) (9.05) (9.01) (9.97) (10.39) (8.38) (5.66) (3.11) 
Refuse to declared income 0.11 0.35*** 0.14* 0.14* 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.03 -0.05 0.17 
 (1/0) (1.53) (3.27) (1.89) (1.78) (1.38) (0.41) (0.87) (0.34) (-0.31) (1.44) 
Constant  4.86*** 2.26 3.68** 3.82** 4.41*** 6.34*** 6.32*** 5.14*** 4.71*** 6.20*** 
 (4.61) (1.02) (2.25) (2.52) (3.09) (5.00) (5.36) (3.94) (2.66) (4.30) 
No. of observations 2564.00 2564.00 2564.00 2564.00 2564.00 2564.00 2564.00 2564.00 2564.00 2564.00 
R-square 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.64 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 5.7: OLS and quantile regression for insurance 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.6) Q(0.7) Q(0.8) Q(0.90) 
Insurance (1/0) 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (6.29) (4.60) (2.98) (6.33) (5.15) (3.42) (3.88) (4.84) (5.86) (5.11) 
Total household size -0.02** 0.00 -0.01 -0.02* -0.03** -0.02* -0.02* -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
 (-2.20) (0.23) (-0.83) (-1.84) (-2.46) (-1.64) (-1.90) (-2.07) (-2.30) (-2.04) 
Household size age 0.06*** 0.05* 0.05** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
15 plus (4.20) (1.71) (2.45) (3.89) (3.88) (3.12) (3.20) (3.51) (3.80) (2.68) 
Full employment (1/0) 0.20*** 0.12 0.10 0.15** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.10 
 (3.72) (1.58) (1.11) (2.15) (2.84) (3.63) (3.35) (4.80) (4.17) (1.62) 
Part time employment 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.11 -0.05 
 (0.93) (-0.80) (-0.51) (0.67) (1.02) (1.38) (1.07) (1.54) (1.57) (-0.65) 
Voluntary unemployment 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.09 
 (1/0) (5.13) (3.14) (2.62) (3.40) (4.51) (4.90) (4.33) (4.55) (4.46) (1.22) 
Unemployed (1/0) 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.19** 
 (0.90) (0.93) (0.51) (0.94) (1.30) (1.48) (1.19) (1.37) (0.35) (-2.54) 
Log age (1/0) -5.67*** -3.78 -4.08** -4.35** -6.40*** -7.39*** -6.91*** -7.09*** -7.07*** -6.04*** 
 (-4.10) (-1.45) (-1.96) (-2.52) (-3.09) (-4.53) (-3.97) (-4.61) (-3.62) (-3.34) 
Log age squared (1/0) 1.95*** 1.37* 1.44** 1.49*** 2.18*** 2.53*** 2.36*** 2.41*** 2.39*** 1.98*** 
 (4.35) (1.64) (2.12) (2.64) (3.19) (4.76) (4.15) (4.94) (3.82) (3.43) 
Low income (1/0) -0.32*** -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.20*** -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.29*** -0.34*** -0.40*** -0.53*** 
 (-8.27) (-3.50) (-4.65) (-4.45) (-6.79) (-5.35) (-5.02) (-6.66) (-6.77) (-8.55) 
Middle income (1/0) 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.39*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.16** 0.01 
 (4.95) (3.43) (5.83) (5.44) (5.78) (6.16) (3.95) (3.70) (2.62) (0.20) 
High income (1/0) 0.53*** 0.70*** 0.79*** 0.66*** 0.59*** 0.65*** 0.55*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.29*** 
 (8.86) (6.21) (9.21) (7.71) (7.86) (8.94) (6.17) (6.86) (6.34) (3.54) 
Married (1/0) -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 
 (-0.23) (-0.44) (-0.17) (0.21) (1.21) (0.86) (0.04) (-0.78) (0.06) (-0.45) 
Single (1/0) -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.04 
 (-0.13) (-0.59) (-0.85) (-0.35) (0.06) (0.31) (-0.19) (-0.72) (0.42) (0.52) 
Black (1/0) -0.69*** -0.84*** -0.76*** -0.78*** -0.72*** -0.66*** -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.60*** -0.51*** 
 (-13.58) (-9.75) (-9.39) (-13.03) (-13.18) (-12.53) (-10.86) (-9.93) (-10.86) (-7.36) 
White (1/0) 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.13* 0.11* 0.05 0.17** 
 (1.28) (-0.05) (-0.16) (0.23) (0.92) (1.27) (1.91) (1.70) (0.73) (2.34) 
Coloured (1/0) -0.37*** -0.48*** -0.36*** -0.41*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.21*** 
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 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.6) Q(0.7) Q(0.8) Q(0.90) 
 (-6.84) (-5.12) (-4.46) (-6.75) (-6.44) (-6.29) (-5.25) (-5.01) (-4.80) (-3.08) 
Post matric (1/0) 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.35*** 
 (6.62) (4.25) (4.62) (5.08) (4.63) (4.77) (4.66) (6.00) (5.10) (5.53) 
Distance to nearest ATM 0.29*** 0.41*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 
From home (1/0) (8.07) (6.86) (6.78) (6.85) (5.60) (5.35) (5.36) (6.12) (5.90) (5.02) 
Distance to nearest bank 0.10*** 0.03 0.08 0.07* 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.08 0.08* 0.09** 0.03 
Branch from home (1/0) (2.91) (0.54) (1.62) (1.83) (3.23) (2.90) (1.43) (1.93) (2.10) (0.66) 
Gender (1/0) 0.04* 0.04 0.05 0.07** 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 
 (1.68) (0.93) (1.46) (2.11) (1.28) (0.92) (1.09) (1.07) (0.31) (0.94) 
Primary or less education -0.59*** -0.61*** -0.54*** -0.55*** -0.58*** -0.59*** -0.61*** -0.65*** -0.61*** -0.61*** 
 (1/0) (-14.41) (-7.56) (-7.69) (-11.01) (-11.24) (-12.07) (-11.37) (-11.75) (-10.13) (-11.87) 
High school (1/0) -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.16*** 
 (-9.53) (-5.34) (-6.45) (-8.89) (-8.47) (-8.33) (-7.95) (-6.70) (-5.44) (-3.97) 
Geographical area (1/0) 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 
 (11.59) (6.41) (8.20) (9.11) (10.51) (11.76) (9.50) (8.40) (5.42) (3.42) 
Refuse to declared income 0.13* 0.31*** 0.15 0.14** 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.14 
 (1.80) (3.41) (1.49) (2.00) (0.78) (1.16) (0.76) (0.60) (1.27) (1.20) 
Constant  6.01*** 3.74* 4.33*** 4.77*** 6.39*** 7.14*** 7.03*** 7.39*** 7.59*** 7.46*** 
 (5.80) (1.87) (2.85) (3.71) (4.20) (5.90) (5.43) (6.09) (5.10) (5.39) 
No. of observations 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 2703.00 
R-square 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.64 
 
Notes:  t statistics in parentheses  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
There are growing bodies of empirical evidence showing that financial development is essential for 
economic growth: unlocking the entrepreneurial abilities of the poor and thereby leading to a 
reduction in poverty and income inequality (King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 2005; Aziakpono, 
2011; Beck et al., 2007a). However, the financial sector in many SSA countries remains largely 
underdeveloped despite massive financial reforms in the 1980s to transform the sector. For 
example, private sector credit as a ratio of GDP in SSA has been below 25% since the 1990s and 
the number of adults 15 years and older with formal bank account increased by 10% to 34% in 2014 
including mobile money accounts (Allen et al., 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
available empirical evidence shows that broader financial access reduces poverty and income 
inequality (Beck et al., 2007a; Burgess and Pande, 2005; Bruhn and Love, 2013; Allen et al., 2012). 
This has intensified the call to broaden financial access to all by international and domestic 
development practitioners and policy makers because greater financial inclusion also influences 
other core aspects of the financial system (Cull et al., 2012; Chiwira et al., 2013; Mehrotra and 
Yetman, 2015; Khan, 2011). Hence, one would expect developed financial systems and greater 
financial access to be associated with improvements in well-being. For example, reducing poverty 
and income inequality and unlocking the entrepreneurial potential of poor talented individuals 
would support inclusive economic growth. However, this is not the case in SSA because poverty 
and income inequality has remained stubbornly high after a decade and a half of robust economic 
growth. Furthermore, the shortage of empirical evidence linking financial development to welfare 
as well as between financial inclusion and welfare makes it difficult to evaluate the effect of 
financial systems on welfare in SSA. The few available studies, particularly on financial 
development and welfare as measured by the Gini coefficient in Africa, have some methodology 
limitations. Meanwhile, evidence from the access dimension of financial systems is scant and 
comes mostly from microfinance activities, making it difficult to generalise findings because 
microfinance provides selected access. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between financial development, financial 
inclusion and welfare dynamics in SSA. This is broken down into four specific objectives. The first 
objective was broken down into two sections: the first section demonstrated the linkages between 
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financial inclusion and the other core aspect of the financial system, and the second section gave a 
comparative analysis of the level of financial inclusion across regions in SSA. The second main 
objective focused on the long-run relationship between financial development and income 
inequality for a selected group of 15 African countries (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Lesotho, Morocco, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tunisia 
and Uganda) from 1985 to 2007 using the Standardised World Income Inequality dataset created by 
Solt (2009). This objective employed the augmented mean group (AMG) to examine this 
relationship. The strength of the AMG is its ability to account for country-specific heterogeneity as 
opposed to the homogeneous slope coefficient reported by previous studies on this topic. Hence, 
this objective addressed the methodological limitation cited earlier by reporting country-specific 
parameters of the relationship between financial development and income inequality. The third 
objective investigated the relationship between financial inclusion and welfare in a cross-section of 
37 SSA countries using the Global Findex 2011. Cross-sectional regression analysis was performed 
due to the nature of the data available. However, the advantage of the Global Findex dataset is the 
ease of comparability across countries, thus addressing the problem of generalisation raised earlier. 
The last objective examined the relationship between financial inclusion and asset ownership in 
South Africa using the FinScope 2014 consumer survey. This last objective focused on South 
Africa for two reasons. Firstly, there is a lack of data on financial inclusion and assets ownership 
across SSA countries. Secondly, availability of suitable and quality financial inclusion data with 
sufficient indicators of assets ownership at the individual level that can be used to proxy such a 
relationship. This made South Africa a perfect choice to deepen the understanding of the 
relationship between financial inclusion and welfare as proxied by assets ownership. Since the 
interest is on individuals at the bottom end of asset ownership, quantile regression was used to 
examine this relationship. This objective provided more insights on how asset ownership by 
individuals at the bottom of the asset distribution changes with changes in the level of financial 
inclusion.  
This chapter accomplishes three purposes. Firstly, it provides a general summary of the key results 
of the study presented in Chapters 2 to 5. Secondly, it highlights the policy implications of the 
results, and lastly it offers some policy recommendations. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This section summarises key findings concerning the level of financial inclusion across regions in 
SSA, the long-run relationship between financial development and income inequality in Africa, and 
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the relationship between financial inclusion and welfare in SSA. Finally, the section discusses some 
possible implications of the results. 
6.2.1  Financial inclusion, financial stability, financial integrity and financial consumer 
protection 
The study started by demonstrating the linkages between financial inclusion and other core aspects 
of the financial system. The emerging evidence clearly showed that financial inclusion is 
interrelated in several ways with financial stability, financial integrity and financial consumer 
protection. This implies that attempts to boost one of these aspects automatically strengthens the 
others. For example, greater financial inclusion brings more people into the formal financial sector, 
which is likely to increase aggregate savings and diversify the deposits base as well as the loan 
portfolio of banks. This makes banks more resilient to systemic risk, therefore enhancing financial 
stability, which in turn positively influences the integrity of the financial system. The same analogy 
applies to the other aspects: financial integrity, financial stability and financial consumer protection. 
Secondly, evidence from the descriptive analysis on access to account, credit and saving at formal 
financial institutions showed great variation and huge unmet demand for financial services across 
all the regions in SSA. On average, about 54.5% of adults 15 years and older initiated a new loan in 
SSA in 2014 but only 6% borrowed from the formal financial sector. Across the regions, the rate of 
formal saving and borrowing in Southern, East and non-French-speaking West Africa (Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Mauritania) is about twice as high as the rate in French-speaking West 
Africa and Central African countries. It also emerged from the analysis that French-speaking 
African countries lack basic institutional structures to support and empower consumers, and this 
correlates with the low level of financial inclusion observed in French-speaking countries. 
6.2.2 Financial development and income inequality in Africa 
The emerging evidence suggest that the relationship between financial development and income 
inequality in the group of African countries studied is non-linear and varies between inverted u-
shape and u-shape depending on the measure of financial development. Specifically, the analysis 
found no evidence to suggest that financial development reduces income inequality (negative linear 
relationship) except for Côte d’Ivoire where bank deposits was used as a measure of financial 
development. 
When domestic credit to GDP was used as a measure of financial development, the inverted u-
shape hypothesis of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) was at least 5% statistically significant in 
Botswana and Lesotho. If financial development is measured as bank deposits to GDP, the inverted 
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u-shape was confirmed in Botswana and Rwanda. This suggests that the financial sector is still at 
the early stages of development, and as such is associated with rising income inequality. 
Furthermore, both measures of financial development found evidence of a u-shape relationship 
between financial development and income inequality in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Uganda. This suggests that financial development will reduce 
income inequality even at the early stages of financial development up to certain levels where 
further financial development increases income inequality. Clarke et al. (2006) termed the point at 
which further financial development increases income inequality as the inequality-widening 
hypothesis. The results also suggested that the level of economic development influenced income 
inequality. The Kuznets (1955) inverted u-shape relationship between income inequality and GDP 
per capita was supported only in Lesotho, Botswana and Uganda using both measures of financial 
development. These results suggested that income inequality increased at lower levels of GDP per 
capita and declined at higher levels of GDP per capita. These results therefore echoed the 
limitations to impose the homogenous slope assumption in long-run analysis and emphasised the 
importance of country-specific analysis in long panel data. Finally, the u-shape relationship is 
likely to capture the banking and financial crises of the 1980s and late 1990s triggered by ongoing 
financial reforms that falls within the period of study (1985-2007).  
6.2.3  The relationship between financial inclusion and welfare in sub-Saharan Africa 
The empirical evidence suggested that some aspects of financial inclusion exerted more influence 
on welfare than others, and that financial inclusion may negatively influence welfare in the short 
run. Firstly, financial inclusion was found to have a positive influence on the composite HDI 
through account ownership, electronic payment and formal loan and saving. However, the results 
from electronic payment were both positive and negative, which was expected as financial inclusion 
can induce some users into indebtedness. Meanwhile, the evidence from formal loan and saving 
were not robust as the majority of the models estimated were positive but not statistically 
significant.  
Nevertheless, if one examines the relationship between financial inclusion and a single measure of 
welfare, the picture looks different. For example, the results showed that health insurance and loans 
to pay school fees reduced the headcount poverty ratio, and the magnitude of results was higher in 
rural areas. The results further showed that account ownership, health insurance and formal loan 
reduced under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births. Therefore, to enhance economic welfare, 
policies to improve access and use of these aspects of financial inclusion should be encouraged. 
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That is, access to account ownership, health insurance, formal loans and loan to pay school fees are 
essential to reduce the poverty headcount ratio and the under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births 
in rural areas. 
Lastly, income inequality showed a positive relationship with account use for business purposes, 
electronic payment and formal saving. This implies that financial inclusion increases income 
inequality at least in the short run and this finding is almost similar to the u-shape discussed in 
Section 6.2.2. Several factors including current urban practice and governance, colonial institutions 
and excess liquidity in the banking sector of SSA are likely to drive this positive relationship. 
However, the positive relationship can be a short-run phenomenon but it will depend on future 
access and the productivity of labour. If few people gained financial access, the spillover will be 
small and the relationship may prevail for longer. Nevertheless, the positive relationship seems to 
confirm the prevailing situation in SSA: robust economic growth for over a decade and a half and 
rising income inequality.  
6.2.4 The relationship between financial inclusion and individual asset ownership in South 
Africa 
The results showed that financial inclusion has a positive relationship with asset ownership and that 
great heterogeneity existed between asset ownership at the lower and upper tails of the income 
strata. The magnitude of estimated coefficients for individuals at the bottom quantiles (10th, 20th and 
30th) of the asset distribution was higher than the median asset ownership, an indication that asset 
building social welfare programmes will disproportionately benefit the poor. Meanwhile, the weak 
response by individuals at the 40th, median and 50th quantiles was likely to reflect the fact that they 
have acquired these basic assets. Hence, an increment in financial access does not add any incentive 
to acquire more of the same assets and these individuals may not be rich enough to acquire more 
luxury assets.  
With a well-developed financial sector and a functioning social welfare system, these results 
suggest that asset-building programmes will be a suitable complementary strategy to fortify the 
income transfer approach to poverty alleviation. That is, well-designed incentives that encourage 
the poor to save through “matched savings” associated with asset building social policies will have 
a long-term effect at the lower end of asset ownership. The benefits of encouraging the poor to save 
for post-secondary education of their children outweigh the costs of not doing so as this is likely to 
give hope to the 11.9 million children currently receiving child support grants. It is obvious that 
these children may face challenges financing post-secondary education. If proper strategies are not 
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in place to ensure capacity development and empowerment of the poor and low-income families, 
high demands on the fiscal budget are likely in the near future. The labour force participation rate 
may fall, thus narrowing the tax base while poverty, social unrest and widening of income 
inequality will continue to persist. 
6.2.5  Synthesis of results and policy implications 
The results discussed above bear some resemblance to the current influence that the financial 
sectors in SSA exert on welfare: robust economic growth with rising income inequality and sluggish 
decline in the headcount poverty ratios. They also highlight some areas that authorities should focus 
attention on, to strengthen the influence of the financial system to serve as the engine of growth and 
welfare enhancement. 
First, financial inclusion interacts with financial stability, financial integrity and financial consumer 
protection. This suggests that any weaknesses/strengthening in one dimension automatically affects 
the others, either negatively or positively. Within this framework, it emerged that French-speaking 
West and Central African countries seriously lack basic financial consumer protection structures 
and this affects financial integrity in the region. Hence, French-speaking African countries have the 
lowest level of access to formal accounts, saving and credit compared to non-French-speaking West 
Africa, Southern and East Africa.  
The authorities in these regions will have to take the necessary remedial actions such as building 
institutional structures and human capital to support financial consumer protection. Once there are 
checks and balances in place to ensure that financial services providers do not use their 
informational advantage to exploit consumers and those consumers are fully aware of the benefits 
and risks of using financial services, uptake will increase. Furthermore, to circumvent the high cost 
of delivery of financial services in rural areas because of long distances, policy makers should 
encourage partnership between banks and telecommunication companies to provide financial 
services through mobile money. 
Secondly, the u-shape relationship between financial development and income inequality in Africa 
closely mirrors the prevailing rising levels of income inequality with over a decade and a half of 
robust economic growth. The period studied (1985 to 2007) coincides with the ‘lost decade’ in 
Africa characterised by banking and financial crises, and our results capture the true outcome of 
these reforms on welfare. Apart from the u-shape, the level of GDP per capita also influenced 
income inequality and this partly reflects Africa’s current development and growth strategy that 
focuses more on the formal sector.  
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An important policy intervention will be to account for the high level of informality of most African 
economies by connecting the informal to the formal sector through improvements in the quality of 
basic services. Second tier banking or specialist formal financial institutions are possible options to 
increase financial outreach in the rural areas. Banking and financial crises should be avoided as 
much as possible by undertaking a due diligence evaluation of new proposals for financial reforms 
before they are implemented as well as taking ownership of reforms. However, this depends on 
whether there is sufficient human capacity to properly evaluate, monitor and run such institutions. 
This again highlights the importance of loans to pay school fees discussed earlier. The role of 
technology and innovation also comes into play to ameliorate deficient physical infrastructure on 
the continent. 
Thirdly, some aspects of financial inclusion are instrumental in enhancing welfare, whereas other 
aspects have a negative effect on income inequality. This speaks to the need for tailor-made 
delivery of financial services. For example, personal health insurance and loans to pay school fees 
displayed a negative relationship with the poverty headcount ratio. Furthermore, formal account 
ownership, health insurance and formal loans were found to reduce the under-five mortality rate per 
1,000 live births. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients across the population segment were 
quite high. This clearly demonstrates the importance of micro-insurance for the poor and the need 
for government to build public trust in the financial system to increase uptake and use of financial 
access. Furthermore, where possible the government should incentivise public private sector 
initiatives to encourage loans for vocational training, particularly in the rural areas and among 
women where poverty is persistent. A second aspect of this result was that financial inclusion 
increased income inequality and this possibly reflected the lack of financial outreach and some 
institutional weaknesses such as limited focus on the formal sector to drive growth. As discussed 
earlier, holistic approaches that consider the importance role of the informal sector will be a viable 
policy intervention to enhance full participation of all spheres of the economy in the growth 
process. 
Finally, financial inclusion showed a strong positive relationship with individual asset ownership at 
the lower quantiles of the asset distribution function and this has implications for social policy in 
South Africa. Generally, this means that encouraging asset ownership at the lower tail of the asset 
distribution through asset building social welfare policies will improve the welfare of those at the 
bottom of the income pyramid. For South Africa, with about 16.9 million people currently 
depending solely on income transfer, it signals the need to start thinking beyond transfers and 
investing in capacity development of the poor. This can work through asset building programmes 
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such as child accounts at birth, child development accounts and individual development accounts. 
Through any of these programmes, the government can incentivise low-income families to save for 
a particular purpose through matched deposits and access to such matched deposits is restricted 
until maturity. Specifically, a progressive asset building social policy that combines income transfer 
with asset building will offer a sustainable pathway out of poverty for the poor and low-income 
families. At maturity, invested funds must be used for down payment on a house, to pay for post-
secondary education or to start a small business. Asset building programmes have delivered positive 
results on poverty and vulnerability in Uganda and Zimbabwe as well as changing youth saving 
behaviours in Ghana. Unless attempted, it will be difficult to predict the outcome but the chances of 
success are high given the state of financial sector development and effective social welfare system 
in South Africa. 
However, the challenge will be to ensure that invested funds are not diverted into other uses not 
related to asset building social welfare and the possibility of leakages. One option is to use a 
bottom-up strategy where the participants in the community own the project and this will ensure 
their full commitment, another option will be to enforce a monitoring and evaluation strategy. 
Furthermore, the compulsory financial literacy and management skill training component attached 
to asset building social welfare if manage effective, is likely to influence financial attitude and 
behaviour. 
6.3 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Overall, this study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. Firstly, it provides a 
comprehensive comparable analysis of the level of financial inclusion across regions in SSA. 
Previous studies have failed to analyse the contribution of each country and region to the high level 
of financial exclusion in SSA. This study fills the gap by separating French-speaking West and 
Central African countries from non-French-speaking countries and showed that French-speaking 
West and Central Africa have the lowest level of financial inclusion in SSA. 
Secondly, the augmented mean group (AMG) technique was to model the long-run relationship 
between financial development and income inequality and this provided another contribution to 
empirical modelling. Unlike previous studies that assume homogeneity of long-run slope 
coefficients across countries, AMG has the advantage that it provides country-specific estimates, 
thereby accounting for heterogeneity across countries, and is robust to cross-sectional dependence. 
Thus, instead of averaging the data arbitrarily, this study investigates the time series properties of 
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the data and applies macro-panel time series techniques in the analysis. This process avoids the risk 
of reporting unstable and biased estimated slope coefficients. 
Thirdly, this study explored the relationship between various aspects of financial inclusion and 
welfare using a dataset that is comparable across countries. This objective therefore provided more 
insights on which aspects of financial inclusion should be encouraged and for which segment of the 
population, contributing to enhanced targeted policy interventions. Furthermore, the study deepens 
this analysis using individual survey data to explore the relationship between financial inclusion and 
asset ownership in South Africa. By focusing on the changes in asset ownership for those at the 
bottom end of the asset distribution function, the study demonstrates the importance of asset 
building as a complementary strategy to the income transfer to assist the poor to escape poverty.  
Apart from filling the gaps in the empirical literature, the current study has some limitations. One 
such limitation relates to the nature of available data on the demand and supply sides of financial 
services at the individual/household level. The global financial inclusion (Global Findex) dataset, 
which is the first comprehensive survey data on the demand and supply sides of financial services, 
is not yet available as a panel. Hence, the data is suitable for cross-sectional analysis and not for 
sophisticated econometric modelling. Consequently, as the dataset develops into a panel, it will be 
necessary in the future to re-examine this relationship. The interpretation of the results was linked 
with the excess liquidity in the banking sector in SSA. However, excess liquidity was not the focus 
of this study, and accordingly is suggested as area for future studies to enhance understanding of 
how this affects access to and use of financial services in SSA. 
Another limitation of the study comes from cross-sectional (N) and time (T) dimensions of the 
panel data used in the modelling. While 15 countries and 23 years are large enough to carry out 
analysis, the numbers of control variables included are limited because of the degrees of freedom. 
As such, the relationship should be re-examined as more data become available across countries. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the u-shape relationship between financial development and 
income inequality was linked to banking and financial crises, but the study did not control for this 
and future studies can model this effect on income inequality in SSA.  
Finally, financial inclusion and asset ownership is still a new area of empirical research and this is 
encouraging but data on asset building programmes, particularly in South Africa, is a challenge. 
However, further research is required using any rich financial inclusion dataset at 
household/individual level with sufficient indicators of assets to increase understanding on how 
financial inclusion can be used to raise the poor above the poverty level. 
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6.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In summary, emerging evidence suggests that financial development in the group of African 
countries examined does not lead to reduction in income inequality. There is strong evidence that 
greater financial development benefits the rich rather than the poor, lending more to rich households 
and neglecting the poor and under-served who cannot provide collateral, and this can be persistent 
in a weak institutional environment. This produces an initial decline in income inequality, giving 
rise to the u-shape relationship where later stages of financial development may be responsible for a 
widening in inequality. For two countries, the study found that income inequality increases at the 
early stages of financial development but as the financial sector develops further, the positive trend 
reverses into a negative trend. Furthermore, while some aspects of financial inclusion exert a 
positive influence on welfare such as the poverty headcount ratio and the under-five mortality rate 
per 1,000 live births, income inequality was found to have a positive relationship with financial 
inclusion. This may be due to the limited number of people with access to formal credit, and the 
situation is even worse in the informal sectors. Other factors include weak competition among 
banks and deficiencies in physical and financial infrastructure, which increase information 
asymmetry and risk of moral hazard.  
However, the recent technological innovation in Africa is addressing some of the challenges to 
delivery of financial services to the poor and in rural areas. Nevertheless, a concerted effort is 
needed to develop supporting institutions, build human capital and create an enabling regulatory 
and supervisory environment to promote effective competition that will encourage wider financial 
inclusion.  
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